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 i 
Abstracts 
A multiple case study of four foreign franchisors was conducted in 2000 to study the 
critical success factors of international franchising in East Asia.  The four franchisors 
were chosen because they possess different international franchising capabilities and 
are at varying levels of internationalisation.  This study provides a useful insight into 
how a foreign franchisor should approach and compete successfully in East Asia.  
Firstly, the research provides a conceptual model, which displays the six key 
categories and success factors for international franchising in East Asia.  The study 
has made a significant contribution in identifying two new categories that have mostly 
been neglected by researchers in international franchising.  Secondly, the study 
reveals a unique form of master franchising that is being practiced in East Asia.  
Thirdly, the effective management of Asian partners is found to begin with recruiting 
the right partners with the desired characteristics and subsequently developing a long-
term mutually beneficial working relationship with the partners.  Finally, successful 
franchisors were found to believe strongly in the power of branding and niche 
marketing in East Asia.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As a business model, franchising has experienced a significant increase in popularity 
throughout the world over the past three decades.  Commencing from the 1970s, 
franchising has grown to represent nearly one-third of United States (U.S.) domestic 
sales (Boe, Ginalski and Henward III, 1987).  In 1990 it totaled approximately 
US$700 billion of sales (Hogan, 1990; Steinberg, 1991).  The majority of this growth 
has been attributed to “business format franchising” (Chan and Soon, 1992; Felstead, 
1994).  Business format franchising requires the franchisee replicate, in different 
locations, the entire franchisor’s business concept other than the right to use its 
trademark.  This type of franchising accounts for 74 per cent of all franchise 
arrangements in the U.S., where it contributes some 14 per cent of total retail sales 
(Mendelsohn, 1995).   
Franchising is not just a U.S. phenomenon but has proven to be highly popular 
elsewhere.  Franchising is common in Europe, parts of Asia, Australia and New 
Zealand (Chan and Justis, 1990; Durden, 1994; Preble, 1995).  With respect to Asia, 
Japan was the first country in the region to be targeted by U.S. franchisors in the 
1970s (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1997; Love, 1995).  As of March 1995, Japan had 
158,000 franchise outlets, which ranked the country as having the third largest 
number of franchise outlets in the world after U.S. and Canada.   
The popularity of international franchising in Asia grew exponentially in the 1980s 
when local companies set out to acquire the country rights of foreign franchises in fast 
food (e.g. McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Pizza Hut), service (e.g. Avis, 
Hilton, Mister Minit), and general retail (e.g. 7-eleven, Body Shop, Benetton) (TDB 
and Arthur Andersen, 1997).  The overwhelming success enjoyed by these firms 
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pioneered further interest among other international franchisors to create their 
presence in Asia. 
Foreign franchisors were attracted to Asia because it had a soaring middle class, 
with high disposable income, and more than half of the world’s population lives in the 
region.  China alone comprises nearly one-quarter of the world’s population and is 
considered the most under-retailed country in the world (Swartz, 1997).  Further, 
governments in Singapore and Malaysia have recognised franchising as a vital key to 
stimulate growth in entrepreneurial activities and small businesses (TDB and Arthur 
Andersen, 1997).  The two governments have introduced laws and established 
organizations and development programs to stimulate franchising in their countries.   
1.1 Problem Statement 
Despite this widespread growth in franchising as an international business model, 
research on this form of business remains sparse, perhaps in part, because of its rapid 
emergence.  Most studies of international franchising were conducted in the 1990s 
and there remains a scarcity of empirical and conceptual research on the topic 
(Ackerman, Bush and Justis, 1994; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996; Shane, 1996a; 
Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995; Huszagh, Huszagh and McIntyre, 1992).   
Fladmoe-Lindquist (1996) suggests that international franchising research has been 
limited to problems, motivating factors, constraining factors, and managerial attitudes. 
However, research in international business and franchising has recently begun to 
identify several distinct categories of capabilities needed to franchise internationally 
(Shane, 1996b; Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre, 1992; Kedia, Ackerman, Bush and 
Justis, 1994).  Despite this trend there remains a lack of research on determining the 
critical factors, other than capabilities, that lead to improving the performance of 
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franchising in foreign markets, especially in Asia.  An examination of organisational 
characteristics and international strategies of franchisors, other than capabilities, 
would be helpful in determining the critical success factors of international 
franchising.  Therefore, the following three questions are studied, analysed and 
answered to address this  
1. How do foreign franchisors expand into East Asia? 
2. How do foreign franchisors manage their overseas partners in East Asia? 
3. Why are some foreign franchisors in East Asia more successful than others? 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the factors critical to the success of 
international franchising in relation to four foreign franchisors operating in East Asia.  
This study aims to provide a detailed, fully documented and valid theoretical 
foundations of how international franchising operates in East Asia.  It is hoped that 
these findings can be studied and utilized by franchisors proposing to expand into 
East Asian markets. 
1.3 Contributions of the Study 
International franchising, as a business model, appears set to increase in popularity 
within East Asia.  Over the past 10 years the level of competition has intensified 
significantly for foreign franchisors as many local East Asian-based franchises have 
entered the sector and learned to compete with and even surpass their more famous 
Western counterparts (Prystay and Kumar, 1997).  Without a systematic exploration 
of the strategic aspects of international franchising within East Asia there will be no 
guidance as to how best to compete within the region.   
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This study has made several contributions.  Firstly, this study will add to the 
existing knowledge on international franchising, since published empirical research in 
this area is very limited (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996; Shane, 1996a).  Furthermore, it 
not only provides linkages of theoretical and empirical constructs, but also synthesizes 
theoretical concepts of success factors of international franchising, postulated by 
various researchers.    
Secondly, this study provides a model of the critical success factors that an 
international frachisor needs to develop or acquire in order to gain a competitive edge 
in East Asia.  The model serves as a useful framework for other franchisors desiring 
to enter into other emerging regions of the world (i.e. Eastern Europe, Middle East, or 
South America).  This model could be adapted to apply for any retail concept. 
Finally, this study uncovers the master franchisee characteristics that are associated 
with successful international franchising in East Asia.  The desired master franchisee 
characteristics are financial strength, entrepreneurial and like-mindedness.  Selecting 
the appropriate overseas partner is a critical factor for franchisors entering East Asia 
as master franchising is the most popular business mode used by foreign franchisors 
in the region (Chan and Justis, 1992).  However, there appears to be a lack of 
empirical research conducted in determining the characteristics of a master franchisee 
that will increase the likelihood of success in East Asia. 
1.4 Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this study the following terms, arranged in alphabetical order, have 
been given special definitions: 
 
§ Asia – The entire geographical area which encompasses East Asia, India, 
Pakistan, Vietnam, and Cambodia.  
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§ Business Format – The entire franchisor’s business concept, including the 
marketing strategy and plan, the operating manuals and standards, and quality 
control. 
 
§ Critical Success Factors – Those capabilities and key areas of activity, which 
must be possessed and performed particularly well in order for the franchise 
firm to outperform its competitors. 
 
§ East Asia – The geographical region which encompasses China and her Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Ta iwan and Thailand. 
 
§ International Franchising – A foreign market entry mode that involves a 
relationship between the entrant (the franchisor) and a host country entity, in 
which the former transfers, under contract, a business package (or format), 
which it has developed, and owned, to the latter. 
 
§ Master franchising – A contractual relationship between the franchisor and an 
independently owned sub-franchisor to develop a specified number of 
franchises in a given area in exchange for exclusive right to use the business 
format for a specified length of time. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature review has eight major sections.  Section 1 provides a definition of 
international franchising, which has often been inappropriately equated to licensing, 
exporting and foreign direct investment.  Section 2 provides an overview of the 
phenomenal growth of international franchising over the past 20 years.  Section 3 
discusses the various modes of international franchising.  Section 4 reviews the 
literature on international franchising.  Section 5 discusses the capabilities required in 
international franchising and provides a typology for understanding international 
franchise types.  Section 6 overviews the international expansion of U.S. franchisors.  
Section 7 discusses the market entry modes used by international franchisors and the 
adaptation of the franchise systems in East Asia.  Section 8 overviews the trend of 
changing consumers in East Asia over the last four decades and identifies the various 
customer segments in the region.   
2.1 Definitions of International Franchising 
Previous studies have treated franchising as a generic mode of entry into international 
markets, requiring no equity investment or control (Boddewyn, Halbrich and Perry, 
1986; Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995).  A more realistic view would see 
international franchising to be a continuum of different modes of market entry, which 
vary in the amount of risk and control they embody.   
Incomplete definition and conceptualisation of international franchising can lead to 
the development of misleading theories, the wrong choice of data collection, 
inappropriate selection of analytical techniques and erroneous conclusions (Alon, 
1999).  International franchising has been equated to licensing, exporting and foreign 
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direct investment.  However, international franchising is a unique method of doing 
business that captures several modes of market entry. 
International franchising has been traditionally treated as a type of licensing 
(Ackerman, Bush and Justis, 1994; Root, 1987; Boddewyn, Halbrich, and Perry, 
1986).  For example, Root (1987) proposed that franchising was a form of licensing in 
which a company (franchisor) made available its intangible assets (i.e. patents, trade 
secrets, know-how, trademarks, and company name) to an independent company or 
person (franchisee) in return for royalties and/or other forms of payment.  Studies 
utilising this conceptualisation have concluded that the franchisor is less affected by 
risk of failure because ownership is often assumed by the franchisee (Aydin and 
Kacker, 1990). 
Unlike licensing, franchising may provide tangible as well as intangible assets.  The 
franchisor often provides an input into the production of the franchisee product or 
service.  Furthermore, a study of U.S. based international franchisors conducted by 
Arthur Andersen (1996) found that the average investment in international franchising 
was about US$680,000.  An example of this was McDonald’s which invested over 
US$50 million in its Russian venture before even opening its first store (Love, 1995).  
Therefore, the traditional view of international franchising as licensing is erroneously 
rooted in the assumption that international franchising is a non-equity and non-direct 
mode of entry (Burton and Cross, 1995). 
Ackerman, Bush and Justis (1994) equated international franchising to exporting 
because both are means of entering global markets with little investment and limited 
risk.  The experience of many franchisors reveals that entering a foreign market 
involves at least some investment by the international franchisor (Love, 1995; Arthur 
Andersen, 1996).  Furthermore, unlike exporting, international franchising requires 
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close attention to tracking down equipment, securing local raw materials that meet the 
franchisor’s quality specifications, and protecting trademark and trade secrets 
(Steinberg, 1992).  Therefore, equating international franchising to exporting is 
erroneous. 
Finally, international franchising is often distinct from direct investment.  This view 
was espoused by Boddewyn, Halbrich, and Perry (1986) who stated that franchising 
in its purest form does not involve equity investment by the franchisor.  Therefore it 
cannot be considered a form of direct investment.   
However, international franchising is probably best defined by Burton and Cross 
(1995, p. 36), as “…a foreign market entry mode that involves a relationship between 
the entrant (the franchisor) and a host country entity, in which the former transfers, 
under contract, a business package (or format), which it has developed and owned, to 
the latter.”  The host country entity can be either a domestic franchisee, a foreign 
franchisee, a master franchisee, or an entity that is partly owned by the franchisor 
itself.  This definition encompasses multiple forms of international franchising, 
including international master franchising, direct international franchising, 
international joint ventures and sole ventures. 
2.2 International Franchising Phenomenon 
Over the past 30 years, franchising has spread rapidly throughout the world.  In 1971, 
approximately 150 U.S. firms were involved in international franchising.  By 1986, 
this number had doubled to 300 with well over 15,000 foreign franchise units (US 
Department of Commerce, 1988).  The prospects for franchising to continue growing 
on a global basis seem substantial.  Franchising is being increasing understood as a 
useful formula for business growth and success.  It simultaneously harnesses the 
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energies of individual entrepreneurs, takes advantage of local knowledge, and 
expertise, spreads financial risk among all members of the franchise network, and 
relies on a proven successful package and set of procedures at each new location.   
Franchisors are classified either as “product-tradename” or “business format” 
franchising (Arthur Andersen & Co., 1992).  Product-tradename franchising, which is 
prevalent in automotive sales, retail gasoline, and soft-drink distribution, uses 
franchisees to distribute a product under a franchisor’s trademark.  Business format 
franchising is designed to have the franchisee replicate, in different locations, the 
entire franchisor’s business concept including the marketing strategy and plan, the 
operating manuals and standards, and quality control.  Fast food, fast printing, 
cleaning, hygiene, rental, employment and health services are heavy users of this 
“package” concept.  Business format franchisees are typically small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) (Stanworth, Price, Porter, Swabe and Gold, 1995).  
According to Hoffman and Preble (1993), business format franchising is predicted 
to be the dominant form of franchising internationally in the twenty-first century.  
Business format franchising experienced rapid growth in the U.S. during the 1950s.  
However, the 1980s were a period of rapid international expansion during which 
some 400 U.S. franchisors increased their overseas units by more than 70 per cent, to 
almost 39,000 (Preble, 1995).  The majority of these overseas units were located in 
Canada, Japan, Europe, and Australia. Business format franchising has experienced 
faster growth than product name franchising in the domestic market (Kostecka, 1969-
1988) and was the source of most of the successful international franchising ventures 
(Burton and Cross, 1995).   
Although much attention has been focused on understanding the motivations which 
cause firms to begin exporting, relatively little attention has been directed to the 
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forces which influence franchise firms to internationalise their operations (Kedia, et 
al., 1994).  Classical trade theories focus on explaining mechanisms by which firms 
chose to remain in domestic markets, export to foreign markets or invest in in-country 
facilities to serve those foreign markets.  While these theories may provide 
explanatory power for decisions regarding traditional export, licensing and foreign 
direct investment strategies, they may not be useful for newer entry strategies such as 
franchising and international joint ventures. 
Franchising became a significant force in the post World War II United States in the 
form of gasoline franchises (Hogan, 1990).  Since the 1970s, the growth in franchise 
arrangements has been large, representing nearly one-third of domestic retail sales 
(Boe, Ginalski and Henward III, 1989; Hogan, 1990) and totalling approximately 
US$716.7 billion of sales in 1990 (Hogan, 1990; Steinberg, 1991). 
Interest in international franchising has experienced a similar growth rate, with 
household names such as McDonald’s becoming well known throughout the world.  
Interest in franchising operations has expanded from the U.S. to other countries, with 
companies based in countries such as the UK, Australia, and Canada, entering the 
United States as a foreign market (Welch, 1989b). 
The internationalisation of franchising began initially by firms establishing a 
presence across overseas markets within industrialised nations with developed 
economies and language/cultural proximity and affinity to the home market (Hogan, 
1990).  As markets began to become saturated in America, and as the export potential 
of franchising became more evident, the growth rate accelerated and the global net 
has broadened.   
The recent growth in international franchising is fuelled by both push factors, such 
as saturation, competition, and diminishing profits in the domestic market, and pull 
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factors, such as the liberalisation of the Eastern block countries, the formation of 
regional trading blocks and the emergence of some newly industrialised countries in 
the international market place (Alon and McKee, 1999).   
2.3 Modes of International Franchising 
Six modes of international franchising can be identified.  They are (1) master 
franchising, (2) area development franchising, (3) joint ventures, (4) direct 
franchising, (5) direct franchising with a subsidiary, (6) sole venture and (7) 
conversion franchising.  In the following sections these modes are discussed: 
2.3.1 Master Franchising 
Hackett (1976) was one of the earliest observers of the use of master franchising in a 
global setting.  According to his study, 21 per cent of the firms surveyed were using 
this mode of market entry.  Twenty years later, Arthur Andersen (1996) found that 81 
per cent of the reporting firms used master franchising, up from 59 per cent in 1989.  
This research also suggests that master franchising was the most popular franchising 
mode of entry.  One possible factor responsible for this marked rise is the use of 
franchising is the increase in U.S. franchisors’ entry into distant and culturally 
dissimilar countries such as Asia, Mexico, the Caribbean and the Middle East (Arthur 
Andersen, 1996). 
Master franchising refers to the contractual agreement between the franchisor and 
an independently owned sub-franchisor to develop a specified number of franchises in 
a given area in exchange for exclusive right to use the business format for a specified 
length of time (Justis and Judd, 1986).  The master franchisee is an intermediary party 
between the franchisor and franchisee that has the responsibility to sell the franchises, 
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qualify franchisees, collect part of the royalties and majority of the franchisee fee, and 
train the franchisees.   
The major advantages of using master franchising as a foreign market entry mode 
are: (1) increased speed of business/market development, (2) relatively little capital 
outlay, and (3) enhanced knowledge of local markets (Justis and Judd, 1986).  The 
master pays a fee for the territory based on the perceived strength of the area, often 
measured by the level of population.  The franchisor assumes very little political risks 
since it receives the initial fees up front and a small percentage of sales over time.  
Franchisors often seek masters who are familiar with local culture, financially stable 
and like-minded.  
Master franchising is a mode of entry that that is low in risk and control (Burton 
and Cross, 1995).  It involves an arm’s length transaction with a host country 
independent entity in which the franchisor makes no financial and management 
commitment.  Political and market risks are negligible.  The franchisor delegates most 
of the responsibilities of monitoring and control to the master, who in turn keeps a 
portion of the franchise royalties.   
With the selection of master franchise partners, U.S. franchisors generally require 
proven management expertise, ability to compile a business plan, the financial 
resources to support growth, understanding of the local market and U.S. business 
practices, access to real estate, and the right goals (Steinberg, 1994).   
Despite the widespread use of master franchising, research by Ryans Jr., Lotz and 
Krampf (1999) has found several criticisms of this entry mode expressed by 39 
leading international franchisors.  The results suggest that most master franchisees 
often fail to communicate effectively with the franchisees, follow home  office 
directives or follow the fundamental concepts of the franchise.   
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James Kramer, vice president of international franchising for McDonald’s cautions 
any franchisor considering using international master franchising (Ryans, Lotz and 
Krampf, 1999, p. 33) saying:  
All you have, if the agreement goes sour, is your contract.  Yes, you have the right 
to terminate, but it can be a long, onerous, expensive task and in the end you may not 
get the outcome you desire.  McDonald’s prefers to make investments with our 
partners or franchisees because it changes the basic relationship and gives us greater 
control either as a shareholder of the operating companies or owner/lessors where our 
restaurants are located. 
2.3.2 Area Development Franchising 
An increasing popular version of master franchising has been the use of area 
development agreements.  Research by Arthur Andersen (1996) found that 112 per 
cent more franchisors have used this mode since 1989.  The study also revealed that 
area development was the second most popular franchising mode of entry.   
In an area development agreement, the area developer is permitted only to establish 
and operate its own units (Burton, Cross and Rhodes, 2000).  These units are run by 
employee managers of the area developer.  This franchise agreement does not permit 
the area developer to sell the franchise on to independent sub-franchisees. 
Area development franchising is at times preferred by franchisors to master 
franchising.  The prolonged nature of the franchising contract (usually 10 to 20 years) 
exposes the franchisor to problems associated with choosing the wrong master, such 
as ensuring quality, and the likelihood of being sued by the franchisees for not 
meeting the expectations (Justis and Judd, 1986).  In case of a dispute between the 
franchisor and master, the master may keep the franchisees since they are used to 
working with the master and are reluctant to deal with the franchisor (Burton and 
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Cross, 1995).  Therefore, some franchisors have been found to be “hedging their bets” 
with area development franchising before committing themselves into a long-term and 
extensive relationship (Steinberg, 1994).   
For example, Gloria Jean, the gourmet coffee chain, first signed an area 
development agreement in Mexico with an individual to open three stores in three 
years.  Three months later after sales at the first store outperformed U.S. stores by 42 
per cent and the foreign individual proved he could manage the business, Gloria Jean 
converted the area development agreement into a master franchise contract.  
2.3.3 Joint Ventures 
Some 35 per cent of franchisors reported entering foreign markets via joint ventures 
(Arthur Andersen, 1996).  This mode of entry is used when it is required by law and 
when a local partner is necessary in securing resources and local market knowledge.  
The advantages of this mode are: (1) the political and economic contacts it can 
provide, (2) local market knowledge, and (3) existing distribution networks and 
labour that may be available via the partner (Burton and Cross, 1995).   
Ownership in a joint venture can vary from minority to majority share holdings.  
International joint ventures tend to reduce the possibility of legal or economic 
impediments to the growth of the franchise system in a host country, but their success 
depends on key economic and competitive environment factors (Falbe and Dandridge, 
1992).  For example, a joint venture agreement with the City of Moscow allowed 
McDonald’s to secure real estate and production inputs in addition to smoothing out 
political impediments (Love, 1995).   
The disadvantages of this market entry mode are that (1) profits need to be shared, 
(2) disputes with the joint venture partner may arise, and (3) administrative costs may 
be high (Falbe and Dandridge, 1992).  Cross-cultural negotiations and 
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communications with the joint venture partner add another dimension of difficulty 
because of the broader scope for disagreement on operational issues (Alon, 1999).  
Furthermore, divestiture is more difficult than in the case of a master agreement 
(Amos, 1993). 
2.3.4 Direct Franchising 
Direct franchising is found to be used by around 67 per cent of foreign franchises 
(Arthur Andersen, 1996).  Direct franchising is an extension of domestic franchising 
arrangements.  It involves a direct contractual agreement between the franchisor and 
foreign franchisee in a similar manner as it is used in the domestic market.  This 
contractual relationship is often used by U.S. franchisors in Canada where the cultural 
and physical distance is small (Kostecka, 1988).  This method is, however, not 
suitable to countries, which are distant and have linguistic and cultural differences.   
Distance makes effective monitoring of the franchisee’s behaviours and business 
conduct, including quality control and customer service, very difficult to achieve.  
Cultural differences make arrangement at arm’s length difficult due to different 
perceptions and expectations of both parties (Burton and Cross, 1995).  The 
advantages of using direct franchising are: (1) contracts can be standardised and (2) 
profits on fees and royalties do not have to be shared with another party.  Therefore, 
the franchisor uses the franchisees for managerial, labour and financial resources. 
2.3.5 Direct Franchising with a Subsidiary 
It is estimated in 1995 approximately 18 per cent of franchisors used a foreign 
subsidiary, up from 10 per cent in 1989 (Arthur Andersen, 1996).  This mode of 
market entry is similar to direct franchising except the franchisor locates in the host 
country and enters into franchising agreements from there.  The advantages enjoyed 
by the franchisor when using this mode include (1) the ability to monitor franchisees 
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closely and reduce service costs, (2) a capability to develop empathy with the local 
culture thus improve relations with their franchisees and (3) the ability to take 
advantage of various governmental incentives, such as tax advantages, preferential 
loans, and government subsidies (Burton and Cross, 1995). 
However, international franchising using a subsidiary involves more investment and 
risk than is typical with direct franchising, as the franchisor has to establish a 
subsidiary in the host country.  Since the subsidiary is often associated with the 
foreign market, it may be subject to nationalistic ideologies and adverse governmental 
actions within its own country (Alon, 1999).  For example, Kentucky Fried Chicken 
(KFC) in Syria was forced to rename itself as the “Kuwaiti Fried Chicken” (KFC) 
because governmental officials were not satisfied with the American cultural 
imperialism the name symbolised (The Road from Damascus, 1998).  The result was 
that KFC has lost its distinctive marketing appeal, leading to the deterioration of its 
competitive advantage.  
2.3.6 Sole Ventures 
Sole ventures in international franchising are similar to foreign direct investments in 
the sense that full control as well as market and political risks are assumed by the 
franchisor (Alon, 1999).  The primary advantage of using a sole venture is that the 
franchisor retains full authority over the operations of the foreign units and, therefore 
keeps the entire proceeds of the profits.  The disadvantages of this mode of entry are a 
lack of cultural sensitivity and greater market and political risks (Falbe and 
Dandridge, 1992).   
This mode of entry is prevalent in developed countries with similar linguistic 
characteristics.  For example, McDonald’s used sole ventures in Australia, Canada 
and England (Alon, 1999).  Sole ventures abroad can be either purchased or built.  
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Blockbuster, for instant, first built 15 stores when it entered the United Kingdom and 
then purchased Cityvision, the largest video chain store.  
2.3.7 Conversion Franchising 
Conversion franchising refers to the development of a franchising system primarily 
through the conversion of independent, going concerns into members of a franchise 
system (Hoffman and Preble, 1991).  Independent firms facing mature and intense 
competition are attracted to the franchise’s internationally known brand name, access 
to customers, and cost savings through mass purchasing power or improve operations 
(Feltes and Digman, 1986).  For example, Century 21, a U.S. based real estate 
company, has catapulted to 6,181 units worldwide almost exclusively by converting 
real estate brokers to Century 21 franchisees (Steinberg, 1993).   
2.4 Research on International Franchising 
To understand the internationalisation of franchise operations, two general streams of 
literature must be examined: (1) the literature that specifically investigates the 
decision to internationalise operations via franchising; and (2) for the purpose of 
comparison international expansion through exporting.   
Hackett (1976) found that the desire to exploit potential markets was the most 
important force in franchisors’ decisions to internationalise their operations.  
Trankhiem (1979) found the most common reasons given by franchisors for having 
international markets were increased sales and profits, market expansion, and a desire 
to be known as an international firm.   
Aydin and Kacker’s (1990) findings suggest that firm size is a significant variable 
in understanding the decision to internationalise operations.  Companies with large 
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numbers of franchisee units have a greater likelihood of entering international 
operations than their smaller counterparts.   
A study of 142 U.S. franchising firms undertaken by Kedia et al. (1994) suggested 
that franchisors are more significantly motivated by managerial attitudes, particularly 
the desire to expand, and the desire to increase profits, than by firm characteristics 
such as size. 
Subsequent research has also examined franchisors’ reasons for not entering 
international markets.  For example, Aydin and Kacker (1990) investigated U.S.-
based franchisors’ international expansion intentions.  They concluded that the 
primary reasons firms remained domestic were adequacy of opportunities in the U.S. 
and lack of international knowledge and competencies.   
Perlmutter (1969) noted that the attitudes of top management played a significant 
role in determining the extent to which a given firm will engage in international 
activities.  There appears to be a common thread between some of the literature on 
franchising and that on exporting (Welch, 1992).  Given these commonalities, one 
would expect some similarities in the general patterns of internationalisation between 
exporting and franchising.  Since the literature regarding exporting is much larger in 
volume than that of franchising, certain key studies can provide insights into the 
internationalisation of franchising activities. 
Franchisors grow by expanding the size of their franchise systems.  This expansion 
can take place in two ways: through the establishment of additional company-owned 
outlets or through the establishment of franchise outlets.  Franchisors appear to prefer 
to expand by franchising in geographically distant locations (Brickley and Dark, 
1987; Norton, 1988; Martin, 1988; Brickley, Dark and Weisbach, 1991).  This 
preference has been explained as a function of relative agency and governance costs.  
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The more remote the location of an outlet, the higher the costs of monitoring 
employees and the greater the preference for franchising (Brickley and Dark, 1987; 
Martin, 1988). 
Research studies undertaken during the 1960s and 1970s into franchising dealt 
mostly with domestic operations and concentrated on the industry’s legal problems 
(Hunt, 1976; Hunt and Nevin, 1978).  In the field of international franchising, two 
research studies stand out: Etzel and Walker (1973) and Hackett (1976).  Both 
examined the international expansion of U.S.-based franchisors and their future plans.  
As a structural form and mode of operation, franchising has a number of important 
advantages for franchisors in comparison with wholly-owned branches or subsidiaries 
(see Ayal and Izraeli, 1990). The same advantages apply in varying degrees to 
international joint ventures.  Some of the advantages include adaptability to local 
conditions, enhanced market communications, local ownership giving stronger 
motivation for success and reduced operating expenses. 
Firms that are operating successfully and innovatively in their domestic market are 
frequently motivated to set up franchise system by the perceived competitive 
advantages that it can offer (Preble, 1992).  In order to perfect the franchisor’s 
management and operating systems, (Welch, 1989a) has posited that most firms 
would be expected to get significant domestic experience before going abroad.  
Although a fair degree of variability existed as to the timing of franchisors making the 
initial expansion outside the U.S., Walker (1989) reported that the majority (60 per 
cent) of his respondents had at least 5 years of franchising experience and/or at least 
100 units operating domestically (56 per cent) before going international.  In the fast 
food sector, McDonald’s took more than a decade before making its first international 
entry into Canada in 1967 (Love, 1995).   
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Empirical research studies investigating the motivations for franchisors to 
internationalise have identified several key considerations (Hackett, 1976; Walker, 
1989; Walker and Etzer, 1973).  One factor cited by a high proportion of respondents 
in all three studies was “Companies receiving inquiries or proposals from prospective 
or existing franchisees.”  It seems, therefore, that many franchisors may enter foreign 
markets in response to approaches from these markets.  Two of the three studies also 
identified foreign market potential as a key reason for international expansion 
(Walker, 1989; Walker and Etzel, 1973).  A further consideration was geographic 
proximity and/or cultural similarity of markets. 
2.4.1 The Evolution of International Franchising 
Research on the use of franchising within international operations has tended to 
concentrate on companies that have built franchising activities first within their 
domestic market before utilising that experience and the tried franchising system in 
the international arena (Walker and Etzel, 1973; Hackett, 1976; Walker, 1989; 
McCosker and Walker, 1992; McIntyre and Huszagh, 1995).   
Walker (1989) found that the majority of U.S. franchising companies had engaged 
in minimal changes to the marketing mix  (eg. product, price, promotion, placement) 
components of their franchising packages in international operations. Clearly there are 
significant benefits in being able to experiment, modify and develop a franchising 
system within a local market first – learning how to operate the system and to manage 
a franchise network.   
If the resulting system and associated learning can be transferred to a foreign 
location with limited alteration, the transfer process becomes easier and cheaper.  
Nevertheless, research in the U.S. has stressed the additional demands on firm 
capabilities as a franchisor moves from domestic to international franchising, as a 
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result of having to adapt to differences in the franchising and cultural environment 
(Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996). 
While there appears to be a dominant path of domestic to international franchising, 
there is conceptually no reason why there should not be other patterns of adoption of 
franchising as a form of international operations.  Welch (1990) in a small scale study 
of Australian firms engaged in international franchising found a diverse range of 
forms and paths to franchising used in international operations.  These companies 
entered their initial overseas markets using non-franchise strategies, but gradually 
adopted franchising as an internationalisation growth strategy. 
Several authors (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968; Hackett, 1976; Welch, 1989a; 
McIntyre and Huszagh, 1995; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996) have proposed the “theory of 
franchising life cycle.”  According to this theory, franchising goes through several 
stages of internationalisation.  Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-9) have proposed that the 
most successful franchise systems will end up as almost wholly-owned chains.  This 
hypothesis has been tested in the 1980s and 1990s using U.S. data with ambiguous 
results, partly relating to differences between industry sectors (Dant, Paswan and 
Stanworth, 1996).  The reason could be due to the use of company-owned outlets 
being used initially as a basis for testing the franchising package within the target 
market before rolling out on a franchising basis.  Companies concerned about control 
over their market are likely to follow this model (Welch, 1990).  McDonald’s 
typically employs this approach, and has in some cases extended the company-owned 
path for some time, as in the case of the U.K. (Love, 1995).   
Over time, as the franchisor develops experience and confidence with international 
markets, it increases its involvement, selecting entry modes that provide more control 
over the foreign franchise system (Alon, 1999).  The franchisor may begin by the use 
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of international master franchising and subsequently may wish to participate more 
directly in what emerges as a high growth market (Law, 1999).  
2.5 International Franchising Capabilities 
Two distinct categories of capabilities needed to franchise internationally have been 
identified (Shane, 1996a, Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre, 1992; Kedia, et al., 
1994).  The first category is the level of the administrative efficiency of the 
international franchise relationship.  The second concerns the ability of the 
international franchisor to operate in a foreign context and directly relates to their 
level of risk management.   
2.5.1 Administrative Efficiency 
The level of administrative efficiency inherent in franchising as an internationalisation 
strategy is concerned with how contractual arrangements facilitate the alignment of 
preferences between franchisor and franchisee (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Carney and 
Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994; Lafontaine, 1992).  The problem 
of franchisee evaluation arises when monitoring is difficult or expensive and is 
exacerbated by a lack of goal congruence and asymmetry of risk preferences between 
the principal (franchisor) and agent (franchisee) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The 
ability of a franchisor to monitor its foreign franchisees has been empirically 
identified as an important capability that distinguishes domestic from international 
franchisors (Shane, 1996a).  The effects of distance (Heskett, 1986) and culture 
(Bergen, Dutta and Walker, 1992) combine to further complicate franchisee-agent 
monitoring, control over service delivery and contract conditions.  As a consequence, 
the ability to manage over distance via systems and the level of cultural adaptability 
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of the franchisor are key international capabilities that need to be developed by 
successful franchisors. 
2.5.1.1  Distance Management 
Many franchise services are location dependent, thus creating a network of service 
outlets that are physically distant from the franchisor.  For the franchisor, the problem 
of incomplete information regarding their franchisee-agent’s behaviour is aggravated 
by this decentralised service delivery system whose geographical scope extends 
beyond national boundaries (Norton, 1988).  These problems of geographic distance 
and franchisee-agent monitoring intensify the problems facing the franchisors’ 
entrepreneurial capability, where both time and distance can raise the level of 
uncertainty and widen the information gap (Norton, 1988).  
Despite technological improvements that may facilitate the transmission of 
information, it is still difficult and costly to gather and receive complete and timely 
knowledge about foreign operations.  Furthermore, the management of geographic 
distant locations may involve as much “art” as “science” which is often gained 
through experience (Aharoni, 1966).  The ability of a franchisor to monitor its 
franchisee-agents over long distances involves a complex set of skills that may not be 
commonly possessed by the entrepreneurs or managers operating franchise firms and 
does not necessarily substitute for experience (Huszagh, Huszagh and McIntyre, 
1992).  These abilities, which include supervisory skills, have been shown to be 
important for international expansion (Shane, 1996a). 
By carefully observing franchisee behaviour, franchisors can control opportunistic 
behaviour (Norton, 1988).  If people are carefully observed, they perceive a greater 
livelihood of being caught and so reduce their opportunism.  Franchisors can monitor 
against opportunism by inspecting franchisee facilities, examining their records, and 
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by specifying and verifying equipment usage or minimum standards.  Therefore, 
monitoring is a capability that franchisors deve lop. 
The development of this capability can be enhanced by increasing the size of the 
franchising system, the allocation of resources towards its development, and through 
learning over time (Norton, 1988).   The first source of monitoring capability comes 
from firm size.  In franchising, monitoring frequently requires the direct observation 
of the activities of franchisees (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991).  This implies an 
administrative cost on franchisors who need to have sufficient supervisory capability 
to undertake this observation (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994).   
A second important aspect of distance management is the structure of the 
international franchising contract, which is a central aspect of the franchisor-
franchisee relationship (Rubin, 1978; Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994).  Within the 
franchisor’s domestic market, most contracts between the franchisor and franchisee 
are standardised (LaFontaine and Kaufmann, 1994), thus simplifying general contract 
management.  Contract details such as fees, royalties, advertising contributions and 
length of agreement vary little from franchisee to franchisee within the domestic 
context.  However, within the international market, franchising contracts can vary 
substantially (Abell, 1990).   
Given the greater potential for opportunism in the international arena, franchisors 
who intend to expand overseas need to create incentives for franchisees not to act 
opportunistically.  One way to control opportunism is through the use of ex-ante 
bonding (Norton, 1988).  If a franchisee has to pay a bond that is forfeited if he or she 
acts opportunistically, the franchisee has a financial incentive to avoid opportunistic 
behaviour.  Typically, franchisees pay franchisors the use of their franchise system in 
two ways – through an up-front fee and through ongoing royalties and advertising 
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fees as a percentage of sales revenues.  The franchisor controls the relative balance 
between the two payment mechanisms and can establish any given ratio, holding 
constant the total size of the payment made for the system.  Franchisors can develop a 
bonding mechanism through the creation of a pricing structure that requires high up-
front payments relative to the size of payments over time. 
A high franchise fee relative to the size of ongoing royalty and advertising 
payments appears to be an effective bond (Norton, 1988).  Franchise fees are usually a 
significant sum relative to the size of the franchisee’s investment in the ownership of 
the outlet.  Therefore a franchisee incurs a substantial risk of forfeit if this ratio is 
high.   
Moreover, according to standard franchise agreements, the franchisor has the right 
to revoke the franchise agreement without return of the franchise fee if the franchisee 
does not adhere to his or her contractual obligations.  The higher the franchise fee 
relative to the size of the royalty and advertising payment, the greater the cost to the 
franchisee of agreement termination, and the more the franchisee needs to adhere to 
the franchise system (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Norton, 1988; Combs and 
Castrogiovanni, 1994).  This bond is a particular effective tool, as the franchisee 
usually invests a large percentage of his or her personal net worth in the purchase of 
the outlets (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994).  Under these circumstances, 
termination of the franchise agreement often results in great financial hardship for the 
franchisee. 
An important part of the franchising agreement is permission to use the franchisor’s 
business system in return for a share of the franchisee’s profits (Matthewson and 
Winter, 1985; Klein, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Norton, 1988).  The franchisor’s 
business system is the product that it sells to franchisees and includes such things as 
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store layout, product mix, operating procedures, and the location selection heuristic.  
Hymer (1976) argues that firms expand overseas because they possess a proprietary 
advantage that makes them able to out-compete local entrepreneurs.   
According to Shane (1996a), international franchisors may need to modify contracts 
to include the initial terms of their franchise agreements, the ratio of their franchise 
fees, and provisions concerning cooperative advertising and store opening support.  
Such variations with an international contract may be due to the size of a franchisee, 
host country restrictions, local business practices, and the opportunistic behaviour of 
particular franchisees.  It is important that franchisors have the ability to negotiate 
contract modifications (Root, 1987) and handle contract enforcement in order to 
achieve successful international development (Hood and Young, 1979).   
2.5.1.2  Cultural Adaptability 
The differing cultural environments found in foreign markets add further complexity 
to international franchising (Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre, 1992).  A cultural 
environment that is significantly different from the franchisor’s home country may 
affect not only the contract negotiation process (Weiss, 1996), but also issues such as 
recruitment and selection of personnel, and the franchise format (Justis and Judd, 
1989).  The very strength of the franchise format, its standardisation, makes its 
successful replication in foreign markets difficult (Aydin and Kacker, 1990).  
Frequently, modifications may be needed.  This may require not just in such things as 
the recipes and menu selections, but in the operations as well (Sadi,  1994).  
Embedded in the operational routines and processes are assumptions about how work 
should be done.  Variations in cultural norms such as “power distance,” Confucian 
dynamism, and individualism can affect local implementation (Hofstede, 1980; 
Hofstede and Bond, 1988).   
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2.5.2 Host Country Risk Management 
The second set of capabilities to succeed in international franchising involves the 
ability to deal with uncertainty within the overseas host country.  Risk management is 
an important consideration in international business research (Ghoshal, 1987).  Issues 
such as government policies, regulations and macroeconomic variations make 
conducting business internationally more uncertain than domestically (Miller, 1992).  
Hackett (1976) indicated that such issues were important to franchisors.  The 
franchisors in his survey were primarily concerned with government regulations 
within the foreign market that affect both the conduct of the service and monetary 
uncertainty, rather than the complexities of format modification.  Therefore, host 
country policy evaluation and foreign exchange management are fundamental 
capabilities that are important for international franchisors to develop. 
2.5.2.1 Host Country Policy Evaluations  
The primary problems that international franchisors encounter in relation to foreign 
government policy are restrictions on the ownership and control of corporate assets 
and intellectual property, as well as repatriation of profits, interest, royalties, and 
principal repayments (Aydin and Kacker, 1990; Lafili and Van Ranst, 1990).  It is 
important that international franchisors have the ability to evaluate these aspects of 
foreign government policy.  Unfortunately, this set of management skills may be the 
hardest to develop because of the complexity of foreign regulations and the time and 
resources required to develop such expertise.  Advice on such issues is available from 
many franchise consultants and small business agencies, but may be too expensive for 
some smaller franchisors (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).   
As many franchise businesses have a service-base, it may be easy for competitors to 
imitate the firm’s business model.  As such the protection of intellectual property 
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becomes a fundamental concern for many franchisors (Lafili and Van Ranst, 1990).  
Franchisors need the ability to monitor the franchisees’ use of their brand name and 
trademarks, including the specific details of management systems, designs, or 
processes that constitute core elements of the system (Justis and Judd, 1989).  
However, the protection of brand name, trademarks and reputation is not easily 
managed in countries where intellectual property laws vary or are not enforced.   
A franchisor’s business system can be considered an example of a proprietary 
advantage, because the business system is unique to the franchisor (Calvet, 1981).  
Caves (1971) demonstrated that companies with a proprietary advantage have an 
incentive to expand overseas, because they can use that advantage in foreign markets 
at little or no cost over the cost of initial developing the advantage in the domestic 
market.  Because foreign competitors would have to incur the total cost of deve loping 
that proprietary advantage, the firm has a cost advantage over competitors (Caves, 
1982). 
Understanding host country policies concerning the transfer and repatriation of 
dividends, fees and royalties is also an important capability for the international 
franchisor.  In the United States, franchise contracts generally standardise initial fees 
and royalty rates (LaFontaine and Kaufmann, 1994).  These are usually only 
negotiated when groups of franchisees form a bargaining bloc to change the 
conditions of the agreement.  In the international environment, fees and royalties are 
subject to national laws and regulations (Justis and Judd, 1989). 
2.5.2.2  Exchange Risk Management 
The need to manage the effects of exchange rate movements arises from the impact of 
fluctuating home and host country exchange rates on franchise contracts (Huszagh, 
Huszagh, and McIntyre, 1992).  Large and frequent swings in foreign exchange rates 
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demand particular capabilities and expertise.  For example, many franchisors require 
that some inputs into the franchise operation be imported from the home country.  
Therefore, any major change in the exchange rate can increase the franchisor’s 
economic exposure as well as impacting negatively on the market.  Many of the 
potential problems of fluctuating exchange rates may be proactively managed by the 
use of periodic rate adjustment and payment terms expressed in percentages (Meroni, 
1990).  However, this requires specialist skills not commonly found in most domestic 
franchisors. 
2.5.3 A Typology of International Franchisor Types 
The above discussion of international franchisor capabilities describes the important 
internal elements needed for international franchising.  However, what is important is 
how those elements or capabilities are combined (Penros, 1959).  Not all international 
franchisors possess these capabilities to the same degree.   
Some franchisors’ international experience are limited to their neighbouring country 
whereas a few may be in more than 20 countries.  A franchisor, with a limited scope 
of international capabilities, will be less likely to seek new foreign opportunities, 
whereas a franchisor with a well-developed set of international capabilities should 
have the competencies needed to deal with the uncertainty of foreign agent 
monitoring and host country variability (Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996). 
Fladmoe-Lindquist (1996) presents a two-dimensional framework of international 
franchisor development that uses the existing set of international franchising 
capabilities and the capacity for developing international capabilities as the two 
dimensions (see Table 1).  She identifies four types of international franchisors: 
constrained franchisors, integrating franchisors, conventional franchisors and 
worldwide franchisors.   
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The typology utilises resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991), which 
stipulates that know-how based resources (Buckley, 1988), or routines for operating 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982), are essential in providing competitive advantage to 
individual firms.  In addition, some companies are simply better than others at 
generating ideas and new ways to doing things (Penrose, 1959).  Resource-based 
theory also emphasizes the importance of not just possessing resources, but of 
continual organisational learning (Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
TABLE 2:1 
International Franchising Capabilities and Capacity for Development 
 
Existing International Franchising Capabilities Capacity for Developing 
International Capabilities LOW HIGH 
HIGH INTEGRATING FRANCHISORS  WORLDWIDE FRANCHISORS  
 · Pursuit of cautious growth 
· Use multiple forms of 
franchising 
· Proactive evaluation 
· Focus on global markets 
· Use multiple forms of 
franchising 
· Both proactive and reactive 
LOW CONSTRAINED FRANCHISORS  CONVENTIONAL FRANCHISORS  
 · Locally international 
· Limited involvement in 
international markets 
· Reactive evaluation 
· Focus on several foreign markets 
· Use fewer forms of franchising 
· Often reactive with some 
proactive efforts 
Source: Fladmoe-Linquist, K. (1996), “International Franchising: Capabilities and Development,” 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 11 (2), p. 428. 
 
2.6 Internationalisation of U.S. Franchisors 
The growth of U.S, franchisors in international markets has been phenomenal.  In 
1986, 354 U.S. franchisors operated over 31,000 outlets globally, which is a 786 per 
cent increase in outlets since 1971 (Kostecka, 1988).  In 1988, 17 per cent of U.S. 
franchisors had more than 35,000 outlets in international markets (Falbe and 
Dandridge, 1992).  Aydin and Kacker (1990) estimated that foreign outlets of 
international franchisors have increased at a rate of 17 per cent per year.  This trend of 
growth is expected to continue (Shane, 1996a; Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996).   
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The initial internationalisation efforts of U.S. based franchisors were directed 
toward Canada, Britain and Australia, countries that are culturally, politically and 
economically similar to the U.S.  As franchising systems matured in these countries, 
profit potential decreased because of increasing domestic and international 
competition (Welch, 1992).  Therefore, U.S. based franchisors had to seek growth 
avenues in less developed or culturally dissimilar or politically unstable countries.  
These environments presented a new set of challenges that often required changes in 
the product/service mix, contractual arrangements or methods of operation. 
With the increased diversity of countries in which franchisors sought potential 
outlets came the need to develop a systematic way to evaluate potential host countries 
(Welch, 1992).  The standardised nature of franchising necessitates a high degree of 
cooperation and control by the franchisor, which is complicated in a multicultural 
context.   
Walker (1989) examined reasons given by American companies to engage in 
internationalisation for the first time.  A majority of them (44.0 per cent) had simply 
responded to a first/only contact from a foreign prospect.  After that came ‘proximity 
to the U.S.’ (27.6 per cent), and ‘similarities to the U.S./English language’ with 18.0 
per cent combined.   
Although international franchising of services started in developed countries based 
on geographic proximity, language and culture similarity (Steinberg, 1991; Aydin and 
Kacker, 1989), it is now spreading rapidly into other emerging markets such as 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Mexico.   
Approximately 15 per cent of U.S. owned franchise outlets are now located in 
lesser-developed countries (LDCs) (Aydin and Kacker, 1991).  It appears that 
franchise companies will continue to move into developing countries when 
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opportunities arise, either on their own initiative or in response to approaches from the 
countries concerned.   
In a survey of 386 U.S. franchisors in 1995 conducted by Arthur Andersen (1996) 
for International Franchise Association, respondents were asked to evaluate on 20 
factors that might be significant in successfully establishing and operating franchises 
outside of the U.S (see Table 2).  Caution must be exercised when interpreting the 
result in Table 2 for the following three reasons: (1) no distinction was made between 
the perceptions of international and non- international franchisors; and (2) almost half 
of the franchisors were operating in Canada, and (3) only 17 per cent of the 
respondents had operations in Asia. 
TABLE 2:2 
Success Factors in Establishing and Operating Foreign Units by U.S. 
Franchisors  
(* Respondents were asked to rate each of the factors on a scale of one to four, with  
one being the least significant and four being most significant) 
SUCCESS FACTORS FOR  
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING  
Mean* SUCCESS FACTORS FOR  
INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING  
Mean* 
1.Maintaining adequate quality 
   controls  
3.4 11. Making product acceptable 3.0 
2. Ability to support franchisees 3.3 12. Repatriating royalties 3.0 
3. Recruiting qualified franchisees 3.3 13. Overcoming language/cultural 
      barriers 
2.9 
4. Controlling franchisees outside U.S. 3.2 14. Securing sufficient financing 2.9 
5. Dealing with trademark violations 3.2 15. Obtaining suitable locations 2.9 
6. Committing sufficient human 
    resources 
3.1 16. Dealing with tax and import 
      duties 
2.9 
7. Arranging supply channels  3.0 17. Adapting promotional 
      approaches 
2.7 
8. Training franchisees 3.0 18. Coping with currency 
      uncertainty 
2.7 
9. Satisfying government or legal 
    restrictions 
3.0 19. Redesigning the franchise 
      package 
2.6 
10. Determining potential of markets 3.0 20. Beating competitors in host 
      country 
2.4 
Source: Arthur Andersen (1996), International Expansion by U.S. Franchisors, Chicago, USA, p. 62. 
 
 
In another survey conducted in 1996 of international U.S.-based restaurant 
operators by the National Restaurant Association (Masur, 1997), the findings revealed 
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that almost two-thirds of respondents indicated their companies franchise all of their 
international units.  
The survey also found that a well-chosen foreign franchisee was more likely to be 
familiar with the local market, which partially explained why respondents reported 
franchise units showing a positive return earlier than fully owned establishments.  
Survey respondents reported that their companies’ franchise establishments turned 
profitable in 16 months on average, compared with more than 25 months for 
company-owned units. 
The 1996 Survey of International Restaurant Operators also revealed that many of 
the ingredients that contributed to success in the domestic marketplace were also 
important to success abroad.  According to respondents, finding and retaining good 
managers was the most important element of success, followed closely by finding and 
retaining good hourly staff.  Thirdly, marketing was regarded by respondents in 
ensuring success overseas.  It was one of the elements more likely to be altered by 
operators when entering a new foreign market.  Finally, respondents perceived 
distribution and supply issues as very important in international restaurant expansion.   
The 1996 survey also indicated that 80 per cent of the respondents reported that 
they modified their menus in international markets.  Taste differences were the most 
frequently cited reason for altering menus, followed by the local lack of specific food 
items.  Higher food costs, religious considerations and government restrictions were 
also mentioned. 
2.6.1 McDonald’s International Expansion 
When one thinks of fast food, the first name that comes to mind is likely to be 
McDonald’s.  With 28,707 restaurants located in 120 countries as at December 31, 
2000, McDonald’s is by far the largest food service organisation in the world 
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(http://www.mcdonalds.com).  In many of its foreign markets such as Australia, 
Canada, Japan, U.K. and Hong Kong, McDonald’s is the leading food service chain.   
The company’s strategy of offering a limited menu of consistently prepared food 
has fostered the chain’s phenomenal growth.  Although the brand is global and the 
core attributes of Q.S.C. & V. (i.e. Quality food, fast and friendly Service, restaurant 
Cleanliness, and a menu of Value) are fundamental, each market has its own way of 
delivering the promise.   
Around the world, McDonald’s offers the standard menu of hamburgers, chicken 
and fish sandwiches along with its world-famous french fries.  Some markets, 
however, choose to offer one or two local items to appeal to customer preferences and 
to offer variety (Watson, 1997).  Some examples include ‘McHuevo’ in Uruguay, a 
hamburger with a poached egg on top, ‘McLaks’ in Norway, a grilled salmon 
sandwich with dill sauce; beer in Germany, and the ‘Samurai Pork Burger’ in 
Thailand, a sausage patty in teriyaki sauce. 
McDonald’s has staged this phenomenal growth using a distinctive franchising 
system that concentrates on recruiting and training individuals with motivation and 
entrepreneurial talent to become active, on-premise owners and not just investors 
(McDonald's: Hong Kong Individuals Before Investors, 1997).  It stresses personal 
commitment and a sharing of common goals, principles and ideals.  The company has 
extended this system internationally to encompass not only its franchisees, but also 
the partners it chooses to set up joint venture operations with overseas.   
Early successes in Canada and Japan made it clear to McDonald’s that to succeed in 
retailing abroad, it needed a partnership that could give the company a home-grown 
flavour in each foreign market without deviating from the fundamentals that made 
McDonald’s work in the U.S. (Love, 1995).  Its success in operating in a completely 
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different culture in Japan gave McDonald’s the modus operandi in entering overseas 
markets – dependence on a local entrepreneur with a substantial ownership position in 
a joint venture and even more autonomy than that of franchisees in the U.S.   
Apart from their entrepreneurial flair, no two foreign partners shared similar 
backgrounds or even similar arrangements with McDonald’s (see Love, 1995).  
Daniel Ng, the joint venture partner of the McDonald’s 177 restaurants in Hong 
Kong, was a chemical engineer who did research for seven years at Chicago’s noted 
Institute of Gas Technology before he returned to his native Hong Kong and became a 
venture capitalist.  Robert Kwan, the joint venture partner with 52 stores in Singapore, 
had a small wholesale toy operation before taking an equity stake interest in 
McDonald’s Singapore.  Peter Rodenbeck, the partner in Rio de Janeiro, was an 
investment banker in Rio.  Saul Kahan, one of McDonald’s partners in Mexico, was a 
new car sales manager in Mexico City.  
Despite their diverse backgrounds, one common element found among most of 
McDonald’s foreign partners overseas was that they are all foreign by birth, non-
traditionalists in their homeland, with an affinity for American business practices and 
American entrepreneurs, and had spent considerable time in the United States (Love, 
1995). 
2.7 International Franchising in East Asia 
During the 1980s and 1990s, East Asia attracted foreign investors because its growing 
economies saw the emergence of a rising affluent middle class in a region with more 
than half of the world’s population.  China alone comprised nearly one-quarter of the 
world’s population and was considered the most under-retailed country in the world 
(Swartz, 1997).  Other governments notably in Singapore and Malaysia encouraged 
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franchising through the introduction of laws that established organisations and 
development programs to support the effort. 
By the end of the 1990s, the ubiquitous presence of U.S. fast food chains in East 
Asia stood as testimony to the success of international franchising in this region.  
When western (predominantly U.S.-based) fast food chains first entered East Asian 
markets, many sceptics argued that Asians would never develop a taste for 
hamburgers and pizzas, and that their presence would only be a passing fad (Wee, 
1997).  Such arguments were not unfounded.  The prices of these western fast foods 
were not cheaper than local fast food.  Further, it would have been plausible to believe 
that Asians, who had grown up on rice and vegetables, would never fall for “junk” 
foods.   
Despite these misgivings, the western fast food outlets like those of McDonald’s, 
Burger King, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and Pizza Hut became familiar sights in 
any major city such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur.  Average 
sales per store in Asia for KFC are US$1.2 million, compared with US$750,000 in the 
U.S.  The difference occurs even thought most Asian markets have much lower per 
capita income than the U.S. (Tanzer, 1993).  In Hong Kong, with a population of 
around six million, was home to five of the world’s 10 busiest McDonald’s (Love, 
1995).  
Strong marketing positioning by the western fast food franchisors was identified as 
one of the key factors for their success (Love, 1995; Watson, 1997; Wee, 1997).  In 
East Asia, there is a plethora of cheap and tasty foods that are easily available.  It was 
unproductive for western fast food chains to compete head-on against these local 
operators on the basis of food.  Instead, these franchisors have positioned themselves 
as a lifestyle phenomenon by offering other benefits such as courteous service, air-
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conditioned comfort, hygienic and efficient food preparation, clean toilets, brightly lit 
dining areas, modern and attractive ambience, and constant but varied promotional 
offers.   
According to Chan and Justis (1992), the proliferation of franchising in East Asia is 
due to several economic and demographic trends.  Some of them include universal 
cultural trends, increased disposable income, increasing number of women in the 
workforce and demographic concentrations of people in urban areas. 
Two western franchises that proved particularly successful in East Asia were Pizza 
Hut in Hong Kong and Kentucky Fried Chicken in Malaysia (Gatbonton, 1998).  
Pizza Hut Hong Kong is owned by the Jardine Pacific and a Marketing Management 
winner of the Asian Management Awards.  Jardine Pacific is a leader in the Asia-
Pacific region, with approximately 300 outlets and more than 8,500 employees.  
These operations include the world’s largest international franchisee of Pizza Hut, as 
well as Taco Bell, Ruby Tuesday, and the “Nine to five” restaurants, plus the Oliver’s 
Super Sandwiches chain (http://www.jardine-matheson.com). 
In Malaysia, Kentucky Fried Chicken is owned by KFC Holdings (Malaysia) 
Berhad, which is a publicly- listed company on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.  
The company operates restaurants, a convenience food store chain, a poultry 
processing and poultry retail chain, breeder farms, hatchery, broiler farms and a 
feedmill.  KFC Holdings’ sales were reported as US$232 million in 1999 and the 
company owned 274 KFC stores (KLSE, 2000).  Effective marketing, vertical 
integration and strong, stable management were reportedly responsible to its 
astounding leadership position of 60 per cent share of Malaysia’s fast food market 
(Astbury, 1992). 
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Although U.S. franchisors are perhaps among the best known, many Asian 
franchises have entered the sector and learnt to compete with and even beat their 
famous Western counterparts in their own game (Prystay and Kumar, 1997). One such 
company is Jollibee, a Philippine hamburger chain.  With 302 outlets it is the clear 
market leader, making the Philippines one of only two countries in the world where 
McDonald’s is not the market leader.  Much of Jollibee’s success at home and abroad 
is tied to the greater variety of foods found on its menu and the taste that is more 
suited to Filipinos (Cash-Up Filipinos Feast on Fast Food, 2000; Liddle, 1998).   
2.7.1 Modes of International Franchising in East Asia 
Several foreign market entry strategies have been used by franchisors in East Asia.  
At least four major types of market entry modes are used: (1) master franchising, (2) 
joint ventures, (3) establishing a franchising agreement with the local government as 
master franchisee and (4) regional franchising (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1997; 
Chan and Justis, 1990).  
2.7.1.1  Master Franchising 
Master franchising has been the most popular market entry mode used by American 
firms to franchise into East Asian countries.  McDonald’s, Burger King and KFC 
have successfully used this strategy in their East Asian markets.  The master 
franchisee may be an individual, business or conglomerate corporation that assumes 
the rights and obligations to establish franchises throughout a particular country or 
region (Chan and Justis, 1990).  Master franchisees have the option to sub-franchise 
the units or open all units by themselves. 
Although master franchising is an attractive option to many franchisors in East 
Asia, it suffers one major weakness: control (Steinberg, 1994).  Franchisors have to 
give up much of the control over the sub-franchisees, who actually operate the units, 
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to the master franchisee.  Although some measures can be put into place legally such 
as approving all system changes, site selection and sub-franchisees appointment, the 
distance between the franchisor and master franchisees often lessens the practically of 
doing so. 
2.7.1.2  Joint Ventures 
Foreign investors appear to be driven by three major forces in selecting joint ventures 
in East Asia (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).  The first of these is political imperative 
(the will of local governments); the second is a competitive imperative (the need to 
acquire competences in order to compete more effectively); and the third is a risk-
sharing imperative (to hedge against adverse conditions when the stakes in the 
investment are high).   
With joint ventures, franchisors can access the local partner’s capabilities in sales, 
local market know-how, and most important contacts with decision-makers and 
business networks (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).  Manage rial and human resources are 
often the most critical resources that can be obtained from a local joint venture 
partner.  Furthermore, the local partner can handle all language problems, cultural 
differences, and help develop local markets through appropriate means of advertising 
and promotion.   
Finding the right person, who is the master franchisee, as an international joint 
venture partner became one of the keys to McDonald’s success in East Asia (Law, 
1999).  In effect, the use of a master franchise is combined with an equity stake by 
McDonald’s.  Such active participation serves to both check on, and assist the partner. 
and reduces the risk of quality dilution and brand erosion.   
The selection of a potential joint venture partner is the most crucial and difficult 
decision the foreign franchisor will make, and one that will have long-term 
 40 
ramifications for its future in the target country (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).  Partner 
selection is crucial because the foreign franchisor’s expansion and strategic success in 
a country will depend on the capabilities of the partner, the partner’s willingness to 
cooperate, and the climate of mutual trust that must be developed between both 
parties.   
One method often used by non-franchising companies willing to test a partner 
before embarking on a joint venture in East Asia is to establish some sort of ‘pre-
marital’ arrangement, either in the form of a manufacturing contract, a limited 
distributorship or a licensing agreement (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).  This allows 
partners to experiment with their working relationship on a small scale.  This method, 
while not entirely error- free, increases the chances of detecting eventual misfits.   
For example, Starbucks Coffee International entered into a licensing agreement 
with Shinsegae Department Store in early 2000 to operate Starbucks cafes in South 
Korea (Starbucks and Shinsegae Sign Joint Venture Agreement to Expand Growth in 
the Korean Market, 2000).  Six months later, the licensing relationship was converted 
to a joint partnership following the phenomenal success Starbucks enjoyed with the 
first store. 
2.7.1.3  Partnering with Government 
In China, foreign franchisors often partnered with the Chinese government (national 
or provincial) in operating the country’s franchise operations (English and Xau, 
1994).  The Chinese government can be a master franchisee or an international joint 
venture partner, depending on the particular arrangement.  The franchisor will 
contribute investment funds, the needed technology and provide some management 
expertise (particularly training).  The Chinese partner will contribute investment 
funds, securing the necessary supplies, site-use rights, some of the management and 
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all of the non-management personnel.  For example, KFC’s operation in China is an 
international joint venture with KFC International that contributes 60 per cent of the 
investment, the remaining being shared between two Chinese government bodies 
(English and Xau, 1994).   
There are several advantages in having the government as the local franchisee 
(Chan and Justis, 1992).  First, the franchisor need not worry about full compliance 
with the law.  Second, the host government is in a stronger financial position than a 
business or an individual, and may have little difficulty providing the necessary 
capital to run the franchisee.  Third, general adherence to quality standards is more 
likely.  Finally, payment of royalty fees is guaranteed unless otherwise stated in the 
franchise agreement. 
On the other hand, there are also several disadvantages in having the government as 
the local franchisee.  First, the government is generally less able to attract qualified 
managers and staff than a private business.  Second, the restrictions imposed by the 
government on the franchisor may limit options and activities.  For example, the 
government may require that the local unit be restricted to a certain area that may turn 
out to be a poor location. 
2.7.1.4  Regional Franchising 
Regional franchising involves granting of the franchise rights for a number of 
countries to an entity in a particular host country (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1996).  
It is usually practiced in two forms.  In the first form, the foreign franchisor appoints a 
regional master franchisee for a number of countries and the franchisee would then 
proceed to develop the franchises within these countries.  This is achieved by opening 
franchise outlets either through the regional master franchisee, various country master 
franchisees or direct franchisees appointed by the regional master franchisee. 
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The second form of regional franchising is practised through the establishment of 
its own corporate entity by the master franchisee.  This entity will then appoint direct 
franchisees or master franchisees within the region.  Nearly 80 foreign franchisors 
have used Singapore as a platform or hub for regional franchising which included 
Hertz car-rental, Planet Hollywood and Tony Roma’s Ribs Restaurant (Swartz, 1997).  
Singapore and Hong Kong have served as platforms for foreign companies for 
gathering intelligence and initiating contacts, which later become the hub for future 
regional coordination (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).  
2.7.2 Adaptation of Franchise Systems in East Asia 
It is important to note that franchising, as a business model, requires a great deal of 
standardisation (Preble, 1992).  In most cases, this does not mean 100 per cent 
uniformity but, instant international recognisability (Czinkota and Ronkainen, 1990).  
Additionally, there is a strong desire on the part of these franchisors to “roll-out” into 
new countries the proven franchise package, which has been responsible for their 
success in their home market.  This partly helps to explain the pattern of geographical 
expansion and concentration that has emerged.  Foreign countries with advanced 
economies and comparable cultural characteristics to the U.S. have been logical 
candidates for the transfer of franchise systems and consequently, a high degree of 
standardisation has been possible there (Welch, 1989).   
Although Japan is culturally dissimilar to the U.S., there are numerous American 
fast food franchises found in that country.  This can be attributed to three factors.  
Firstly, international master franchising has been extensively and successfully used by 
western companies to minimise being directly involved in development operations in 
a foreign culture such as Japan’s (Grant, 1985).  Secondly, Idea Link Japan Inc. has a 
large network designed to link up unique franchising concepts developed in the U.S. 
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with Japanese investors (Ashman, 1986).  Thirdly, the enthusiastic assimilation of all 
things Western has allowed for relatively standardised packages to satisfy a wide 
variety of disparate consumer needs and wants in numerous countries with widely 
varying cultures (Daniels and Radebaugh, 1989). 
Despite the fact that the conditions above suggest high levels of standardisation can 
be practised in all markets, some adjustments to the business format or package are 
required to be made on a country-by-country basis.  These adaptations may be 
expected to increase as franchisors seek out more remote and culturally diverse 
locations.  In order to appeal to differing taste preferences in foreign countries, 
franchisors have sometimes to tailor ‘product’ offerings (Preble, 1992).  According to 
Chua (1999), the huge success of McDonald’s in Singapore has been the ability of the 
brand to assimilate into the daily lives of Singaporeans.  Otherwise, the product will 
always be in the realm of the consumption of the ‘exotic’, which is a singular and an 
occasional thing. 
Examples of product adaptation by western fast food restaurants include Kentucky 
Fried Chicken, which offers a considerably spicier version of Hot Wings, a spicy 
chicken dish, and sweeter coleslaw in Thailand (Tanzer, 1993).  In the highly 
competitive Japanese market, KFC has branched out into dishes like chicken curry.  
Variations on McDonald’s original, American-style menu exist in many parts of East 
Asia (Watson, 1997): milk shakes that are flavoured with a fruit peculiar to Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand, mixed spaghetti in the Philippines, mutton burgers and 
vegetable dishes in India, and corn soup and teriyaki burgers in Japan.  McDonald’s 
restaurants in India are the only ones in the world where no beef is being served 
because of the large population of Hindus.  One can purchase an all lamb version of 
the “Big Mac” called a “Maharaja Mac.” 
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2.8 Changing Consumers in East Asia 
Rapid industrialisation and urbanisation are changing the face of East Asia.  With the 
importation of foreign capital, technology and personnel from the western world, it is 
inevitable that the people in East Asia are increasingly influenced by westernisation 
(Wee, 1997).  This influence is further augmented by various western mass media like 
television programmes, cinema shows, magazines, and newspapers.  They not only 
influence the attitude and behaviour of East Asian consumers, but have the capacity to 
alter their outlook and lifestyle as well. 
Western companies may be tempted to believe that, given time, consumers in East 
Asia will become more like Western consumers (Schutte, 2001).  Therefore, most 
companies apply marketing concepts in East Asia developed from a distinctively 
Western (and primarily U.S.) perspective.  This thinking is very much in line with 
Levitt (1983) global marketing concept, which posits that the world’s markets would 
be driven toward a converging commonality.  However, consumer behaviour is 
strongly influenced by culture and East Asian culture is distinctively different from 
Western culture (Schutte and Ciarlante, 1998).  Cultural bonds run deep and different 
tastes, habits, and customs prevent consumers from universally preferring the same 
product attributes, advertising messages, packaging and presentation. 
2.8.1 Segmentation Across East Asia 
Although East Asia is culturally heterogeneous, Schutte and Ciarlante (1998) have 
observed two segments in the region, which exhibit a great deal of similarity with 
each other but differ considerably in other segments.  The first segment comprises the 
‘old’ and ‘new rich’ individuals who are well educated and well travelled.  Members 
of the ‘old-rich’ group are relatively conservative and still hold on to Asian traditions.  
However, those who belong to the ‘new rich’ group who have recently acquired 
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wealth are less attached to traditional values (Chua and Tan, 1999).  They share 
similar preferences and attitudes with cosmopolitan consumers found in the Western 
countries. 
The second segment includes the young, trendy, superficially westernised people 
who are well educated, often travel or study abroad and spend considerable  time 
searching for new ideas and values.  Asian youth have been the marketing targets of a 
growing number of corporations in light of the massive size of the population (Yasue 
and Gu, 2001).  Population ratios of those under 30 years old in major Asian countries 
are 67 per cent in Indonesia, 65 per cent in Vietnam, 63 per cent in Malaysia, 58 per 
cent in China, 52 per cent in Taiwan, and 46 per cent in Singapore.  It is extraordinary 
that on average close to 60 per cent of the Asian population are in their twenties or 
teens. 
Two large-scale surveys were conducted in 1995 and 1997 with respondents 
between the ages of 15 and 54 years old in 12 Asian cities to study lifestyle attitudes 
and value of Asian consumers (Yasue and Gu, 2001).  This survey is called Dentsu’s 
Global Compass consumer research, initiated by Dentsu Inc., an advertising agency in 
Japan.  The findings on Asian youth reveal the following: 
· Asian youth in large cities have become affluent in terms of possession of 
durable goods. 
· Consumption attitudes of these young people have become increasingly 
cautious and mature, somewhat similar to young consumers in developed 
countries.  The financial crisis in Asia has accelerated the trend. 
· The values of the Asian youth have been shifting from traditiona l group 
orientation to the Western individual orientation.   
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· Asian youth are progressing in the same direction and share similar lifestyle 
values and traits, regardless of the country of residence.  However, the degrees 
of similarities vary between countries. 
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3 COUNTRY PROFILE: SINGAPORE 
 
East Asia is a diverse region with countries having heterogeneous economic or 
political systems.  National and business cultures vary significantly and macro-
economic data show extreme differences (World Bank, 1994).  In 1996, Indonesia had 
197 million people with an income per capita of US$1,080; neighbouring Singapore 
had a population of four million people with an average income of US$30,550.  Japan 
represents 17 per cent of the global economy, but has only 2.2 per cent of the world’s 
population; China’s population, on the other hand, makes up more than a fifth of the 
world’s population but contributes only three per cent to the world’s economy.   
Among all of East Asia’s many markets, Singapore has proven highly attractive to 
many of the world’s international franchisers.  The country’s rapid economic growth 
since the 1980s has been substantial, and it remained both stable and affluent in the 
face of the “Asian Economic Crisis” of 1997.  In addition to its economic stability, the 
rapid spread of Western influence on the relatively young population in Singapore has 
resulted in an increased demand for western-oriented lifestyle and higher quality 
products and services.  Singapore also has ready investors receptive to new business 
opportunities who have demonstrated strong interest in foreign franchise concepts.  
Finally, the Government of Singapore has established several programs to promote 
franchising as a business model.  For these reasons Singapore has been selected as the 
country in which to undertake the case study that forms the basis of this analysis. 
The country profile has four sections.  Section 1 provides brief geographical and 
economical background information on Singapore.  Section 2 identifies various  
segments made up of demographic and psychographic variables in Singapore’s 
marketing environment.  Section 3 overviews the Singaporean franchise industry in 
terms of its domestic franchising, governmental programs and international 
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franchising.  Section 4 provides a summary of the country profile and identifies the 
key constructs critical to achieving success in franchising in Singapore. 
3.1 Background Information 
Singapore is a small city-state approximately 641 square kilometres in area, consisting 
of the main island of Singapore and some 60 islets within its territorial waters (Wirtz, 
1998).  Lying 137 kilometres north of the equator, it is linked to Peninsular Malaysia 
by a causeway across the Straits of Johore and separated from Indonesia to the south 
by the Straits of Singapore. 
Singapore has a diversified economy.  With a gross domestic product of only 
US$84 billion in 1999, the Singapore economy is small by world’s standards 
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000a).  However, it is also one of the richest 
countries in the world.  This affluence is largely due to the open nature of the 
economy.   
The Singapore economy continues to enjoy strong fundamentals such as a high 
savings rate, strong reserves of about US$77 billion in 1999 (Singapore Department 
of Statistics, 2000a), a pro-business legal framework, world-class sea, air and 
telecommunications infrastructure, and a strong support for technology, research and 
development (http://www.contactsingapore.org.sg).  These factors have placed 
Singaporeans among the most potentially lucrative consumers in East Asia. 
3.2 Marketing Environment 
Three decades of rapid economic growth from 1997 to 2000 have spawned an 
expanding middle class within Singapore.  Evidence of this is everywhere throughout 
the island-nation (Chua, 1998).  Prestigious cars are not the only famous goods known 
to Singaporeans.  Almost every international fashion house is represented within the 
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ubiquitous shopping complexes everywhere on the island.  All fast food chains, but 
particularly those of American origin, are highly visible.  They are found not only in 
leisure districts but also in the public housing estates that accommodate more than 90 
per cent of the four million population.  
In order to reach various targeted groups, it is critical for companies to segment 
consumer markets according to either geographic, demographic, socioeconomic, or 
psychographic factors as well as consumption patterns, attitudes and brand loyalty 
(Jain, 1997).   
Market segmentation allows companies to gauge differences in buyer attitude, their 
motivations, values, patterns of usage, aesthetic preference and degree of 
susceptibility.  For the Singapore market there would be no need to do a geographic 
segmentation, as the size of the tiny island does not justify it (Stravens, 1996).  
Furthermore, the population is largely urbanized and there is very little rural area left.  
The segmentation of the Singapore market will therefore be examined in terms of 
demographic and psychographic variables alone. 
3.2.1 Demographic Variables 
As of 30 June 2000 Singapore had a population of 4,017,833.  This included 754,524 
foreigners (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000b).  The growth of the total 
population during the last decade 1990 to 2000 was 2.8 per cent annually, which was 
the fastest in the post independence era.  This was mainly due to inflows of permanent 
residents and foreign workers.  The proportion of foreigners within Singapore’s 
population increased from 10 per cent in 1990 to 19 per cent in 2000.  It is likely that 
Singapore will continue to use foreigners for both specialized skills not available in 
the city-state and for unskilled work, such as work on construction sites and basic 
assembly work in electronics factories (Wirtz, 1998).   
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The ethnic composition of Singapore’s population had remained relatively stable in 
1990s.  The population is predominantly ethnic Chinese; with just over 2.5 million 
people or 77 per cent of the total population in 2000 (Singapore Census of Population, 
2000).  The next largest group is ethnic Malays, constituting 453,633 or 14 per cent of 
the population, followed in turn by ethnic Indians with 257,791 people or 8 per cent 
of the population.   
Singapore has a fairly youthful population.  Approximately 71 per cent of 
Singapore residents are below 45 years of age (Singapore Census of Population, 
2000).  Just over 1 million people (35 per cent of the population) are below the age of 
24 years.   
Without the financial burdens of family concerns or a home mortgage, this ‘youth’ 
segment can freely spend on itself (Chua, 1998).  This segment has been identified as 
being willing to indulge in unlimited consumption, constrained only by financial 
circumstances.  The consumption practices of youth have also become increasingly 
Americanised or Westernised, a condition only aggravated by stints of living and 
studying in foreign lands in the case of returned students. 
On the other hand, Singapore is one of the fastest aging countries in the world due 
to smaller families and low birth rates (7000 Jobs Lost Last Year but 46 000 New 
Ones Created, 1995).  Between 1990 and 2000, the median age rose from 29 years in 
1990 to 34 years in 2000.  The number of people aged 45 to 54 years increased by 
seven per cent per annum (see Table 3). 
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TABLE 3:1 
Proportion of Singaporeans by Age Group 
 
 
AGE GROUP  
 
NUMBER  
 
PER CENT 
AVE. ANNUAL GROWTH 
(%) 
TOTAL 3,263,209 100.0 1.9 
Below 15 700,798 21.5 1.1 
15-24 423,929 13.0 -0.7 
25-34 558,462 17.1 -0.3 
35-44 636,112 19.5 3.4 
45-54 469,708 14.4 6.7 
55-64 236,574 7.2 2.6 
65-74 157,183 4.8 4.1 
75-84 62,969 1.9 2.4 
85 & Over 17,474 0.5 6.1 
Source: Singapore Census of Population 2000, Singapore Department of Statistics, Singapore. 
 
Singaporeans are affluent when compared to other East Asian countries.  The 
expanding economy has greatly improved the livelihood of working persons in the 
last decade, as reflected in the rising income from work.  The median income among 
working persons doubled from S$1,100 to S$2,200 per month over the last ten years 
(Singapore Census of Population, 2000).  Younger working persons aged 25 to 39 
years experienced the fastest income growth, with median income rising from 
S$1,200 to S$2,600 per month during 1990 to 2000. 
In line with the greater earning power of the workforce, the average Singapore 
household has become more affluent.  The median household income from work grew 
from S$2,300 in 1990 to S$3,600 in 2000 per month (Singapore Census of 
Population, 2000).  This amounted to an average increase of five per cent per annum 
over the ten-year period.   
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3.2.2 Psychographic Variables 
Psychographic segmentation utilizes factors such as lifestyle and personality traits to 
segment the market (Jain, 1997).  In Singapore, the ethnic Chinese and Malay 
populations can be clustered into 10 psychographic groups (see de Mooij and Keegan, 
1998 for more details).  All these 10 groups have very distinct differences and, 
therefore, marketers can, in fact, market products that will appeal to each group or a 
number of groups.   
3.2.2.1  Lifestyle Studies 
Singapore has a strong Oriental focus as well as having traces of Western values so 
that Singaporeans are characterised by different degrees of westernisation.   
According to Tan and Farley (1987), Singapore’s consumers presume that foreign-
made products are of better quality than local brands.  Western models were generally 
preferred in advertising and a strong “family orientation” – common throughout East 
Asian society - also appears to affect consumer evaluation of advertising.   
Some Singaporeans adhere closely to the traditional values associated with older 
generations, while others may show strong Western beliefs and lifestyles.  The “more 
Chinese” consumers are usually thrifty, quality minded, spend less on conspicuous 
items and shop more at stores that carry Chinese goods while those “more 
Westernised” Chinese consumers tend to be sophisticated, brand name conscious and 
have shopping habits more like their Western counterparts (Tai and Tam, 1996). 
Further research by Kau and Yang (1991) found that Singaporeans between the 
ages of 15 to 40 generally enjoyed a rather secure and comfortable life, felt quite 
contented, and lived in a safe environment.  Although they were somewhat cautious in 
their attitudes, their traditional values were undergoing transformation.  A Delphi 
study, to determine the characteristics of future Singaporeans, was conducted by 
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(Kau, Yong and Richmond, 1993) with 150 participants.  The authors concluded that 
future Singaporeans would be characterised by the traits of below: 
· Increasing individualism.  It is felt that increasing influence, and living in a 
highly urbanised society, will make consumers want to differentiate themselves 
from society in general. 
· Remaining very status conscious and materialistic.  This is reflected in the 
famous “5 Cs,” said to be aspired by all young professionals: career, cash, credit 
card, condominium, and a car. 
· More brand conscious.  Respondents believed that future consumers would be 
increasingly concerned with buying well-known brands across a wide range of 
product categories, from cosmetics and food to jewellery and cookware.  It 
appears that brands associated with high income, status, and sophistication will 
show the highest growth. 
· More discerning consumers.  Consumers are expected to value more and more, 
and be more and more willing to pay for, higher quality products.  They are also 
expected to want more and more detailed and accurate product information, and 
their appreciation of art and culture is expected to increase. 
· More health-conscious consumers.  As the population ages and influence grows, 
consumers are expected to pay more attention to their health.  For example, this 
will show in an increased demand for fitness and health clubs, as well as health 
food with lower cholesterol, fat, salt and sugar content, but more vitamins, fibre, 
and natural ingredients. 
· More emphasis on leisure activities.  Pastimes such as watersports, golfing and 
cultural activities will become increasingly important. 
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· More demand on time.  The recent increase in the labour participation rate of 
women will lead to more time pressure, particularly for working women.  
However, time pressure will not reach levels such as those in the West, as 
Singaporeans frequently live within an extended family, and maids, and other 
household helpers are readily available. 
3.3 Franchise Industry 
The development of Singapore’s franchise industry dates back to the 1970s when 
major companies such as Shell, Esso, Singer and Bata operated under licensing 
systems which bore characteristics of present day franchise concepts (TDB and 
Arthur Andersen, 1997).  In the 1980s, Singapore based companies began acquiring 
country rights of international franchises such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, Avis, Mister Minit, ServiceMaster, Body Shop, 7-Eleven, 
Benetton and Esprit.  As at June 1996, there were close to 125 foreign franchises 
operating in Singapore (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1997).  At the same time, several 
local provision stores had also launched their local franchise programmes. 
The size of the franchise industry in Singapore is difficult to quantify due to the 
limited data available on this highly diversified form of business activity.  A recent 
report published in 1996 by TDB and Arthur Andersen stated that franchising 
represents 13 per cent of total retails sales in Singapore.  Major contributors to this 
sales volume are the petrol station chains and hotels.  Latest available data on total 
retail sales in Singapore showed $7 billion for 1999 (Singapore Department of 
Statistics, 2000).   
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3.3.1 Domestic Franchising 
Local franchising started in the 1980s (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1996).  One of the 
first sectors to venture into franchising was the convenience store company.  Both 
Econ Minimart and Happy Family Minimart started the expansion of their franchise 
network through the conversion of traditional independent provision shops.  Their 
success in expanding the group to a few hundred franchise outlets contributed 
significantly to the popularity of franchising and led to the recognition of franchising 
as an avenue for small business growth. 
The number of homegrown companies that have developed franchise systems has 
also grown tremendously over the last decade (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1996).  At 
the end of 1995, there were 85 companies with developed franchise systems.  This 
number grew to 140 at the end of 1998 (TDB, 2000). 
A franchising survey was conducted jointly by Trade Development Board (TDB), 
Singapore Productivity and Standards Board (PSB) and Singapore International 
Franchise Association (SIFA) in March 1999 to assess the performance of the 
Singaporean franchisor’s performance as well as to identify areas for improvement, 
development and growth.  The survey findings were compiled from 83 franchisors 
who responded to the study.   
The franchisors surveyed were mostly from the education, healthcare and other 
services sectors (40%), with high proportions from the food and beverage sector 
(36%) and retail sector (24%).  The survey showed that the highest number of 
franchises being launched both locally and overseas was in the 1997-98 period, where 
20 per cent increase occurred compared with the year before.  This is a positive 
development despite the East Asian economic slowdown during the 1997-1998 
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period.  It was found that most of the franchises set up within this period were from 
the retail and service sectors. 
Almost all of the franchisors (90%) surveyed experienced an increase in average 
monthly sales since embarking on franchising.  Similarly, almost all the franchisors 
(90%) agreed that franchising was a feasible option of business expansion compared 
to owning company outlets.  The survey also showed that the majority of franchisors 
enjoyed better profits since franchising, with 74 per cent of them reaping net profits in 
the last financial year.   
More than half (55%) of the franchisors had franchised their operations overseas to 
seek more business opportunities.  Although Southeast Asia was still a popular region 
for expansion, 34 per cent of the respondents had already gone further to Latin 
America, Middle East, Africa, and Europe.  55 per cent of the respondents also felt 
that franchising was an effective strategy for overseas business expansion in the next 
12 months.  The five most attractive markets being China, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Indonesia and Taiwan. 
The franchisors indicated that their success in franchising was caused by their 
strong track record, good financial background, a committed management team as 
well as proactive support from promotional agencies such as TDB and PSB. 
In addition to the franchisor survey, PSB also conducted a survey on franchisees 
during the same period in 1999.  Of the 154 respondents, which represented a 
response rate of 53 per cent who responded, close to 80 per cent of the franchisees 
experienced an improvement in sales since joining a franchise.  Of these, seven out of 
10 reported improved profitability since becoming a franchisee. 
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3.3.2 Governmental Programs 
The Singaporean government has demonstrated considerable commitment to 
franchising as a means of small business development and expansion (PSB, 2000).  
The Singapore Trade Development Board (TDB) plans to make Singapore into a 
franchise hub (TDB, 2000).  It aims to help successful local businesses to become 
homegrown international franchises, assist local companies to acquire master 
franchise rights for the region, and promote Singapore as the regional headquarters for 
foreign franchisors.   
The TDB views franchising as an avenue for Singaporean companies to expand 
internationally with the offer of the Franchise Development Assistance Scheme 
(FRANDAS).  With this scheme, successful local companies with a strong track 
record and firm foundation for franchising would receive assistance to develop their 
franchise systems and promote their franchises overseas.  Franchise missions to locate 
suitable overseas franchises have been arranged to Hong Kong, Paris, China and 
South Africa, with others being considered, including Australia.  Since its inception in 
1990, some 40 Singaporean franchises have been assisted in international expansion.  
Examples include Kinderland (a child-care provider), Melandas Casa Mobili (a 
furniture manufacturer and retailer) and Bee Cheng Hiang (a retailer of barbecued 
meat products).  It appears that the FRANDAS can assist foreign franchises if they are 
involved in conversion franchising, such as offering franchises to existing local firms, 
so improving their efficiency and survivability, or using Singapore as a base to 
expand into other areas of Asia. 
TDB has also developed another assistance program to help both Singaporean and 
foreign companies to expand their franchise businesses using Singapore as their base 
(TDB, 2000).  This program is called the International Franchise Enterprise Program 
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(IFEP).  Foreign companies can access IFEP to expand their franchise businesses 
through partnerships with Singaporean companies.  Singaporean firms could leap into 
the international area through IFEP by receiving assistance in franchise research and 
consultancy, trade mark registration, prototype shop design, franchise manuals and 
prospective development and international marketing. 
In 1993, under the efforts of TDB to encourage industry representation, a group of 
franchise companies gathered together to form the Singapore International Franchise 
Association (TDB, 2000).  Since its launch, it has actively worked with various 
governmental agencies to promote franchising and assist its members in their 
international expansion.   
3.3.3 International Franchising in Singapore 
The economic situation in Singapore has had a very positive effect on the demand for 
consumer-ready products.  The buying power of Singaporeans for imported goods has 
increased, and interest in “Westernised” products is growing (Patterson and Kong, 
1996).  A strong “yuppie” culture exists in Singapore, where Singaporeans spend 
willingly on branded products.  Still, consumers are generally very price conscious 
and want value for their money in their purchases. 
It is often said that the two national pastimes of Singaporeans are shopping and 
eating.  Over the past decade, Singapore’s consumers have almost doubled the amount 
they spend on food and beverages.  They consumed US$5 billion worth of foodstuffs 
and beverages in 1999, about half of which was spent eating out (Department of 
Statistics, 2000).   
Eating habits are changing, which are caused by being increasingly exposed to 
Western media, travel, and education abroad.  Fast food restaurants are particularly 
well liked by youngsters, who exert enormous influence over family decisions as to 
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where families eat out on weekends (Kong, 1997).  Western franchises, such as 
McDonald’s, Hard Rock Café, Planet Hollywood, Pizza Hut, Kenny Roger’s 
Roasters, KFC and TGI Friday’s are present on the local food scene.  The number of 
Italian and other continental style restaurants has also doubled since the early 1990s.  
For foreign franchises setting up in Singapore, acceptance of the franchise and 
brand name by the local population is vital, so skilful marketing is essential (Kong, 
1997).  Products and services may also need to be tailored to local preferences to get 
maximum response.  Food franchisors are popular but very competitive, and some 
strong U.S. entrants have failed in Singapore such as Hardee’s and Wendy’s.  
Although it is not known why some fast food restaurants have not succeeded in 
Singapore, lessons could perhaps be drawn from the entry of KFC and McDonald’s 
into Hong Kong.   
Western food was first introduced to Hong Kong by KFC in 1973 (Lan and Khan, 
1995).  The first KFC unit was managed under a joint venture contract with a local 
Hong Kong partner.  Business was brisk at the outset and KFC grew to 11 units 
within a year.  KFC made several fatal errors including poor locations, inconsistent 
product qua lity and uncertain market positioning and pricing.  In 1975, KFC closed 
down all 11 units and withdrew the concept from Hong Kong. 
The same year that KFC left, McDonald’s arrived, bringing with it an approach 
different from KFC’s (Lan and Khan, 1995).  First, McDonald’s advertised 
aggressively to raise awareness of the fast food phenomenon among its target 
customers – children and teenagers.  Second, new units were added carefully and 
gradually after intense market research.  Third, a competitive pricing strategy 
positioned the restaurants well in the target market.   
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Those offerings that are very different have better possibilities, and franchises that 
emphasize foreign aspects are more likely to be popular (Kong, 1997).  Others that 
concentrate on healthy foods would appeal as health-consciousness is high and few in 
the food industry have this approach. The foreign fast food and restaurants presently 
operating are dominated by U.S. franchises. 
A franchising survey was conducted by TDB in June 1996 to provide key measures 
of the growth and profile of the franchising industry in Singapore (TDB and Arthur 
Andersen, 1996).  The survey findings were compiled from 83 franchise companies 
that responded to the survey.   
Almost half (42 %) of franchises were foreign concepts.  They were made up of 
USA (66%), UK (16%), Switzerland (6%), Australia (6%), Italy (3%), and Hong 
Kong (3%).  This is to be expected, as the U.S. is the largest and most established 
pool of franchise concepts in the world.  This also indicates the generally high 
receptiveness of Singaporeans to U.S. brands, products and services. 
A large majority (70%) of the franchises had established their franchise operations 
within the last five years.  Firms with at least 10 years of franchising operations in 
Singapore made up about 15 per cent of the franchises. 
Advertising and promotion (65%), and training (70%) were the main major 
activities undertaken by franchises.  On the other end of the scale only 23 per cent of 
the respondents indicated that they carried out manufacturing activities in Singapore.  
This could be due to the comparatively higher labour and land costs in Singapore.  
Some local franchisors have shifted their manufacturing operations abroad to tap on 
cheaper production resources while maintaining their headquarter functions in 
Singapore.  Master franchisees largely imported the products rather than 
manufactured them locally. 
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A third (35%) of the franchises indicated the initial term of agreement granted were 
between 10 and 15 years.   This is followed by 20 per cent of the respondents having 
their franchise agreement between two and less than five years.  When it comes to the 
number of years granted in an extension of the franchise agreement, the common 
period granted ranged from five to 15 years.   
About 93 per cent of the respondents indicated that they provided initial training for 
their franchises.  Out of this group, a quarter of them provided training that ranged 
from 14 to 21 days.  This was followed by another group (20%) that provided training 
for less than seven days.  As for on-going training, the survey indicated that 68 per 
cent of the respondents stated that the number of days of training provided per year 
fell within 21 days. 
The survey found that 44 per cent of the franchise companies started with local 
franchise outlets prior to expansion overseas.  However, 56 per cent indicated they did 
not have any franchising experience.  Taking the small population size of Singapore 
(4 million) in consideration, it is perhaps not uncommon for companies to serve the 
entire domestic market with company owned stores rather than having any franchise 
outlets. 
3.4 Implications for Foreign Franchises 
Over the past 30 years international franchises have created a strong presence in 
Singapore.  Renowned franchises such as McDonald’s, Kentucky Fried Chicken 
(KFC), Pizza Hut, 7-Eleven, Hertz, and the Body Shop have achieved overwhelming 
success in Singapore, which subsequently have motivated other international 
franchises to expand into the country.   
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The strong growth of the franchising industry in Singapore is expected to continue 
over the foreseeable future.  This is largely fuelled by the country’s robust economic 
growth, excellent infrastructure, friendly business environment, political stability and  
Government’s pro-active policies toward franchising.  In addition, the rapid spread of 
Western influence on the relatively young population in Singapore has resulted in an 
increased demand for western-oriented lifestyle products.   
For foreign franchises to succeed in Singapore, skilful marketing is essential to 
generate wide acceptable of its concept and brand name by the local population.  The 
huge success of McDonald’s in Singapore has been the ability of the brand to 
assimilate into the daily lives of Singaporeans.  Although Singaporeans are largely 
cosmopolitan and westernised, there is still a need for foreign franchises to make 
adaptations to their concept to achieve maximum results. 
Singapore has also found to have astute investors with the financia l and 
administrative resources to take up and develop master franchises for the Asian 
region.  In addition, foreign franchisors can access FRANDAS, which is a 
Government’s development assistance financial scheme, when using Singapore as a 
base to expand into other parts of Asia.  Singapore can offer two major advantages to 
potential foreign franchisors considering expanding into Asia.  Firstly, Singapore’s 
relatively large westernised population makes it highly suitable for foreign franchises 
to test-market and fine-tune its foreign franchise concept before introducing it into the 
Asian region.  Secondly, foreign franchisors can take advantage of the Singaporean 
investor’s extensive experience and strong local knowledge of the region. 
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4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research is designed as a multiple-case study comprising four purposely-selected 
foreign franchisors that have expanded into East Asia.  The process of operating 
franchises in East Asia, including selection of franchisees, management and 
marketing is the focus of the study.  The research into international franchising has 
been largely quantitative, which makes its complexities very difficult to be tracked 
and studied in detail.  The decision of carrying out case studies was that they are 
valuable as preliminaries to major investigations as they generate rich data that may 
suggest themes for more intensive investigation (Burns, 1990). 
Yin (1994, p. 13) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
The case study method has been an essential form of research in the social sciences 
and management.  It has been used in research involving business and organisational 
issues, education, child-development and youth policy, family studies, international 
affairs, evaluation, technology development and research on social problems (Yin, 
1983).   
Traditionally, case stud ies were considered appropriate for exploratory research 
only.  Yin (1994) however, points out that some of the best and most famous case 
studies have been both descriptive, such as Whyte (1955)’s “Street Corner Society” 
and explanatory, such as Allison (1971)’s “Essence of Decision-Making: Explaining 
the Cuban Missile Crisis,” in 1971.  Eisenhardt (1989) identifies other uses for the 
case study method to provide description (Kidder, 1981), test theory (Anderson, 1983; 
Pinfield, 1986), or generate theory (Harris and Sutton, 1986; Gersick, 1988). 
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This chapter is divided into two main sections. First, the case study method is 
examined in the principal areas of the common criticisms it is facing and verification 
of the evidence by the process of triangulation.  Second, the application of the case 
study method to this research study is demonstrated.  The key components of the 
research methodology including research questions, cases selection, data collection, 
and data analysis are discussed. 
4.1 The Case Study Method 
A case study is considered a more appropriate strategy for answering research 
questions which ask ‘how’ and ‘why’ and which do not require control over the 
events (Robson, 1993).  This is because such questions deal with operational links 
that would need to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence.  
Furthermore, because of its ability to test and generate theory, the case study approach 
will be more suitable than survey research to establish the validity of the content.  By 
using the case study approach, the reasons why certain decisions were made, how 
they were implemented and what the results are can be identified. 
Case studies can be classified by purpose, which is differentiated as descriptive, 
explanatory, evaluative or exploratory (Gall, Borg and Gall, 1966; Robson, 1993).  
When the purpose is descriptive, the researcher looks for constructs to organise data 
and relate them to other research findings and for themes that identify the salient 
features of a case.  The purpose of descriptive research is to accurately portray an 
accurate profile of persons, events, or situations (Robson, 1993).  This requires 
extensive knowledge of the research subject in order to identify appropriate aspects on 
which to gather information.  However, Yin (1994) cautions that descriptive case 
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studies should not be used simply to describe everything but to focus on answering 
the purpose of the study.   
In an explanatory case study, the operative dynamic is the identifying of patterns, in 
which one item of observed variation is systemically related to another (Gall, Borg 
and Gall, 1966).  If causality is claimed, the pattern is termed causal; if not, it is 
termed relational.  Evaluative case studies refer to those in which the researcher 
makes judgments (Gall, Borg, and Gall, 1966). 
The exploratory case study seeks to find out what is happening, to seek new 
heights, to ask questions, and to assess phenomena in a new light (Robson, 1996).  
This is perhaps the most pure hypothesis or theory building form of case study.  
Consequently, an exploratory case study normally focuses on current events and 
concerns and seeks to answer questions of how and why.  Yin (1994) favours 
exploratory case studies only when the available literature or existing knowledge base 
is poor.  Once the uncertainty has been investigated and resolved, the exp loratory 
phase is complete and the real study should be undertaken.   
There are two fundamental approaches to using the case study method.  Yin (1994) 
uses case studies to test theory while Eisenhardt (1989) uses case studies to develop 
theory.  The latter, theory development from case study evidence, was used for the 
purpose of this study.   
In the case of theory development, the existing knowledge base may be poor, and 
the available literature does not provide any conceptual framework or hypotheses.  
Therefore, such a knowledge base does not lend itself to the development of good 
theoretical statements, and any new empirical study is likely to assume the 
characteristic of being an exploratory study.  However, Yin (1994) argues that it is 
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nonetheless essent ial for the theory development approach to develop theory at the 
outset.   
4.1.1 Criticisms of the Case Study Method 
Although the case study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry, many research 
investigators have regarded it as a less desirable form of inquiry than either 
experiments or surveys (Yin, 1994).  Perhaps the greatest concern has been over the 
lack of rigour of case study research.  This has largely been attributed to the 
investigator allowing equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of 
the findings and conclusions (Yin, 1994). 
A common criticism of the case study method, however, is that it provides little 
basis for scientific generalisation.  “How can you generalise from a single-case?” is a 
frequently heard question.  This question has also been asked with the generalising 
ability of a single experiment.  Yin (1994) points out that scientific facts are rarely 
based on single experiments; they are usually based on a multiple set of experiments, 
which have replicated the same phenomenon under different conditions.  The same 
approach can be used with multiple-case approach but requires a different concept of 
the appropriate research deigns.  Yin (1994, p. 10) further asserts, “that case studies, 
like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations 
or universe. ”   
In this sense, the case study, like the experiment does not represent a sample, and 
the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) 
and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation).  Understanding the 
distinction between two types of generalisation may be the most important challenge 
in undertaking case studies (Yin, 1994).  In statistical generalisation, an inference is 
made about a population (or universe) on the basis of empirical data collected about a 
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sample.  This method of generalising is commonly recognised because researchers 
have ready access to formulas for determining the confidence with which 
generalisations can be made, depending mostly on the size and internal variation 
within the universe and sample.  Moreover, this is the most common way of 
generalising when doing surveys and experiments. 
A flaw in doing case studies is to conceive of statistical generalisation as the 
method of generalising the results of the case (Yin, 1994).  This is because cases are 
not ‘sampling units’ and should not be chosen for this reason.  Instead, case studies 
are to be selected as a laboratory investigator selects the topic of a new experiment.  
This method of generalisation is known as analytic generalisation, in which a 
previously developed theory is used as a template to compare the empirical results of 
the case study.  If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication 
may be claimed.   
4.1.2 Triangulation 
A major strength of case study data collection is the opportunity to use many different 
sources of evidence.  Further, the need to use multiple sources of evidence far exceeds 
that in other research strategies, such as experiments, surveys, or histories (Yin, 
1994).  Experiments, for instance, are largely limited to the measurement and 
recording of actual behaviour in the laboratory and generally do not include the 
systematic use of survey or verbal information.  Surveys tend to be the opposite, 
emphasising the verbal information but not the measurement or recording of actual 
behaviour.  Finally, histories are limited to events in the past and, therefore, seldom 
have any contemporary sources of evidence, such as direct observations of a 
phenomenon or interviews with key actors. 
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The use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows an investigator to 
address a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues (Yin, 1994).  
However, the most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of 
evidence is the development of triangulation.  This is a process of converging lines of 
inquiry, which results in supporting a finding by showing that independent measures 
of it agree with it, or at least, do not contradict it (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Thus 
any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and 
accurate if it is based on several different sources of information. 
There are four types of triangulation that can be used (Patton, 1987).  They include 
triangulation by data sources (data triangulation), among different evaluators 
(investigator triangulation), of perspectives on the same data set (theory triangulation) 
and of methods (methodological triangulation).  The present study used data 
triangulation to verify the interview by collection information from multiple sources, 
which aimed to corroborate the same fact or phenomenon.   
4.2 Application of the Case Study Method 
For this study on critical success factors of international franchisors in East Asia, it 
was decided that the multiple-case approach would be suitable, as it allowed both 
theoretical and literal replication approaches to be used.  According to Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Yin (1994), replication logic enables a researcher to identify the subtle 
similarities and differences within a group of cases as well as inter-group similarities 
and differences.  Replication logic also encourages the researcher to go beyond initial 
impressions.  These forced comparisons allow new categories and concepts to be 
identified.  By using the multiple-case approach, a better understanding of an 
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international franchisor’s decision-making process and critical success factors can be 
attained.   
As this study consists of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, which are more 
explanatory, the use of case studies has been considered by Yin (1994) to be a 
preferred research strategy.  The key steps of the research methodology are discussed 
below. 
4.2.1 Research Propositions 
The main aim of this study is to explore the critical success factors (CSFs) of 
international franchising in East Asia.  The concept of CSFs needs to be clearly 
explained.   
Critical success factors (CSFs) are those key areas of activity, which mus t be, 
performed particularly well in order for the organisation to outperform its competitors 
(Vasconcellos e Sa, 1988).  They represent those areas that management must 
carefully consider in order to bring about continued good performance.  Hofer and 
Schendel (1978) asserted that CSFs are well known to the existing competitors in an 
industry, although they may not be as evident to potential new entrants.  Managers’ 
evaluations of relevant CSFs and the firm’s position vis-à-vis these factors provide the 
foundation for a firm’s competitive strategy (Porter, 1980).   
Yin (1994, p. 103)’s preferred strategy of analysing case study’s evidence is to 
“follow the theoretical propositions that led to the case study. ”  The proposition helps 
the researcher to focus on examining only the relevant data.  It also helps to organise 
the entire case study, which enables alternative explanations to be examined.  
Theoretical propositions about causal relationships – answers to “how” and ‘why” – 
can be especially useful in guiding case study analysis. 
 70 
One of the problems faced by international franchisors, even with advances in 
telecommunications technology, is the gathering and receiving of complete and timely 
knowledge about foreign operations (Aharoni, 1996).  The ability of a franchisor to 
monitor its franchisee-agents over long distances involves a complex set of skills that 
may not be commonly possessed by the entrepreneurs or managers operating 
franchise firms and does not necessarily substitute for experience (Huszagh, Huszagh 
and McIntyre, 1992).  These abilities, which include supervisory skills, have been 
shown to be important for international expansion (Shane, 1996a).  Therefore, it is 
expected that international franchisors should have capability in distance management 
in order to increase the likelihood of success in East Asia.  
P1: The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in distance management. 
The structure of the international franchising contract is considered to be a central 
aspect of the franchisor- franchisee relationship (Rubin, 1978; Lafontaine and 
Kaufmann, 1994).  Most franchising contracts within the franchisor’s domestic 
market are standardised (LaFontaine and Kaufmann, 1994).  However, within the 
international market, franchising contracts can vary substantially (Abell, 1990).   
In most standard franchise agreements, the franchisor has the right to revoke the 
franchise agreement without return of the franchise fee if the franchisee does not 
adhere to his or her contractual obligations.  The higher the franchise fee relative to 
the size of the royalty and advertising payment, the greater the cost to the franchisee 
of agreement termination, and the more the franchisee needs to adhere to the franchise 
system (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991; Norton, 1988; Combs and Castrogiovanni, 
1994).  This bond is a particular effective tool, as the franchisee usually invests a 
large percentage of his or her personal net worth in the purchase of the outlets (Combs 
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and Castrogiovanni, 1994).  Under these circumstances, termination of the franchise 
agreement often results in great financial hardship for the franchisee. 
According to Shane (1996a), international franchisors may need to modify contracts 
to include the initial terms of their franchise agreements, the ratio of their franchise 
fees, and provisions concerning cooperative advertising and store opening support.  
Such variations with an international contract may be due to the size of a franchisee, 
host country restrictions, local business practices, and the opportunistic behaviour of 
particular franchisees.  It is important that franchisors have the ability to negotiate 
contract modifications (Root, 1987) and handle contract enforcement in order to 
achieve successful international development (Hood and Young, 1979).  Therefore, it 
is expected that international franchisors should  have the capability to handle contract 
negotiations and enforcement in order to increase the likelihood of success in East 
Asia.  
P2 The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in handling contractual 
negotiations and enforcement. 
The different cultural environments found in foreign markets add further 
complexity to international franchising (Huszagh, Huszagh, and McIntyre, 1992).  
The very strength of the franchise format, its standardisation, makes its successful 
replication in foreign markets difficult (Aydin and Kacker, 1990).  Frequently, 
modifications may be needed in various aspects of the franchise operation (Sadi, 
1994).  Variations in cultural norms such as “power distance,” Confucian dynamism, 
and individualism can affect local implementation, especially when conducting 
business in East Asia (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1988).  Therefore, it is 
expected that international franchisors must be able to make adaptations to its 
operations if it desires to achieve success in East Asia. 
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P3 The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in cultural adaptability. 
To succeed in international franchising, companies must have the ability to deal 
with uncertainty within the foreign country.  Risk management is an important 
consideration in international business research (Ghoshal, 1987).  Issues such as 
government policies, regulations and macroeconomic variations make conducting 
business internationally more uncertain than domestically (Miller, 1992).  Hackett 
(1976) indicated that such issues were important to franchisors.  The franchisors in his 
survey were primarily concerned with government regulations within the foreign 
market that affect both the conduct of the service and monetary uncertainty, rather 
than the complexities of format modification.  Therefore, it is expected that 
international franchisors possess a capability in host country policy evaluation and 
foreign exchange management to achieve success in East Asia.   
P4 The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in host country risk 
management, including host country policy evaluation and foreign 
exchange management. 
 
4.2.2 Selection of Cases for the Study 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that in the multiple-case approach there are no ideal number 
of cases, but suggests that a study of between four and 10 cases usually works well.  
With fewer than four cases, theory is difficult to generate, and with more than 10 
cases, the volume of data is difficult to cope with.  For this study, four foreign  
 that have several years of experience operating in East Asia. 
Small to medium-sized firms were chosen because of the feasibility of access to 
principal decision makers.  However, a highly successful large international 
franchisor has also been included in the study.  The reasons for this inclusion are three 
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fold: (1) the company was judged to fit the characteristics of a ‘worldwide franchisor’ 
according to the typology of Fladmoe-Linquist’s (1996) model,  (2) the U.K.- based 
company has a regional head office in Singapore that can be accessed easily from 
Perth, and (3) the regional international manager, who has been involved with the 
company’s expansion into East Asia since 1983, was prepared to be interviewed. 
Each case was selected because it either predicts similar results (literal replication) 
or predicts different results for expected reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin, 1994).  
The unit of analysis was the firm.  This meant that questions had to be pertinent to this 
unit of analysis otherwise the data collected would be irrelevant.  An important step in 
all of these replication procedures is the development of a rich, theoretical framework 
(Yin, 1994).  The framework needs to state the conditions under which a particular 
phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal replication) as well as the conditions when 
it is not likely to be found (a theoretical replication).  The theoretical framework later 
becomes the vehicle for generalising to new cases, similar to the role played in cross-
experiment designs. 
The four cases were selected because they have different characteristics from each 
other, as Eisenhardt (1989) recommends.  They have different existing international 
franchising capabilities and capacity for developing international franchising 
capabilities and are at varying levels of internationalisation development according to 
each of the four cells in Fladmoe-Linquist’s (1996) model as mentioned in the Section 
2.5.3 of this thesis.  Since each firm was selected to fit into each category of Fladmoe-
Linquist’s (1996) model it is predicted that the level of performance of each firm in 
East Asia would differ for specific reasons (see Table 6).  The integrating franchisors, 
constrained franchisors, conventional franchisors and worldwide franchisors are 
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predicted to have varying levels of success for the reasons explained by Fladmoe-
Lindquist (1996).   
TABLE 4:1 
Typology of International Franchisors  
 
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING CAPABILITIES CAPACITY FOR DEVELOPING 
INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES LOW HIGH 
HIGH INTEGRATING FRANCHISOR WORLDWIDE FRANCHISOR 
 Dome Coffees (Australia) 
· Pursues cautious growth 
· Uses joint venture and master 
franchising 
· Proactive evaluation 
The Body Shop (U.K.) 
· Focuses on global markets 
· Uses multiple forms of franchising 
· Both proactive and reactive 
LOW CONSTRAINED FRANCHISOR CONVENTIONAL FRANCHISOR 
 Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream 
(Australia) 
· Concentrates locally 
· Withdrew from international 
markets 
· Reactive evaluation 
Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf (U.S.) 
· Focuses on several foreign markets 
· Converted from franchise to 
company-owned stores  
· Often reactive with some proactive 
efforts 
Adapted from Fladmoe-Linquist, K. (1996), “International Franchising: Capabilities and 
Development,” Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 11 (2), p. 428. 
 
Constrained franchisors have limited international management capabilities and 
capacity for learning.  A company in this capacity is not likely to pursue significant 
international franchise development.  Such franchisors will limit their international 
expansion to the country closest to them, geographically or culturally.  The Australian 
franchisor Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream fits into this typology.  The company opened 
its first store in 1985 but did not begin franchising overseas until 1991.  Although it 
subsequently expanded into Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan and the Philippines, 
it withdrew all its 23 stores from these markets in 1998. 
Integrating franchisors have limited international franchising capabilities but 
considerable capacity for learning from experience and integrating experiences into 
operations.  These firms are more likely to initiate international expansion early in 
their life cycle.  The Australian franchisor Dome Coffees has been selected for this 
typology.  Dome Coffees expanded into Singapore after the opening of its first store 
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in Perth.  The company enters each market using an approach that reflects an 
awareness of different national tastes, regulations and franchise partners.  Dome set 
up a joint-venture with a Singaporean company to expand into Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore.  It entered the Philippines and Dubai by master franchising. 
Conventional franchisors have some of the capabilities needed for international 
expansion but do not have a great ability to develop what is needed to succeed in a 
broader global setting.  These franchisors are also likely to expand into international 
franchising through foreign solicitations by prospective franchisees.  A businessman 
from Singapore approached a U.S. family-owned gourmet coffee store Coffee Bean 
and Tea Leaf about opening stores in Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan.  Three years 
later, the Singaporean master franchisee acquired a substantial stake in the franchisor.  
This move has effectively transformed the franchise stores in all its overseas markets 
to become company-owned stores.  Presently, the company prefers unsolicited 
enquires rather than proactive franchisee recruitment as a means to determine genuine 
interest shown in its concept. 
Worldwide franchisors are generally largely franchisors with a great amount of 
experience and greater capabilities in both administrative efficiency and host country 
risk management.  These franchisors operate in many countries.  They used a variety 
of ownership and franchise agreements configuration.  They have operated 
internationally for a long period of time and gathered additional knowledge in variety 
of markets.  The U.K. franchisor Body Shop would fit into this category.  The Body 
Shop is a value-driven, high quality skin and hair care retailer operating in 49 
countries with 1,730 outlets spanning 25 languages and 12 time zones in 2000.  The 
company’s entry into East Asia first began in Singapore in 1983.  In Asia, the Body 
 76 
Shop is a well-established business with 332 stores (Annual Report and Accounts, 
2000).  Of the 322 stores to date, 17 are company owned.   
4.2.3 Data Collection  
In this study data were collected primarily via two methods: in-depth interviewing and 
documents research.   
In-depth interviewing (face-to-face) was a data collection method relied on quite 
extensively in this study.  The interviews were conducted with key decision makers 
involved in the internationlisation of the firms.  They included managing directors, 
founder, international franchise managers and overseas master franchisees.  All the 
interviews were tape-recorded and then transcribed.  The typical interview lasted two 
hours; the length varied from 90 minutes to three hours.   
A guideline for interview questions was provided in Appendix A.  It consisted of 31 
open-ended questions.  Each question, however, was only a point of reference.  
During the interviews, questions were neither repeated verbatim nor in a given order.  
The importance of this guideline was that it provided some directions for the 
interviews.  Typically, the researcher began the interviews with questions similar to 
the questions suggested in the guideline, and then depending upon the responses 
received, he moved into probing questions.  Probing questions were useful in gaining 
more insights and clarifying the answers from the respondents.   
The researcher explored a few general topics regarding international franchising to 
help to uncover the respondents’ meaning and perspective, but otherwise respected 
how the respondent framed and structured the responses.  This was to ensure that the 
respondent’s perspective on issues of international franchising unfolded as the 
respondent viewed it, not as the researcher viewed it.   
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In keeping with the case study method, document research or multiple sources of 
data collection were used to provide triangulation.  Documents are good sources of 
evidence, because many documents are easily accessible, free and contain information 
that otherwise would take an investigator substantial time and resources to gather 
(Dexter, 1970).  The data were collected from documents such as annual reports, 
minutes of meetings, letters, internal memoranda, court proceedings, newspaper 
clippings, magazine articles and books.   
4.2.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the collected 
data.  Merriam (1988) and Marshall and Rossman (1989) contend that data collection 
and data analysis must be a simultaneous process in a qualitative research design.  
The method of qualitative analysis here draws on Yin (1994, p. 103)’s preferred 
strategy of relying on theoretical propositions that led to the case study.  The 
propositions helped to organise the case study and to examine alternative 
explanations. 
Both single case and cross-case analyses were included in this study, and the 
process of data analysis entailed three activities: data reduction, data display, and 
conclusion drawing and verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 10-3).  These 
activities proceeded concurrently during the research project, although one might take 
precedence over the others at various times. 
Data reduction refers to the process of selection, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, 
and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).  The process of data reduction in this study began as soon as 
the important topics or themes were identified and continued throughout data 
collection and report writing.  
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The writings of Miles and Huberman (1994) were drawn on for techniques of data 
display.  They suggest that data displays should be designed to assemble organised 
information in a compact form that is immediately accessible.  One of their 
techniques, which was used in this study, was to arrange empirical evidence in tables 
in the forms of words, rather than numbers.  By looking at these tables, themes that 
agree or disagree across cases would emerge. 
Drawing conclusions and verifying them took place before, during and after data 
collection.  Before data collection the researcher might have had vague and unformed 
hunches that could lead to conclusions.  As analysis proceeded, however, these 
conclusions were tested and elaborated systematically for their soundness, the 
conclusions then became more explicit as they were verified by the data in 
increasingly grounded analyses.   
In ensuring internal validity, several strategies were utilised (Merriam, 1988): 
1. Triangulation of data.  Data were collected from multiple sources to include 
interviews and document analysis. 
2. Member checking.  The researcher took data and interpretations back to the 
interviewee to check for accuracy.  When accuracy was confirmed, the case 
evidence was deemed suitable for analysis. 
3. Participatory mode of research.  Interviewees of the four firms were 
involved in most phases of this study, from the design of the study to 
checking interpretations and conclusions. 
 
The primary strategies that were utilised in this study to ensure validity included (a) 
providing the provision of rich, thick, and detailed description so that anyone 
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interested in transferability will have a base of information appropriate for 
comparison (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and (b) by conducting a cross-case analysis.    
To ensure reliability, three strategies were employed in this study: (a) the researcher 
provided a detailed account of the focus of the study, the researchers’ role, the 
participant’s position and basis for selection (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984); (b) 
multiple methods of data collection and analysis were to strengthen reliability as well 
as internal validity (Merriam, 1988); and (c) data collection and analysis process were 
reported in detail in order to provide a clear and accurate picture of the methods used 
in this study (Merriam, 1988).   
Data reduction, data display, and drawing conclusions were activities of data 
analysis occurring interactively throughout the study.  All the three activities were, 
therefore, combined to produce a comprehensive analysis of the study. 
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5 CASE STUDIES 
 
In this chapter, three successful international franchisors operating in Asia and one 
failed international franchisor were carefully selected for conducting the case studies.  
They are Dome Coffees Australia Pty. Ltd., Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf, The Body 
Shop and Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream Cone Company.  Several face-to-face 
interviews have been conducted with the respective franchisors and master 
franchisees of these companies in Perth, Sydney and Singapore.   
5.1 Dome Coffees Australia Pty. Ltd. 
Dome is a retailer of coffees in Australia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.  The 
company operates 48, mostly franchise, outlets around Australia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, The Philippines, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates (See Table 7).   
The company also has a coffee roasting business based in Perth, which roasts coffee 
from 16 different countries and sells to the Dome cafes and other outlets.  Each week, 
it airfreights hundreds of kilograms of coffee to The Philippines and United Arab 
Emirates, with its Singapore factory roasting coffee for cafes in Singapore and 
Malaysia.  Over the past 10 years, the company has grown from a single café in 
Napoleon Street in Cottesloe to an international AUD$60 million-dollar international 
enterprise. 
5.1.1 Company Founders 
Dome was founded by Phil May and Patria Jafferies in 1990.  May, who is the current 
Director of International Business, taught himself how to roast and prepare coffee, 
and still remains Dome’s Master Roaster.  Jafferies, currently the Managing Director, 
handles the marketing and presentation package of the franchise division, which has 
become the hallmark of Dome’s appeal.   
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TABLE 5:1 
International Locations of Dome Cafes 
 
MARKET OUTLETS  
Australia 24 
Indonesia  1 
Malaysia  9 
The Philippines  3 
Singapore  8 
United Arab Emirates  3 
TOTAL  48 
 
 
May was a national triple jump athlete for Australia, competing in the Olympics in 
1976 and the Commonwealth games of 1970 (where he won a gold and silver medal) 
and 1974 (Buenas, 2000).  He became involved in the business of coffee after 
working in a company, which sold espresso machines and catering equipment to 
restaurants.  May decided to set up a business roasting coffee after witnessing the 
emergence in the 1980s of a chic café culture on America’s west coast.  In 1983, he 
established Western Roast Coffee, a supplier of roasted coffees and the precursor to 
Dome Coffees.   
Jafferies was born in 1952 in San Jose, California, with a mixture of Italian, Irish 
and Greek heritage.  Her father ran his own telecommunications business that he had 
started in the 50s and Jafferies and her three sisters spent their childhood around the 
San Francisco Bay (Caccetta, 2000).  It was while she was studying at university – a 
double major in graphic design and business – that Jafferies was first introduced to 
Western Australia (W.A.) by an Australian friend.  She made her first trip to Australia 
in 1972 and returned regularly. 
Jafferies began her working life as a rock promoter with Bill Graham Presents, an 
American company that represented such bands as the Rolling Stones and the Beatles.  
She then spent a year working for an aviation company in Paris, which began her love 
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of the cafe industry.  She returned to the U.S. working in the hospitality industry when 
she was asked to come to Perth in 1986 for the America’s Cup to work as a marketing 
manager and publicity officer for the Matilda Bay Brewing Company.   
Jafferies stayed with Matilda Bay for three years, and was credited with the 
successful launch of the company’s Redback beer label nationally.  She was on 
maternity leave when the company was taken over by Carlton and United Brewery.  
“At that point I decided it was going from a family company to a corporate culture, 
and I didn’t want to be doing it with a baby under my arm.” (Laurie, 2000).   
May first met Jafferies when he was supplying coffee to Matilda Bay.  In 1989, 
May and Jafferies joined forces and the two have taken May’s small business from 
production of 187 kg to 2.5 tonnes of coffee a week.   
5.1.2 Company Background 
Dome Coffees Australia Pty. Ltd. was established in 1990 with the firm objective to 
import and roast only the finest coffees from around the world.  Dome created a range 
of distinctive individually styled coffees based on the traditional craft skills of hand 
roasting and blending.  The company quickly found there was a burgeoning demand 
for its product from consumers who were in search of fresher, more flavourful 
alternatives to pre-packaged commercial blends. 
Dome’s success grew from its reputation for providing an outstanding range of fine 
coffees presented in stylish, high-quality packaging.  It became necessary to develop 
the means to showcase the product, which brought about the original Dome Café 
concept.  The design concept was to create the ambience of an Old-World style 
European café to serve as a ‘shop window’ for Dome products, specialising in the sale 
of freshly roasted coffees supported by a range of quality gourmet foods.  Close 
attention was paid to every detail of the café in an effort to create the most inviting 
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atmosphere possible, surrounding patrons with the warmth of polished wood and soft 
brass.  One unique aspect of the original design is the distinctive hand-painted domed 
ceiling map of the world. 
The name Dome was chosen because May and Jafferies wanted an international 
sounding name, with a hint of Middle Eastern, French or Italian heritage, which 
everyone could remember and pronounce.  The first café was opened in the affluent 
Perth seaside suburb of Cottesloe in November 1990.   
“When we built the first store in Cottesloe, we built it to be repeatable and in the 
back of our minds, we wanted to build a franchise, something world class, something 
you could bring to any part of the world.”  May says.   
May and Jafferies took nine months in the development of a franchise system for 
the organisation in 1993.  The first franchise store was opened in Subiaco, a trendy 
Perth suburb close to the city, in September 1994.  Over the next 12 months, three 
stores were opened very quickly in Galleria Shopping Centre, Fremantle and 
Applecross.  Today, Dome has 24 mostly franchise outlets around Australia.   
“We are involved in the lifestyle business,” said May in an interview with Choo 
(1995).  “It is an expression of Western Australian café lifestyle where particular 
types of coffees and foods are appreciated and enjoyed in Western Australia, it is 
where people can wear their fashionable clothes, be seen and enjoy their coffees under 
the sun.”  This corporate philosophy has been faithfully followed by each of Dome’s 
cafes around the world in creating a mood and atmosphere that will enhance the 
enjoyment of its products. 
Internationally, Dome’s concept involves the “creation of a friendly, comfortable 
and casual ambience for the appreciation and enjoyment of stylish contemporary 
gourmet food, its own blend of freshly roasted quality espresso coffee prepared in the 
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traditional Italian way, and good wine, all at affordable prices.”  Its array of fresh food 
and drinks will cater to the discerning taste buds of its sophisticated customers 
throughout the day from breakfast, morning tea, lunch, afternoon tea to dinner. 
5.1.3 Dome’s Internationalisation 
In October 1992, a Singaporean named Ronald Lee approached May and Jafferies to 
discuss setting up Dome Cafes in the Republic.  “My first impression of Ronald was 
he was personal enough,” says May.  “I thought it was an interesting proposition.”   
May and Jafferies flew to Singapore and spent five days in “walking the street” to 
get a feel of the café industry.  “We went everywhere in the city, visited every 
shopping centre, I thought Singapore was terrific and a very immature market for 
coffees, and there was really no direct competition.”  There was no formal market 
research conducted to supplement this preliminary investigation. 
May was very excited and delighted with what he saw in Singapore.  Intuitively, he 
felt that there were tremendously opportunities for Dome to introduce its European 
café concept, specialising in the sale of freshly roasted coffees and quality gourmet 
foods, into Singapore.  Today’s popular Italian coffee drinks such as espresso, café 
latte or machiatto were unheard of in Singapore then.   
The idea of setting up the second Dome outlet in Singapore became a highly 
attractive proposition to May and Jafferies.  The idea of expansion had had been 
seriously desired after the huge success of its first café in Cottesloe.  However, 
Australia was in a significant recession that caused business borrowing to be 
prohibitively difficult and expensive.  On the other hand, Singapore was enjoying an 
economic boom of six per cent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 1992 
(Singapore Department of Statistics, 1993).   
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“Australia has got a very small market, a very mature market, and a depressed 
market.  Why do we want to expand to the eastern states?” said May (Choo, 1995).  
“Conversely, we look north.  Singapore is on the same time zone.  Hence, it’s easier 
to do business with Singapore than Sydney.  The second thing is there is a denser 
population in Singapore.  The people are retail oriented, they have higher disposable 
income, and the whole place is jumping and booming.  It’s the trade gateway to the 
whole of Southeast Asia.” 
In December 1992, May, Jafferies and two Singaporean investors named Ronald 
Lee and his cousin Sebastian Ong formed a joint-venture in Singapore.  Lee was a 42 
year old Singaporean tax lawyer who moved to Perth with his family in 1989 (Lim 
and Tong, 1996).  When Lee failed to get himself admitted to the Bar in Perth, he 
decided to try his hand in business.  It was in Dome’s Cottesloe café that Lee and his 
wife Grace decided that Dome would be the channel to introduce café culture into 
Singapore.  Ong, a 45 year old entrepreneur, had had more than 15 years of 
experience in the food and beverage business in Singapore (Eng, 1999; Kerk, 2000a).  
Prior to joining Dome, Ong had owned and sold a range of eateries including several 
coffeehouses and specialty restaurants, a chain of seven-outlet Korean barbeque 
restaurants, and two 8,000 square foot Chinese restaurants.   
The company was called Dome Café (Cecil Court) Pte. Ltd.  The initial start-up 
capital was S$800,000, which was contributed equally by all the four partners.  Both 
May and Jafferies had so much confidence in Dome’s prospect in Singapore that they 
borrowed $200,000 each from Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) using their 
residential homes as collaterals.  The company’s primary objective was to operate a 
couple of cafes in Singapore initially as a showcase for establishing a franchise 
operation in the region.  Dome’s mission statement was to bring the finest coffee to 
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Asia, serve it in the most stylist surroundings and support it with fresh, epicurean food 
(Jarrett, 1993).  This was the beginning of Dome’s path to international expansion. 
5.1.4 Singapore 
In March 1993, the Australia-Singapore joint-venture spent S$500,000 to set up its 
first café in the heart of Singapore’s financial district Cecil Court.  It is located in the 
main financial district, which is surrounded by major banks and financial institutions.  
May and Jafferies, together with several staff, spent a month in Singapore personally 
overseeing the setting up of the store.  The inaugural café in Singapore resembles the 
Cottesloe outlet in every detail, from the design and interiors right down to the chairs. 
Dome baked its own breads, cakes, pastries and biscuits on the premises but flew in 
all its fresh vegetables, salads, milk, sun-dried tomatoes frozen dough, oils, vinegars, 
olives, chocolates, sweetmeats, jams, chutneys and preserves, Australian wines and 
cheeses, and Fremantle sardines and anchovies from Perth.  The coffees were flown 
into Singapore twice a week.  Upon receiving the coffee beans, they would be frozen 
immediately to maintain their moisture.  Then they would grind and brew the coffee 
beans as and when the customers ordered their drinks (Jarrett, 1993).   
Encouraged by the phenomenal success of its first store in Singapore, the company 
decided to locate its next outlet on Orchard Road, the main shopping and 
entertainment area, in order to achieve high brand visibility.  In August 1993, Dome 
found such a site in the atrium foyer of the Promenade Shopping Centre, which has a 
retail mix of upmarket designer wear, jewellery and accessories.  After some 
dissatisfaction with the design of the Cecil Court cafe, the Promenade outlet was built 
in Perth, dismantled and then rebuilt there (Gould, 1993).  The first two stores were 
company-owned and ran by Australian managers.  Dome Holdings recruited six 
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Australians including three award-winning chefs and three operational managers to 
maintain the “high quality of its food,” said Lee (Lum, 1995).   
The success of Dome’s first two stores led to many enquiries from those who 
recognised a winning concept and were interested in opening a similar operation.  
Consequently, the seeds of franchising were sown. 
In 1994, when May and Jafferies had spent nine months in developing the franchise 
system for its Australian’s operation, they decided that the best way to effectively 
manage and control the venture in Singapore was by master franchising.  This led to 
the formation of a company by Lee and Ong, the Singaporean partners, called Dome 
Holdings (S) Pte. Ltd., which became the master franchisee in Singapore.  Then, May 
and Jafferies sold the first two outlets to Dome Holdings (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.  At the 
end of the restructuring exercise, 1,500,000 ordinary shares of Dome Holdings of 
S$1.00 each were held by Lee, Grace (Lee’s wife) held 500,000 shares and Ong held 
the remaining 2,000,000 shares (Chan, 1998).   
At the same time, Dome Coffees and Dome Holdings formed a 50:50 joint-venture 
called Dome Asia Pte. Ltd.  All intellectual property interests subsisting in the Dome 
image and system are owned by Dome Asia.  The new joint-venture company has the 
authority to sell master franchise of the Dome system in seven countries including 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.  The start-up 
seed capital was S$600,000.  The term of franchise rights held by Dome Asia on its 
territories is perpetual. 
5.1.4.1 The Beginning of Conflict 
In mid 1994, Dome Holdings sold to a Singaporean individual the franchise rights to 
open Dome’s third outlet in Wheelock Place (formerly known as Lane Crawford 
Place).  However, the deal did not eventuate because the individual withdrew his 
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interest at the last minute.  Faced with this predicament, Lee and Ong suggested to 
May and Jafferies that they should instead own and run this outlet.  However, May 
and Jafferies declined the offer due to financial difficulties.  In the end, Lee and Ong 
then decided to own and operate the outlet by themselves as a separate entity.  
Consequently, they both refused to pay royalties to Dome Asia, arguing successfully 
that this new brassiere concept was totally different to Dome’s and that this was going 
to be a ‘one-off affair.’  However, against the wishes of May and Jafferies, Lee and 
Ong promoted the S$1 million café-cum-brassiere as part of Dome by branding it 
Olio Dome.  May and Jafferies were not at all pleased.   
According to Shaik Aziz, the regional general manager of Dome Coffees Australia 
Pty. Ltd., the action taken by Lee and Ong is not uncommon among franchisees in 
Asia.  “The problem with franchisees in Asia is that at one stage in their business, 
they think they know better than the franchisors with their local knowledge.  When 
they get bolder, they will likely to hijack the brand.” 
Eight months after the opening of Olio Dome, much to the surprise of May and 
Jafferies, Lee and Ong set up another Olio Dome at Picture House.  At this time, the 
trust level between the Singaporean partners and May and Jafferies was at its lowest.  
“What the Singaporeans were trying to do was to hijack our intellectual property, that 
was their plan or end game,” says May.  “We were very naive because we trusted 
them.”   
5.1.4.2 Localised Central Supply 
In 1995, Dome Holdings decided to set up a $2 million central factory and kitchen, 
and coffee roasting facility in Singapore that would supply roast coffee beans, cakes, 
pastries, breads and ice cream to all its Dome and Olio restaurants.  Also in the 
pipeline were plans to establish a wholesale distribution company that would make 
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Dome’s fresh roasted coffee blends available to restaurant and cafes all over Asia.  In 
order to finance the purchase of the S$2 million factory, Lee and Ong had to seek for 
an additional injection of capital.  Subsequently on May 15 1996, about a year after 
the restructuring exercise, Dome Holdings admitted another shareholder with the 
issue of 2,000,000 shares of S$1.00 each at the price of S$1.30 per share to Samuel 
Wang.  In the same month, Ong sold 1,000,000 shares to Ho Nai Yin also at the price 
of S$1.30 per share. 
The person recruited for setting up the central factory was a highly experienced, 
entrepreneurial and skilful manager in the Singaporean food industry named Shaik 
Aziz.  He became both General manager of Dome Holdings and Dome Asia.  The 
new central kitchen operation was called Dome Food Industries Pte. Ltd. 
Aziz’s close involvement with the Singaporean food industry started when he was 
the Operations Director of a catering company called Chrisvic Pte. Ltd. in 1980.  “We 
were the leading caterer at that time as we were supplying to all the army camps, civil 
defence force, boys homes and 64 7-11 stores.  We had two factories at Pandan Loop 
and hired 200 odd staff,” says Aziz.  However, the business was terminated in 1985 
because of the loss of a major contract to the largest food supplier in Singapore called 
Singapore Food Industries Pte. Ltd, a government- linked company (GLC).   
Subsequently, Aziz started the Halal Food catering company called Rasa Cinta 
Food Systems Pte. Ltd. and sold it after four years.  Soon after, he became the General 
manager in a small food manufacturing and retailing company (with three outlets) 
called Café Al Fresco.  The major shareholders were an Australian couple from 
Adelaide who had lived in Singapore for many years.  “I decided to join Café Al 
Fresco as I said to myself to forget about local food,” says Aziz.  “I could see the 
cafés developing and western foods developing as well.” 
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Upon joining Café Al Fresco, Aziz helped turn the company around and set up the 
central kitchen to manufacture European bakery products and gelato (an Italian water-
based ice cream) and distribute to hotels, restaurants and cafes.  Dome was one of the 
many customers Café Al Fresco supplied its products to.  One and a half years later, 
Aziz helped to sell the business to a Hong Kong company called Grande Group as the 
Australian owners wanted to sell off the business and return to Adelaide.  Following 
which Aziz joined Dome Holdings.  He also took his German Chef De Patisserie Karl 
Gunter Ableitner from Café Al Fresco with him to Dome. 
Aziz held two positions simultaneously – General manager of Dome Asia and 
General manager of Dome Holdings.  He faced great difficulties at times to 
performing both roles satisfactorily because of the existence of a conflict of interest.  
“I had to maintain the integrity of the concept as GM of Dome Asia and at the same 
time as GM of Dome Holdings, I had to listen to my two Singaporean bosses.” 
The roles of Dome Food Industries Pte. Ltd. are to (1) act as a head office, (2) 
centralise some of the food sourcing and preparation previously done separately in 
each outlet, (3) roast and distribute coffee within the region, and (4) provide a venue 
for administration and staff training.  The overriding objectives are to reduce cost and 
labour and maintain consistent quality of its products.   
Dome Food Industries also supplies a wide range of food products, which include 
cakes, pastries, specialty breads, savoury pies, soups, stews, salad dressings, roast 
meets, gelati, sherbets and semi-frozen deserts and cakes, to hotels and restaurants in 
Singapore.  However, some of Dome’s signature products such as its focaccia bread 
are however supplied exclusively to Olio and Dome.  Over the years, the menu has 
been transformed, with the assistance of chefs from Dome in Australia, to create a 
range of distinctive dishes that is a fusion of East meets West dishes with an Asian 
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orientation such as Afghan lamb curry and Thai-style roast chicken with sweet 
potatoes.  Although 30 per cent of the menu has been allowed on foods to adapt to suit 
local taste, coffee remains a ‘sacred cow’ that is precluded from being altered.  The 
coffee is being roasted by Dome Asia, which leases to Dome Food Industries for a 
space to roast coffee within its premises. 
“The 12,000 square feet central kitchen has enable our customers to get a variety of 
pizzas, gourmet pies and pasta at all our Dome cafes in Singapore,” says Aziz.  “We’ll 
do as much as we can from the factory.  Unlike brassiere, you can’t get everything in 
a café like catch of the day or steak of the day.” 
5.1.4.3 Withdrawal of Support  
In August 1995, Dome occupied 2,500 square feet on the ground floor of Park Mall 
Home Furnishings Centre, which was also modelled after the café in Cottesloe.  Two 
months later, Dome opened a 5,000 square feet café in the Singapore Arts Museum.  
The rapid expansion had led to reported complaints about poor service at Dome’s.  
Lee admitted in an interview with (Kerk, 1995) that the labour shortage, which was a 
problem facing the whole service industry, had led to Dome’s difficulty in retaining 
good staff.   
“The first generation of workers were trained to give a high standard of service, to 
smile and know their product,” Lee explained.  “We also had Australian managers 
kneeling down to take orders, as practiced in Perth and Europe.  But when staff leave, 
we have to tap them from a transitional workforce made up of students who do their 
work without any pride.  To them, it’s just a holiday job.” 
During this period, Dome Asia sold a master franchise in Malaysia to a high profile 
successful Malaysian businesswoman named Farah Khan.  On 5th September 1996, 
May was at the opening of the first Dome outlet in one of Kuala Lumpur’s prestigious 
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shopping mall Starhill.  Unbeknown to May, Dome Holdings had sold two master 
franchise agreements to Khan; one for Dome at S$175,000 and the other Olio Dome 
for $75,000.  May discovered this clandestine deal by accident when Khan requested 
him to look into certain clauses in Olio Dome’s contract during the opening day.   
“Our Singaporean partners took Dome’s agreement and changed a few words, 
substituting Dome with Olio Dome,” says May.  “It is an infringement of copy rights 
and they stole the intellectual property from us; their own partners.”  May was 
extremely furious and decided that the partnership relationship was over.  All the 
support staff from Australia were subsequently repatriated.  Dome Holdings 
reciprocated by making no royalty payments to Dome Asia.  When May found that 
Dome Holdings did not own the trademark rights to Olio Dome in Singapore and 
Malaysia, he made the applications and was successful.   
The sales in Singapore suffered markedly following the withdrawal of support by 
Dome in Australia.  A new outlet was opened in Orchard Point in February 1996.  In 
March 1996, Lee and Ong visited May and Jafferies in Perth to apologise for their 
actions and attempt to repair the already strained working relationship between them.  
A month later, May returned to Singapore to rebuild the business by restoring the 
quality and taste of its coffee and food products.  To achieve this, May had to spend a 
lot of time in Singapore and would often stay for a month per trip. 
In June 1996, Lee was introduced to Robert Wang, the Managing Director and 
shareholder of Suntec Investment Pte. Ltd to explore the possibility of a joint-venture 
(Chan, 1998).  The joint-venture was eventually formed. 
Suntec Investment was already involved in the food and leisure industry through its 
subsidiary, Suntec Food and Leisure Pte. Ltd.  As many of the outlets operated by 
 93 
Suntec Food and Leisure were not operating successfully, it was hoped that they could 
be turned into successful operations under the management of Dome Holdings. 
Suntec Investment was involved in a joint-venture with the Shaw Brothers 
Organisation of Hong Kong and there were plans to spend S$50 million to develop 
250,000 square feet on the third floor of Suntec City into a food, leisure and 
entertainment sport named Suntec Walk.  If Dome Holdings came under the umbrella 
of Suntec Investment, there would be opportunities, advantages and privileges for 
Dome Holdings’ expansion within Suntec City itself. 
Suntec City had the financial resources and capabilities to back Dome Holdings’ 
growth and expansion towards a listing on the Stock Exchange of Singapore within a 
few years. 
On 25 July 1996, Lee, Ong and Wang entered into a written agreement with Suntec 
Food and Leisure and Dome Holdings whereby the former agreed to purchase 
2,326,000 shares from the existing shareholders and subscribe for the 1,500,000 
shares to be allotted to them at S$1.30 per share, which totalled S$4.97 million (Chan, 
1998).  This effectively led to Suntec Food and Leisure owning 51 per cent of the new 
joint-venture entity called Suntec Dome Holdings (S) Pte. :Ltd.   
However on 14 April 1997, Wang sold all his 1,337,500 shares in Suntec Dome to 
Suntec Food and Leisure.  Consequently, Suntec Food and Leisure’s shareholding 
increased to 68 per cent.  The staff of both companies merged under Suntec Dome, 
which managed the food and beverage outlets owned by Suntec Food and Leisure.   
Suntec Investment is an investment vehicle for a group of 20 Hong Kong high 
profile business tycoons including Li Ka Shing, Frank Tsao and Run Run Shaw (Lam, 
1996a).  Currently, the company has three main active businesses in Singapore 
(Rashiwala, 1999):  
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· 51 per cent stake in property consultancy Chesterton International. 
· 68 per cent share in Suntec Dome Holdings. 
· 100 per cent stake in Suntec Food and Leisure, which runs the Fountain Food 
Terrace, a food court in the basement of Suntec City. 
 
May was not at all pleased as Lee and Ong had breached the “First right of refusal” 
clause in the Shareholder’s Agreement of Dome Asia.  The clause indicates that 
Dome Holdings may not sell any of its shares without the prior consent of May and 
Jafferies.  The 51 per cent acquisition of Dome Hold ings by Suntec Food and Leisure 
also made the latter an equal partner in Dome Asia as well.  Therefore a meeting was 
held between May, Jafferies and key executives of the newly formed entity Suntec 
Dome in Singapore to discuss the matter.  The meeting ended acrimoniously resulting 
in the withdrawal of support by the Australian franchisor to its master franchisee in 
Singapore for the second time. 
“Suntec told us that they have bought two brands – Dome and Olio Dome.  Olio 
Dome has got nothing to do with us.  Ronald has invented the concept,” says May.  “I 
say, ‘What about Dome’s agreement’ and they say, ‘Well, sue us then, take us to 
court.' I say, ‘I am not going to take you to court but I am going to make sure your 
business suffers,’ then I said to Patria. ‘Let’s go.’  Patria said, ‘Let’s go to court’ but I 
say, ‘No, because Suntec is going to drag its feet and lots of time and money would 
have been wasted.’ ” 
Suntec Investments made Lee the Managing Director of Suntec Dome Holdings.  
Although the franchisor had terminated its support to its master franchisee in 
Singapore, they continued to hold its obligation to supporting Farah Khan in 
Malaysia.   
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5.1.4.4 The Restoration of Faith  
Following the acquisition, Suntec Dome Holdings immediately converted Suntec 
Investment’s loss-making café called Suntec Terrace Café at Suntec City into the third 
Olio Dome.   
In April 1997, Dome ventured out of the city to a growing Singaporean suburb 
called Bishan.  The eighth outlet was located within the Bishan Community Club.  
The Café was close to Junction 8, which is among the first wave of suburban malls in 
Singapore (Wong, 1997).  It serves a catchment of 700,000 people within a 4-
kilometre radius and it is only 15 minutes away from the central business district.   
“It took a while for our Bishan café to develop but it is now one of our best cash 
generating outlets,” says Ms Eng Foong Ho, director of Suntec Dome.  “There are 
several advantages of operating from the suburbs.  There are a large pool of part-times 
to draw upon, it is easy to get staff, people see it as their neighbourhood store and 
they like it and we are also able to target to other customers whom hitherto were 
frightened to try the outlet and will try us because they see it everyday.” 
Since Lee assumed managing director of Suntec Dome in June 1996, sales in 
Singapore were experiencing a gradual decline.  The reasons include the following: 
Lee did not devote adequate time and energy in managing Dome effectively as he 
was spending two weeks in Singapore and two weeks in Perth. 
The quality of coffee suffered as a result of a lack of support from the franchisor.  
Since the eventful meeting, May had stopped roasting coffee for Singapore.  Instead, 
the people were using inferior coffee beans that were roasted by an inexperienced 
roaster. 
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Aziz resigned on March 25 1997 because he was unable to work with Lee.  “I 
couldn’t get along with Ronald.  He loves to interfere with the decisions I made and 
the hiring of staff.” 
Ong, who had the experience and expertise in operating chain restaurants, sold his 
shares to Suntec Investments in 1998.  Ong was also unable to work with Lee.  Lee, 
who had none of the operation skills, was left to manage the business on his own.   
When Aziz resigned in 1997, he was asked by May to become the regional general 
manager of Dome Coffees Australia Pty. Ltd.  Aziz’s principal responsibility in this 
role is to expand Dome’s franchise concept into markets that fall outside Dome Asia’s 
territory.  During the same year, Dome entered into The Philippines and the United 
Arab Emirates.  This has caught the attention of Suntec Investments who increasingly 
was getting frustrated with Lee’s inability to expand Dome’s franchise concept into its 
territory of China, Japan, Taiwan and Thailand. 
After 18 months of galloping losses and widespread dissatisfaction amongst Lee’s 
first line managers, Suntec Investments eventually sacked Lee in November 1997.  
Subsequently, Lee and his wife Grace took legal action against Suntec Investments 
for running the bus iness in a manner oppressive to minority shareholders (Founders of 
Dome Sue Two Companies, 1998).  As a result, the Lees wanted the defendants to buy 
out their 17.33 per cent stake, estimated to be worth S$1 million.  In February 1999, 
the Court of Appeal maintained the High Court decision in July 1998, which had 
ruled that their interests were not oppressed by majority shareholders Suntec 
Investment and its subsidiary Suntec Food and Leisure (Dome Cafe Couple Lose 
Appeal Over Stake Buy-Out, 1999).  
In June 1998, Miss Eng Foong Ho (then joint managing director) of Suntec 
Investments had a meeting with May to discuss addressing the decline of sales in 
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Singapore.  “Eng has woken up that Ronald Lee was not the genius he claimed to be,” 
says May.  “I told them I could fix the problem within three months and Shaik Aziz 
was to be back at work at Dome.”  
Since Lee’s removal from office, the relationship between Suntec Investment and 
Dome Coffees has been restored and strengthened.  “Phil is a very adaptable man and 
he understands he has to give some freedom to the master franchisee of the country,” 
says Eng.  “Phil is very happy and generous to share his experience with me, even for 
Olio Dome which is not his, and it is good.”   
From July to August 1998, May set out to woo Dome’s previous customers back 
into its outlets.  The first thing that May did was to restore the quality of its coffee.  
Every three to four weeks, he would return to Singapore to provide training to the 
staff.  Soon after, Olio Dome Picturehouse was closed down as it was generating 
losses of some S$70,000 per month, which was in excess of the profits that could be 
made by other locations. 
The second thing May did was to get Suntec Investments to have Aziz returned to 
Dome in Singapore as general manager of Dome Asia.  Therefore, his primary role is 
to expand Dome’s franchise concept within its territory.  “I am a franchisor now.  
Therefore, I have become a custodian of Dome concepts and ideals, which causes no 
conflict of interest,” says Aziz.  ‘I can audit all the outlets and say what is wrong.” 
In his new job, Aziz is also responsible for bringing the benefits of past mistakes to 
current and future franchisees.  This enables the franchisees to shorten their learning 
curve as their hands are being held during the early years of the franchising 
relationship. 
In 1999, Dome closed down another of its outlet in Orchard Point.  Soon after, it 
opened two outlets, one in UOB Plaza (situated in the heart of the financial and  
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banking district) and the other within the Singapore National Library city branch at 
Takashimaya Shopping Centre.  Dome has also closed down its first outlet in Cecil 
Court in March 2000 due to poor sales performance. 
5.1.4.5 Competition 
There have always been the traditional ‘kopi tiam” or the local coffee shops in the 
suburban neighbourhoods, which serve a thick brew made up margarine, corn, sugar 
and cereal and a dollop of sweetened condensed milk.  Western-style coffee houses 
did not become popular until the first Coffee Club outlet opened in Holland Village in 
1991.  Hiang Kie, a Singapore-based coffee trading company established in 1936, set 
up the chain to offer a broad selection of special brews in modern, comfortable 
settings and attracted a loyal following from students to Yuppies.   
Today, more than 100 cafes have followed suit, with the likes of Spinelli Coffee 
Company, Coffee Club, Dome, Starbucks. and Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf all 
competing for a piece of the estimated S$50 million growing market (Teo, 1997).  
Table 3 shows some characteristics of the major specialty cafes in Singapore in 
December 2000.  
The competition faced by Dome in Singapore has intensified significantly over the 
past seven years.  The is evidenced by the aggressive expansion plans undertaken by 
Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf and Starbucks, which started their operations three years 
after Dome.  In order to remain competitive, Dome believes it must never stray in 
constantly improving and maintaining its four fundamentals namely (1) ambience, (2) 
coffee, (3) food, and (4) full table service.   
While café operators acknowledge that competition in the specialty coffee market is 
intense, they are also aggressively expanding to ensure thy are the ones left standing 
when the worst of the battle is over (Kerk, 2000b).  Physical growth also helps push 
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up overall sales.  According to Ee (1996), unlike speciality restaurants, coffee is not 
something people seek out.  Customers are not going to walk an extra block to a 
particular café, if there’s one just next door.  Product plays a part, but location and 
convenience are just as important.   
While major players are expanding aggressively, Dome’s growth has been 
unspectacular even though it was a pioneer in specialty coffee retailing.  “Every outlet 
must make money and that is why we have not grown so rapidly like Coffee Bean and 
Tea Leaf,” says Eng.  “I think Dome is more complex than our competitors, say 
Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf.  They are more prepared to pay more for site but as for us, 
we are more conservative.”   
In Singapore, one thing that most café operators acknowledged is that it is nearly 
impossible to survive just by selling coffee alone (Ee, 1999).  Several local cafes such 
as Coffee Club and Coffee Connection, which started out with an emphasis on coffee, 
have been forced to include hot food on the menu.  High rentals and Singaporeans’ 
penchant for quality food to accompany their coffee are the main reasons as coffee 
sales alone are not sufficient to pay the bills.  Spinelli, which has hitherto been 
reluctant to introduce food items for the fear of losing its identity, is reported to be 
expanding its bakery range to include savoury items and salads (Kerk, 2000). 
According to Aziz, Dome positions itself at the top end of the gourmet coffee 
industry.  It targets the market segment known as the PMEB (Professionals, 
Managers, Executives, and Businessmen) in Singapore.  They are well educated, well 
travelled and wealthy who prefer a variety of foods when they meet at the outlet.  
Although they are willing to pay for quality, they also demand products that are 
value-for-money.  Dome’s major competitors such as Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf and 
Starbucks tend to attract the teenagers who are relatively more price-sensitive.   
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“Dome’s positioning is expensive and exclusive,” says Aziz.  “We may lose some 
customers to our competitors but they will come back as they associate us with the 
good things in life.  It is a place to see and be seen.  They also see us as a treat and 
thanks to the hype created by the media and the café culture sweeping across Asia, we 
have a strong market positioning in Singapore.” 
5.1.5 Malaysia 
In 1995, a high profile successful Malaysian businesswoman Farah Tahira Khan 
approached May for the master franchise in Malaysia.  Both she and her husband 
Akbar Khan were very well connected to the Malay elite and were said to be a close 
acquaintance with Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin and Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohammed (Pillai, 1999).  Khan became aware of Dome during her extensive 
business trips to Perth and Singapore.   
Khan is currently president of a company called Melium Sdn. Bhd., which is in 
retailing, distribution and licensing of high-end fashion labels and accessories.  The 
leading labels include Ermenegildo Zegna, Etienne Aigner, Hugo Boss, Liz 
Clairborne and Oshkosh B’Gosh.  Melium is 51 per cent owned by Insas Berhad, 
which is a publicly listed diversified company with interests in property development, 
credit leasing, management services, construction, healthcare, stockbroking, and 
hotels.   
5.1.5.1 Franchisor Support 
In June 1996, Dome Asia entered into a 30-year master franchise agreement with 
Melium for Malaysia with a franchise fee of S$175,000 (non-refundable) and royalty 
of 3.0 per cent of gross sales to be remitted monthly.  In addition, Melium would be 
expected to commit 2.0 per cent of its annual gross sales on advertising and 
promotion.  As part of the franchise agreement, Khan was given the four trademarked 
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operating manuals developed by Dome.  They included (1) operations and procedures 
manual, (2) coffee and beverages project range manual, (3) kitchen product manual 
and (4) counter product range manual. 
Dome regarded Khan to have the necessary prerequisites of becoming a master 
franchisee of Dome.  “First, they must have the money, the second thing they need to 
have is the corporate structure,” said May (Choo, 1995).  “Our master franchisee in 
Malaysia is a woman who already has got a substantial fashion empire.  As she has 
got a corporate infrastructure in-placed, she has no major problems in engaging our 
expertise in the new division she has created.” 
Following the negotiation of the franchise agreement, Aziz and his deputy general 
manager went to Kuala Lumpur twice for a week each to prepare the groundwork.  
According to May, there are “not many modifications being made in our international 
franchise agreement compared to our domestic one.” Aziz and his deputy general 
manager undertook the following market research in the areas of market opportunity, 
supplier network, transportation costs and corporate taxation.   
Aziz also assisted in the recruitment of Dome Malaysia’s inaugural team of 12 key 
staff.  They included one operations manager, four supervisors, one kitchen chef, four 
cooks, and two cashiers.  The operations manager was sent to Singapore to be 
interviewed by Lee, Ong and Aziz.  In the franchise agreement, Dome Asia must 
approve the hiring of the first Operations manager of all its master franchises.  As it 
was impossible to recruit any individual who had had experience working in a 
chained western café operation, they finally selected an ex-TGIF (an American 
themed bar-restaurant) Manager named Kumar Manisekaran.  Subsequently, he 
worked at Dome for seven years and rose to become the general manager.  The 
current general manager is Rajendar Singh, who has had 15 years of experience 
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working at various fast food restaurants such as Delifrance, Pizza Hut, Shakeys and 
KFC. 
The inaugural team of 12 staff was sent to Singapore for a month to be trained.  All 
the relating expenses were borne by Melium.  The training included a combination of 
the following: 
· Company Orientation.   
o The team was provided with information on the franchisor’s 
background, philosophy, culture and values. 
· On-the-job training. 
o Job rotation was practiced to enable the team to acquire a broad 
understanding of Dome’s business.  Every individual was attached to a 
staff in Singapore whose responsibility was to ensure that the trainee 
fully understood the process. 
· Competitor’s analysis.   
o Aziz took the team to Dome’s major competitors to try out the food 
and coffee to enhance product knowledge. 
 
While the inaugural team was being trained in Singapore, the outlet at Starhill was 
being built.  The outlet took eight weeks to build.  The services of a local designer, 
provided by Melium, were obtained to configure one of Dome’s design formats.  
Dome has three design formats ranging from a brassiere that offers a full menu with 
every meal prepared to order to a café that provides a limited menu in the evenings 
and a range of breakfast options to a kiosk that serves drinks with cakes and biscuits 
only.  May and several key staff from Dome Perth visited Malaysia to conduct 
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training on coffee brewing for four months leading to the opening of the first outlet at 
Starhill. 
In September 1996, Paul Roberts, food operations manager of Dome Australia was 
sent to Dome Starhill to undertake the following task: 
· Developed the formats for the financial reporting system. 
· Installed the computer software for the recipe management system. 
· Developed with managers a new Starhill menu. 
· Assessed training needs and make recommendations. 
· Visited local suppliers and bakers to improve quality of products. 
· Conducted an operational assessment of the café. 
 
“I can open a café in three months,” says Aziz.  “I’m called to visit the site, help 
negotiation.  We work with key staffs, especially the café managers.  If they are 
previously from hotels, we tell them to forget about that because they are big.  Hotels 
are departmentalised; when you have a human resource problem, you would refer it to 
the human resource department.  However, as a café manager, you’re everything – 
human resource manager, operations manager and finance manager as well.” 
According to Aziz, one of the key attractions for master franchisees investing in 
Dome is the easy accessibility to a representative who has an intimate knowledge of 
the Asian culture.  This is an important lesson for foreign franchisors when dealing 
with master franchisees in Asia.  Due to cultural differences, the foreign franchisor is 
often regarded by the master franchisees never to fully understand the intricacies of 
the Asian culture.  Therefore, most franchisor’s ideas, policies and suggestions are 
viewed as questionable in their application to the local market environment. 
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“After Phil and Patria have said their piece in a meeting, the master franchisees will 
never disagree for the fear of creating conflict or lose face.  But they will meet me 
after and asked me whether they should do it.  I have to Asianised the concept and put 
it in the Singaporean or Malaysian context.  I think they looked at me for my opinion 
because I’m Asian, I’ve been in the food business and maybe I can see things these 
Westerners cannot see,” says Aziz.   
May regards Aziz as critical in the management of the franchisor- franchisee 
relationship.  Aziz acts as a conduit between the franchisor and master franchisees.   
5.1.5.2 Cost Reduction 
The first Malaysian Dome outlet at Starhill was officially opened on 5th September 
1996.  The response was overwhelming, as it became a trendy regular handout for the 
high society of Malaysia.  According to Jafferies in her interview with Laurie (2000) 
in The Australian Magazine, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed is 
regularly spotted on weekends drinking coffee with his grandchildren and daughter, 
whose best friend is Dome’s master franchisee in Malaysia.   
Although the first outlet was an overwhelming success, it failed to achieve its 
profitability.  The reasons were two fold.  Firstly, the capital outlay was excessive, as 
the store had no infrastructure to support cooking on the premises.  Therefore, 
additional expenses had to be incurred to reconfigure the space from retail to food and 
beverage.  Secondly, it had the burden of carrying the entire cost of training, labour, 
and marketing.  There were no opportunities to share the cost with other stores.  
To improve the profitability of the franchise operation in Malaysia, Dome Asia 
implemented a two-pronged cost reduction strategy.  The first was to open additional 
outlets (at least two more) quickly within the first 18 months to enjoy the benefits of 
economies of scale.  The other was to develop a network of local supplier.   
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Soon after the Starhill store was opened, Aziz resigned from Suntec Dome on June 
14 1996 as he had problems working with Lee.  However, Aziz continued to be 
intimately involved with the Malaysian operation as a consultant hired by Melium.  
Over the next 18 months, Aziz assisted Melium in opening an additional four outlets.  
The return-on- investment (ROI) of Dome for Melium improved significantly with the 
ownership of four outlets.  After four years, Dome Malaysia has grown to a total of 
nine cafes of which seven are in Kuala Lumpur, one in Johor Bahru and the most 
recent in Penang. 
All of the food ingredients (e.g. breads, sundried tomatoes, grilled eggplant, fruit 
chutney, etc.) were not available in Malaysia during its early years.  Therefore, the 
input cost was prohibitively high, as they had to be airfreighted in chilled containers 
from Singapore.  From 1999 onwards, Dome Malaysia has become totally self-reliant 
as it is buying all of the ingredients from a network of local suppliers with the 
exception of coffee.   
In December 2000, Dome Malaysia has set up a central kitchen.  This is to enable 
the operation to be self-sufficient in food processing and not rely heavily on the 
supplier.  “If you depend too much on your suppliers, they will increase the prices,” 
says Aziz.  “You can’t discipline them with your service level.  I’ve asked the 
franchisees to have more than one supplier for a food item to avoid being too 
dependent so that you can play one against the other.”  An office will be available for 
staff training in the central kitchen in April 2001. 
5.1.5.3 Control and Monitoring 
After the initial training, Dome Asia conducted regular audits to monitor the progress 
and performance of the franchise operation in Malaysia.  The audits were conducted 
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quarterly during the first year, bi-annually during the second year and annually for 
subsequent years.  Each café outlet is being audited comprehensively  
“I don’t audit them ostentatiously but informally over a cup of coffee,” says Aziz.  
“The objective is to do it with adding value in mind so that they will be open with 
you.  After the audit, I produce a detailed report for the Operations Manager. I put it 
in a report with time frame and a checklist.  I also c.c. a copy to the CEO of Melium 
Richard Curtis.” 
The auditor would assess each outlet on 132 individual items on a rating scale of 1 
to 3; where 1 is not meeting the standard, 2 is average and 3 is exceptional (See Table 
8).  Each café would be scored out of 1,000 points.  The operational rating of the 
master franchisee’s café management is shown below. 
 
65-75% The café falls well below the acceptable standards, and indicates 
there are problems in the management of café operations.  The 
operations manuals are not being adhered to. 
76-85% This café does not achieve an acceptable level of standards and 
requires attention. 
85-95% The café meets operational standards. 
95-100% The café exceeds operational standards minimum requirements. 
 
Aziz monitors the café operation very closely by keeping a close watch on the 
current product and new product innovations.  This is critical to maintain the integrity 
of Dome’s concept as foreign master franchisees are often tempted to introduce local 
fare to satisfy its customers.   
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TABLE 5:2 
Operational Categories for Auditing Dome Cafes 
 
CATEGORY ITEM 
· Staff & management 
personal presentation 
· Wearing the same style of Dome uniform 
· Aprons, name badges, head wear 
· Laundering & maintaining presentable uniform 
· Employees’ appearance–Hair, cleanliness, personal habits, 
posture & personal jewelry. 
· Dome ambience & design · Equipment, fixtures, fittings and signs 
· Finishes, trademarks, logos and lettering 
· Reading material, table layout, counter flower display, lights, 
Promotional pamphlets, music, ceiling fans, stationary and 
packaging, menus 
· Dry & live flower displays 
· External flower planters 
· Non-smoking areas 
· Local advertising & 
promotions  & signage 
· Artwork of advertisements and signs 
· Reproduction of trademarks and logos 
· Product range displays · Food display stock, visual appeal 
· Cake display stock, visual appeal, portion control 
· Cake and biscuit counter displays 
· Bread, pastry & condiment displays 
· Merchandise displays and ticketing 
· Customer service · Delivery of food orders (within 10 minutes) 
· Time of order notations 
· Initials on order notations 
· Accuracy of food orders 
· Length of time to acknowledge a customer, length of time the 
customer spends in the queue, handling queue delays greater 
than 5 minutes, queue service 
· Clearing tables, customer survey cards, answering the telephone 
· Customer relations 
· Health & hygiene – storage 
of handling of products 
· Handling food – Hair cover, gloves 
· Dating stock, stock management – First in First out 
· Storage of equipment or supplies – Location 
· Storage of prepared foods & cut ingredients 
· Storage temperatures–display & under bench fridges, coolroom 
and freezer 
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
 
· Handling & hygiene – 
during operational hours 
· F & B spills in the kitchen & counter, on the café floor, on café 
tables & chairs 
· Storage of equipment – safety 
· Espresso machine, stainless steel milk jugs, serving trays 
· Merchandise displays 
· Toilets, car park , bin area 
· Handling & hygiene – 
building, fixtures, fittings & 
equipment 
· Kitchen and counter floors, benches, shelving & wall tiles 
· Kitchen & café painted walls & ceiling, café & alfresco floor 
· Exhaust canopies & filters, ceiling exhaust filters – kitchen & 
toilets 
· Air conditioning vents, coolroom & freezer, display & under 
bench fridges 
· Oven & prover, gas burner, dishwasher, microwave, slicer, slam 
toaster, upright toaster, juicer, mixer, ice machine & filter, 
coffee hoppers 
· Equipment maintenance – 
Espresso machine & 
grinders 
· Water supply pressure, group head water pressure, boiler 
pressure 
· Infusers & filter cups, group heads, steam wand  
· Water softener, water filters, boiler water 
· Deli & espresso grinder blades, espresso grinder dosing 
mechanism, deli grinder, coffee making utensil, grinder hoppers 
· Coffee preparation & 
presentation 
· Frothing milk, infusing coffee 
· Freshness & coarseness of grind 
· Coffee crockery 
· Visual presentation & preparation of coffee 
· Coffees spilled in saucers, the espresso dose 
· Food & beverage 
preparation & presentation 
· Visual presentation 
· Freshness & quality of product & ingredients 
· Authorised product range, 
suppliers & pricing 
· Products being offered for sale 
· Products preparation & presentation 
· Purchase from suppliers, pricing 
· Safety · Floors, broken glass, knives, handling baking trays, electrical 
equipment,  
· First aid kit, fire extinguisher, fire & emergency procedures 
· Operational management · Operations manual & product range manuals  
· Opening hours & days of the café 
· Operations diary 
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“If the franchisee says he wants rendang (a popular Malaysian spicy coconut dish) 
on his menu, I would say no because customers are going to compare it with the local 
rendang which will be cheaper and better, says Aziz.  “Customers don’t come to 
Dome to eat completely local food.  However, we can domify it.  We’ll give it a 
Dome appearance.  It must be colourful, sexy.  The chef must jazz it up to give it a 
fusion theme.  We must maintain our European presence.” 
Dome believes that control and monitoring of foreign franchisees must be done in a 
manner that the franchisor is regarded by its franchisees as an asset.  The franchisor 
must continuously provide value to the master franchisees so as to avoid being 
regarded as superfluous.  The key to be perceived as an asset by the franchisees is the 
degree of knowledge, experience and expertise the franchisor can constantly bring to 
the relationship.  The keyword to a successful long-term franchisor- franchisee 
relationship is interdependence. 
The relationship between the franchisor and franchisees must not only be limited to 
top management but extended to the middle managers as well.  Aziz ensures that he is 
known by all the key operational staffs in all the markets.  Therefore he receives a 
telephone call from an outlet manager or a cook, and not only from the General 
manager, when a problem arises.  
The franchisors must also exercise caution in its control of franchisees so that their 
imagination and creativity are not curtailed so as not to add value to the brand.  This is 
highly essential for concepts that emanate outside of Asia, where some degree of 
adaptation will be required to suit the local tastes.  Therefore, the franchisor must 
establish parameters and communicate clearly to the franchisees what the do’s and 
don’ts of the company are.   
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“Dome has very clear do’s in our branding, image, taste of coffee and marketing 
principles,” says Aziz.  “However, we are quite flexible in our food offerings.  That is 
not to say we give the master franchisees complete autonomy.  If they asked me about 
doing something new or different, instead of saying no we asked them why they want 
to do that.  If we allow one franchisee to have a new product, what will be the 
repercussions in another market?  Dome will be different in different countries.” 
Although Dome ensures that its set of policies and standards is adhered to by its 
master franchisees, it is also aware that it must be constantly reviewed to determine its 
relevance.  “No matter how good your concept is, it must evolve in this dynamic, 
competition environment.  Or else, you won’t survive the competition,” says Aziz. 
5.1.5.4 Future Growth 
Dome Malaysia has grown very quickly to nine cafes since it started four years ago in 
1996.  It has also expanded beyond Malaysia’s capital Kuala Lumpur to less populous 
states of Penang and Johor Bahru.  Dome regards Malaysia as a highly attractive 
market that offers tremendous potential for growth.  Both Dome and Melium plan to 
open an additional five cafe within the next 18 months.  “I’ll talk to Melium C.E.O. 
on my next visit about expanding Dome into cities in East Malaysia such as Kuching 
and Kota Kinabaru,” says Aziz. 
Dome has had much success with its recent concept of creating small elegant coffee 
bars/kiosks in high traffic shopping malls and commercial areas in Malaysia.  Such 
kiosks are deliberately designed to have a small seating capacity of about 30 seats to 
focus on take away.  A boutique coffee store is also incorporated for sale of coffee 
beans and related merchandise. Dome will be experimenting with sub-franchising 
when it expands beyond Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.  Melium will enter into a 
franchise agreement with individual franchisees on a 51:49 joint-venture.  This equity 
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position allows Melium, the majority shareholder, the ability to exercise considerable 
control over the franchisees and achieve profitability by harnessing the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the owner-managers.   
“Based on our previous experience for far away countries, it’s better to manage 
with an entrepreneurial manager in-charged with vested interest in the business for 
control and monitoring.  It’s easier to achieve profitability over long distances,” says 
Aziz.   
5.1.6 The Philippines 
In 1997, Dome Coffees was having talks with two well-connected Filipinos Patricia 
and Leo Riigen about franchising in The Philippines.  The Riigens had heard of Dome 
through Ashok Melwani who then was a minority shareholder of Dome franchise in 
Malaysia.  Patricia is a Vice President of Asia Development Bank and Leo is the 
master franchisee of a computer training Singapore-based franchise called Informatics 
in The Philippines. 
Patricia and Leo visited the Dome cafes in Singapore and liked what they saw.  
Consequently, the Riigens formed a company called ‘Dome Coffees of The 
Philippines’ that owns the master franchise rights to The Philippines for 30 years for 
A$175,000.  The Riigens currently own 75 per cent of the company and Melwani 
holds the remaining shares. 
Dome Coffees granted the rights to the Riigens because firstly they had access to 
funds of A$1 million.  Secondly, they were passionate about coffee.  Thirdly, they 
were politically well-connected with the Estrada and Ramos families and fourthly, 
Patricia promised to resign from the bank and concentrate on running the Dome 
franchise full-time.  However, Patricia has reneged on her promise and continued to 
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work full-time at the bank, much to the disappointment of Dome Coffees.  “It has left 
a source taste in our months,” says Aziz. 
Since Dome’s entry into the Philippines, it currently has three outlets in Manila.  
They are located in three of Manila’s busiest shopping malls, which are Adriatico 
Square, Greenbelt and Shangri-La Plaza.  Although the Riigens have achieved their 
performance schedule of three outlets within 18 months, the growth plans for the 
Philippines have been halted due to a combination of political instability and 
complacency. 
“When you have three outlets, you get very comfortable as you start to gain the 
benefits of cost sharing and economies of scale.  Also, Pat can go around and check 
all the three outlets pretty comfortably,” says Aziz.  “What we need are champions in 
the business.  We have got people who would champion our brand in all the other 
markets but I can’t say that for the Philippines.  Patricia is so busy with her full-time 
job at the bank and her three children.  Also, we have had so many changes of the 
operations.” 
According to Aziz, the Filipino café and restaurant industry is characterised by 
consumers exhibiting a “sheep mentality” who are early adopters of innovation and 
have very little brand loyalty.  The Filipinos are very Americanised and highly likely 
to adopt any foreign concept.  Therefore, Dome has to grow its brand rapidly so that it 
continues to remain competitive in the increasingly crowded marketplace. 
5.1.7 Indonesia 
Although Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, the franchising 
industry did not begin to take off until McDonald’s started its first restaurant in 1991 
(Hsieh and Sutanto, 1997).  Foreign franchisors, including Dome, tended to avoid 
Indonesia over the past 10 years because of (1) lack of familiarity with the 
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marketplace due to a lack of publicity, (2) a lack of intellectual property protection, 
(3) the economic turmoil that commenced in July 1997 as the rupiah began to 
depreciate and (4) the political instability after the downfall of President Suharto in 
May 1998. 
In 1995, an Indonesia woman approached May to make some inquiries about 
franchising Dome’s concept in Indonesia.  Soon after, unbeknown to May, she opened 
a café in Kuta Bali and called it Dome.  Everything about the café, which includes the 
logo, menu and the interior, is a replicate of Dome.  May and Jafferies are in the 
process of taking legal action against the woman for infringement of intellectual 
property rights. 
Dome had received numerous enquiries from potential investors from Indonesia but 
most were found to be unsuitable.  “International expansion depends on getting a 
good master franchisee, says Eng.  “Every master franchisee has a learning curve and 
we have to hand held them.  It took us a while to find our present Indonesian partner.  
I had to say no to a lot of them because they were buying for their wives or 
mistresses.  I’ve to find someone who genuinely is interested, has connections, has no 
delusions that running cafes is damn hard business and prepared to follow Dome’s 
dogma.” 
In June 2000, two ethnic Chinese Indonesian businessmen Felix and Anthonie 
Affandi whose children were studying in Singapore, approached Dome Asia for the 
rights to become Dome’s master franchisee in Indonesia.  The negotiations took two 
months and in August, Dome Asia entered into a 10-year master franchise agreement 
with PT Boga Rembilan.   
There are four directors at PT Boga Rembilan.  They are Felix Affandi 
(Chairman/CEO), Petras Lugito (Director), Andreas Wiharja (Director), Patrick Lim 
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(Director /Operations Director) and Anthonie Affandi (Director).  These four directors 
own a A$100 million wine and  spirit distribution company called PT Tebet Indraya.  
Since 1996, the Indonesian government tightly regulated the import of alcoholic 
beverages (Indonesia Agri-Food Export Market Assessment Report, 1997).  There are 
currently only two licensed importers of wine and spirit.  PT Tebet Indraya is one of 
three distributors that is officially appointed to sell alcoholic beverages to various 
restaurants, hotels, bars and supermarkets in Indonesia.   
The franchise fee for the master franchise rights in Indonesia differs to the previous 
Dome’s master franchises.  The schedule for the franchise fee is provided in Table 9.  
According to Aziz, the reason for the change is that Dome has realised from previous 
experience that setting up the outlets and helping the master franchisee is a very costly 
exercise.   
TABLE 5:3 
Schedule of Franchise Fee for Indonesia 
 
OUTLET FRANCHISE FEE 
1st to 10th outlet S$200,000 for all 
11th to 15th outlet S$10,000 each 
16th to 20th outlet S$5,000 each 
21st outlet onwards No charge 
 
 
On 8th September 2000, the first café in Indonesia was opened at Ratu Plaza in 
Jakarta.  The second café was opened in March 2001 within the luxurious Grand 
Hyatt Jakarta.   
5.1.8 The Future 
Dome, which started in 1990 as a coffee roaster, has enjoyed a phenomena growth 
to an international retailer with 48 outlets in Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates (see Table 10).   
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TABLE 5:4  
Dome Coffees’ International Activity 
 
· October 1992 · Phil May and Patria Jafferies, founders of Dome Coffees Pty. 
Ltd., spent a week in Singapore to evaluate opening a 
company outlet in the city-state.  
· December 1992 · May and Jafferies formed a joint venture with Ronald Lee and 
Sebastian Ong to open the first company outlet in Singapore.    
· March 1993 · The first location was opened at Cecil Court, Singapore. 
· 1994 · Lee and Ong formed Dome Holdings (S) Pte. Ltd. to hold the 
master franchise rights to Singapore. 
 · Dome Coffees Pty. Ltd. formed a joint venture with Dome 
Holdings (S) Pte. Ltd. called Dome Asia Pte. Ltd., which holds 
the master franchise rights to China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
· June 1996 · Dome Asia entered into a 30-year master franchise agreement 
with Melium Shd. Bhd. for to open franchise outlets in 
Malaysia. 
· September 1996 · The first location was opened at Starhill, Kuala Lumpur. 
· 1997 · Dome Coffees entered into a 30-year master franchise 
agreement with Patricia and Leo Riigen to open franchise 
outlets in the Philippines.   The first location was opened at the 
end of 1997. 
 · Dome Coffees entered into a 30-year master franchise 
agreement with Al Ghurair LLC to open franchise outlets in 
Dubai.  The first location was opened at the beginning of 
1998. 
· August 2000 · Dome Asia entered into a 30-year master franchise agreement 
with PT Boga Rembilan to open franchise outlets in Indonesia.  
· September 2000 · The first location was opened at Ratu Plaza, Jakarta 
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Earlier last year Sydney based venture capitalist Grant Samuels Private Equity 
injected A$10 million into Dome Coffees in return for a 50 per cent stake in the 
business (Caccetta, 2000).  The company also has a A$8.5 million debt facility with 
the National Bank of Australia.  With a substantial fund of A$18.5 million, Dome is 
undergoing a radical overhaul to handle its biggest expansion in its 10 year history as 
a retailer. 
Dome’s next phase of growth will be totally company-owned.  In an interview with 
Treadgold (2000) of the Business Review Weekly, Jafferies said: “We tried 
franchising in our early days because we wanted to expand and didn’t have our own 
capital.  There is a role for franchising but we brought in an equity partner to help 
facilitate the growth of company-owned stores.” 
The first phase of Dome’s expansion will be to focus on the Eastern Seaboard with 
30 new outlets planned over the next three years.  Dome would also like to develop a 
strong presence internationally with new outlets planned in India, Thailand, Taiwan 
and South Korea.  May and Jafferies have plans to take Dome to an Initial Public 
Offer (IPO) over the next three to five years.  By which time, they expect the 
company to have 100 shops in Australia and overseas.   
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5.2 Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf 
Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf (CBTL) was started in 1963 by Herbert and Mona Hyman 
and it remains one of the oldest gourmet coffee stores in the United States (U.S.).  
Under the Hymans, CBTL opened 43 café outlets in Southern California from 1963 to 
1999.  The company has seven types of ice-blended coffee (i.e. a frozen coffee drink 
made with skim milk and fresh coffee extracts) and sells a variety of 20 types of 
exotic teas.  Apparently, CBTL is the coffee of choice, especially with its trademarked 
original ice-blended, with many Hollywood’s stars such as Tom Cruise and Sharon 
Stone. 
In July 1999, the Hymans sold a substantial share of CBTL to its master franchisee, 
the Sassoon family, in Singapore.  Currently, this privately owned family business is 
based in Los Angeles.  CBTL’s coffee roasting plant still remains in Los Angeles, 
which vacuum packs and distribute its coffee worldwide.  The firm’s proprietary ice-
blended mix, which is considered to be a company’s trade secret, is shipped to all its 
overseas operations.  Since the acquisition, the business has aggressively grown the 
number of outlets to 136 worldwide over the past 18 months (see Table 11).   
TABLE 5:7 
International Locations of Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf  
 
MARKET OUTLETS  
USA 71 
Singapore 34 
Malaysia  25 
Taiwan 4 
Israel 2 
TOTAL  136 
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5.2.1 Company Background 
Presently, CBTL is owned by the Sassoon family and an American partner, who has 
been a family friend for more than 20 years.  The Sassoon family of Iraqi Jewish 
descent settled in Singapore in the 1930s.  The family business owns Rubina Watch 
Company, which imports designer watches such as Tag Heuer, Cartier and Gucci in 
Indonesia, and the Sunvic group, which includes regional entertainment company 
Sunvic Productions and distributor Sunvic Co.  Both Rubina and Sunvic had a group 
turnover exceeding S$60 million in 1995 (Lam, 1996b). 
Mr. Victor Sassoon, the managing director of Sunvic and chief executive officer of 
CBTL, runs the Asian leg of the business in Singapore.  His wife, Michelle, is its 
chief operating officer.  Victor’s younger brother, Sunny, looks after the American 
market in Los Angeles with the chief operating officer there, Larry Edelman (Lim, 
1999).   
Victor’s first foray into business was in his father’s company, Rubina Watch (Lim, 
1999).  After completing his secondary studies in Singapore at 16, he moved to 
Indonesia to work in the family business.  Six years later, he moved back to 
Singapore.  At the age of 29 he inherited the business when his father died in 1986.  
Sunvic was formed in 1990.  Vic tor and his wife Michelle also ran a chain of stores 
carrying a line of Disney baby merchandise until 1998. 
Prior to November 1996 when the first CBTL opened in Singapore, Sunvic 
Productions – named after Victor and Sunny – was known to Singaporeans as the  
concert promoter who brought big names such as Phil Collins, Tina Turner, Michael 
Jackson, Metallica, Barry Manilow and Pearl Jam to Singapore (Lim, 1999).  In the 
heyday of pop concerts in the early and mid nineties, ticket prices soared as high as 
S$300 and audiences numbered tens of thousands.  Sunvic also staged concerts in 
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Malaysia and Indonesia, and was a key player along with Lushington Entertainments.  
However, when the 1997 economic downturn hit Asia, such high cost large-scale 
shows became unprofitable.  After staging 80 shows, Sunvic decided that it was time 
to diversify its business. 
It came as no surprise that Victor chose coffee.  “Coffee is a lifestyle business.  It 
was a natural extension.  We ourselves love to go out and drink coffee to unwind, “ 
said Victor in his interview with Lim (1999) in The Strait Times. 
5.2.2 Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf’s Internationalisation 
Victor’s first encounter with CBTL was when he was on holiday in Los Angeles in 
1995.  While visiting Sunny his brother at his Beverly Hills office, he was persuaded 
to try the brew known as “the coffee of the stars” in Los Angeles. 
“It was right next to my brother’s office, and I noticed that everyday, there was a 
long queue,” says Victor.  “So, one day when I was queuing up, Paula Abdul was also 
in the queue.  We chatted and she said, ‘This is the best coffee in the world.  You 
gotta get this company!’ ”  Paula Abdul, whom he had met when he staged her 
concert in Singapore in 1992, also told him that celebrities such as singer Janet 
Jackson and director Steven Spielberg were CBTL regulars.  After Victor tried it for 
himself, he liked it, especially the ice-blended coffee, and he was determined to bring 
the brand to Singapore.  
It took nine months of negotiation for Victor, before he could convince the founders 
Herbert and Mona Hyman, then in their 70’s, to give him the franchise.   Victor 
believed that the top three factors that gave the Hymans confidence were sincerity, 
financial resources and the engagement of a food and beverage consultant. 
“The Hymans was running a ‘mom-and-pop’ style cafes.  They had 43 stores, were 
totally focused on the products and all were company-owned,” says Victor.  “I think 
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they gave the franchise to us because they liked us, it is a personality thing.  
Singapore was the first overseas market and they had not even heard of Singapore.” 
In August 1996, the Hymans awarded Sunvic the master franchise rights for 
Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and Australia for 20 years.  The franchise agreement 
had a performance schedule to be observed by Sunvic of eight stores over the first 12 
months.  Over the next three months, a six-week training was provided in the U.S. to 
key managers in product knowledge such as coffee and tea but “nothing about 
management of stores.”  As Sunvic had no prior expertise and experience in managing 
chain stores, it overcame this problem by hiring a management consultant to develop 
the operating system. 
The Hymans came to Singapore for a couple of weeks to assist in the opening of the 
inaugural store.  This was the first time they had ever set foot in Singapore.  Victor 
recalled that early battles that were fought with the Hymans (franchisor) over 
changing menu and operational procedures.  As Victor recalled: “I wanted to expand 
the menu to include sandwiches as Singaporeans need to have food with their coffees. 
I felt the drinks were too sweet for Asians, so I proposed some changes.  The 
negotiations were not easy because to them it was like an insult – ‘You are a 
franchisee and you’re telling me what to do?’ ” 
5.2.3 Singapore 
In November 1996, the first CBTL opened at Scotts Shopping Centre.  The outlet 
served 18 varieties of coffee, 20 blends of exotic teas, seven varieties of trademarked 
ice blended coffees, biscotti, sandwiches, cakes, some salads and pasta.  Within three 
months of the opening of the first CBTL outlet, Singapore’s first Starbucks opened, 
less than half a kilometre away.  There are now 21 Starbucks outlets in Singapore, 
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226 throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and plans for a total of 500 in the region by 
the end of 2003 (Arnold, 2000a).   
Victor recounted that it was difficult trying to convince the landlord of Scotts 
Shopping Centre to lease the space for CBTL.  However, Victor’s reputation in the 
entertainment business eventually gave confidence to the landlord that the concept 
might work for the shopping centre.  Although Victor admitted that he did not possess 
any real estate contacts, he sought the assistance of a professional who understood the 
commercial property and negotiated on Sunvic’s behalf.   
Encouraged by the resounding success of the first outlet, a second outlet was 
opened in Wisma Atria three months later.  Victor commented that obtaining space at 
other major shopping centres for CBTL has become a lot easier following the success 
of the first two outlets.   
Since the first store opened in November 1996, CBTL had expanded rapidly over 
the next 30 months.  There were 28 outlets, which made CBTL the market leader 
among the specialty coffee cafes.  Starbucks, its closest competitor, had 21 outlets.  
Sunvic had also 14 CBTL cafes in Malaysia.  Sunvic opened its first outlet in 
Malaysia in June 1997.  By the end of 1999, plans for an additional six outlets would 
be added in Malaysia and eight more in Singapore (Lim, 1999).  
The beans continue to be roasted in California and shipped out in vacuum-sealed 
packs (Arnold, 2000).  CBLT’s baristas (Italian for coffee makers), mostly teenagers, 
are taught strict quality control, relying on a timer to make sure they pull every shot of 
espresso with just the right amount of crema (Italian for cream).  They mix the coffee 
with milk in a glass so they can monitor the mixture by its colour. 
The CBTL has proven to be very popular with the youth.  Victor reasons that an Ice 
Blended coffee costs about S$4.80 at CBTL, which is the next affordable thing to fast 
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food for the teens and working adults in their twenties.  Besides, they also can obtain 
the comfort and ambience a café offers.  Even the jazz music played at all the outlets 
are hand picked and recorded on CDs just for CBTL.  The selection changes every 
three months.   
CBTL has been most aggressive with its advertising and promotions.  It has aligned 
itself with other major brand names targeting the youth market, such as Tower 
Records and Overseas Union Bank’s Global Debit MasterCard (Lim, 1999).  Victor 
cautions that although the Asian youth market is highly brand conscious, they are very 
perceptive when it comes to food.  “Image will serve as the initial attraction for the 
youth to trial the product but it is not sufficient to promote brand loyalty,” says 
Victor.  “The ultimate test for repeated patronage is the quality and presentation of 
our food and beverage, which is why our sandwiches were created by renowned hotel 
chefs.”   
CBTL’s outlets at Orchard Road attract yuppies, teenagers, students and tourists 
while the suburban outlets are popular with students and families (Chen, 1999).  
Victor admits that those CBTL outlets in suburbs of middle to high socio economic 
groups are performing financially better than those of low socio economic groups.   
5.2.4 Franchisee Became the Franchisor 
In July 1999, Sunvic acquired a substantial stake in the California-based International 
Coffee and Tea LLC, which owns the global franchise.  This move has effectively 
transformed the former master franchisee to the franchisor.  According to Victor, the 
move to buy over the business was a logical one (Koh, 2000).  “I’ve watched many 
other businesses where the principals take back the franchisee after you’ve spent all 
your effort in building up the business.  You’re at their mercy, and as your contract 
gets closer to the expiry date, things will get harder for you,” Victor said. 
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“With the success in Singapore and Malaysia, we realised there was a great 
potential in Asia.  We knew we had to take it over,” said Victor in his interview with 
Jordon (1999).  “It is quite rare for a franchise owner to sell the business to a 
franchisee that is why it took such a long time to negotiation.  They liked us very 
much, we are a family business and they are a family business and we were able to 
build up a lot of trust.  They liked the way we had set up our stores and they realised 
that we had been successful.  We had 25 outlets after two and a half years and they 
had only 40 outlets in 30 years of business, so they were very surprised and they were 
very happy.” 
5.2.5 The Future 
Following the purchase, it was reported that CBTL had plans to have 32 outlets by the 
end of 1999 and would hope to generate more than S$100 million worth of business 
from the Asian region (Coffee Bean to Expand, 1999).  Plans would be set in place to 
develop wholly-owned shops in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia and all over the U.S.  
For the more “complex markets” such as Japan, the Philippines and the Middle East, 
CBTL would intend to seek for franchisees.   
In September 1999, Victor was reported in The Strait Times (Lim, 1999) that he 
would like to grow the business, which was worth about US$80 million to a US$300 
million company in four to five years’ time.   
In April 2000, CBTL set up its first company-owned store in Taipei, Taiwan.  
Currently, it has five stores, which are managed by a Singaporean general manager.  
Victor acknowledges that Taipei is a very tough market because the Taiwanese 
shopping landscape is very different to Singapore and Malaysia.  It is made up of 
mostly strip shopping rather than malls.  Therefore, it does not provide a catchment 
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area, unlike the shopping malls, whereby the majority of the customers are in 
transient. 
CBTL does not allow its master franchisees to sub-franchise any of their outlets in 
the Middle East and Asia.  The reason is attributed largely to the limited size of the 
specialty coffee industry in these markets.  CBTL is targeted at specific niche markets 
rather than the general public.  Therefore, coupled with the high cost of rent, 
franchisees will not able to be financially viable if the ownership is limited to one or 
two stores. 
To be a master franchisee of CBTL, one must possess the following characteristics: 
(1) it must be a public company; (2) it must demonstrate that it has the fund and 
infrastructure to open between 30 to 40 outlets; and (3) it must be currently running a 
successful business.  However, Victor maintains that the most important ingredient he 
looks for in a master franchisee is the “passion for coffee.”  Sassoon prefers 
unsolicited enquiry rather than active soliciting when it comes to locating potential 
franchisees.  Sassoon believes that when a potential franchisee has taken the initiative 
in making the first approach, he would have liked the concept.   
The Sassoons have very ambitious plans for the U.S.  From 60 outlets in Southern 
California, they plan to open additional outlets in California, Nevada and Arizona and 
maybe as far as Chicago and New York (Arnold, 2000b).  The company has consulted 
investment bankers and may try to spin off the Asian operations of CBTL in the near 
future; it may also try to list the U.S. company later. 
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5.3 The Body Shop 
The Body Shop is a value-driven, high quality skin and hair care retailer operating in 
49 countries with 1,730 outlets spanning 25 languages and 12 time zones in 2000 
(Annual Report and Accounts, 2000) (see Table 12).  The company is famous for 
creating a niche market sector for naturally inspired skin and hair care products.  It is 
estimated that in 1998/99 the Body Shop sold a product every 0.4 seconds with over 
84 million customers transactions through stores worldwide, with customers sampling 
the current range of over 600 products and more than 400 accessories. 
The success of the Body Shop, both in the U.K. and overseas, has been well 
documented and the growth of this company that eschews advertising and puts 
principles above profit, has left many a hard-nosed business executives bemused (The 
Body Shop: Timely Arrival in Hong Kong, 1991).  In the company’s 1998 annual 
report, The Financial Times voted The Body Shop the 27th most respected company in 
the world. 
TABLE 5:6 
The Body Shop’s Worldwide Locations  
 
MARKET OUTLETS  
UK & Republic of Ireland 286 
Americas 410 
Europe & Middle East 636 
Asia-Pacific  398 
TOTAL  1,730 
 
5.3.1 Company Founders 
The Body Shop was founded by entrepreneur Anita Roddick.  Anita was born in a 
small English seaside town of a large family of Italian immigrants (Roddick, 2000).  
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The hardship of the post World War II period taught her family to meet their 
requirements by rationing and savings and Anita learnt how to survive.   
Anita graduated from college and started her teaching career.  She worked with the 
United Nations in Geneva for some time and then she decided to travel around the 
world for two years.  She became acquainted with different traditions and customs in 
different countries while travelling.  Upon her return to England, Anita met a young 
Scottish man, Gordon Roddick, who soon became her husband and business partner. 
5.3.2 Company Background 
In March 1976, the first branch of the Body Shop opened in the English south coast 
resort of Brighton on a shoestring budget of a £4,000 bank loan (Roddick, 2000).  
Every element of the business success was, according to Anita in her autobiography 
entitled Business As Usual (2000), attributed to the fact she “had no money.”   
Anita hired a designer to design the logo for £25 and she got friends to help with 
filling the bottles and handwriting all the labels.  She painted the premises dark green, 
not because she wanted to make an environmental statement, but because it was the 
only colour that would cover up all the damp patches on the walls.  The cheapest 
containers Anita could find were the plastic bottles used by hospital to collect urine 
samples.  She could not afford to buy enough bottles so she offered to refill empty 
containers or fill customers’ own bottles.  The act of refilling, reusing and recycling 
became a thumbprint for the differences that would set the Body Shop apart. 
The Body Shop rapidly evolved from Brighton with only around  25 hand-mixed 
products for sale, to a worldwide network of shops.  Initially, Anita decided to 
franchise because she wanted to expand the business network quickly, but had 
insufficient funds to carry it out (The Body Shop: Timely Arrival in Hong Kong, 
1991).  Through the franchising arrangement, the Body Shop provides a business with 
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the products to sell, a license to use the company’s name and the knowledge and 
expertise on how to run it.  In addition, franchising also allows the principles behind 
the Body Shop to be passed on, which Anita believes is vital to the franchise’s 
success.  The franchisee is responsible for obtaining the money to open and run the 
shop independently as his or her own business, while keeping the operation strictly in 
tune with the fundamental principles of The Body Shop. 
The success of the Body Shop is based on its relationships with stakeholders 
including its employees, franchisees, customers, communities, suppliers, shareholders 
and non-government organisations (NGOs) (The Body Shop - Dossier in Brief, 2000).  
The Body Shop believes that business has responsibility to the communities in which 
it operates.  To this end, it supports and encourages employees throughout the world 
to volunteer their time in local action.  Its community action covers a wide range of 
activities from conservation work to providing massages and counselling for people 
with AIDs. 
5.3.3 The Body Shop’s Internationalisation 
In 1978, the first overseas Body Shop opened in Brussels.  Two decades later, there 
were 286 Body Shops in the U.K. and 1,444 overseas in 2000 (Annual Report and 
Accounts, 2000).  The company trades in 49 countries and claims a larger presence 
abroad than any other British retailer.  In the year ending February 2000, the group’s 
export sales totally £192.7 million – an increase of seven per cent on the previous year 
– and export sales accounted for 58 per cent of the total.   
According to Wallace and Brown (1996), the success that the Body Shop enjoyed in 
the early years was that it did not charge franchise fees or royalties, preferring to let 
the franchisees pocket them.  Most of the earnings came from wholesaling the 
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merchandise it makes, much like Italy’s Benetton, which wholesales clothes to its 
stores.   
A large majority (approximately 80 per cent) of overseas Body Shops are franchise 
(Annual Report and Accounts, 2000).  It has 299 company shops in five of its foreign 
markets including U.S., Germany, Singapore, France and Austria (see Table 13).  In 
each country, the Body Shop appoints a head franchisee who is then free to appoint 
staff and sub-franchisees as appropriate.  
Table 5:7 
International Locations of The Body Shop’s Company Stores  
 
 
COUNTRY 
COMPANY 
SHOPS 
FRANCHISE 
SHOPS 
TOTAL 
SHOPS 
USA 245 35 280 
Germany 23 55 78 
Singapore 17 - 17 
France 13 4 17 
Austria  1 8 9 
 
The Body Shop regards regular communications with all its overseas franchisees to 
be critical in strengthening relationships (The Body Shop: Timely Arrival in Hong 
Kong, 1991).  It has set up  a training school in London with an ongoing series of 
courses open to all overseas franchisees and a library offering information and 
training videos.  Once a year all franchisees are invited to the International Franchise 
Meeting to pool ideas and experiences. 
The Body Shop’s success in Asia has been as distinctive, as in other parts of the 
world.  Singapore set the trend with the region’s first Body Shop opening there in 
1983.  To date, there are 17 shops in Singapore, 29 in Malaysia, 18 in Indonesia, 58 in 
Taiwan, 15 in Thailand, 114 in Japan, 21 in Hong Kong, 12 in the Philippines, and 26 
in South Korea. 
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5.3.4 Singapore 
A British expatriate by the name of Anne Downer approached Anita and Gordon in 
the U.K. for the master franchise in Singapore.  The Roddicks and Downer got on 
very well.  “Downer was liked mined, she had the passion, energy on what the Body 
Shop was about and she had the money,” said Peter Tyson, the company’s head of 
retailing and franchising Asia-Pacific.  Tyson suspected that the Roddicks and 
Downer might not have any legal agreement between them as both parties had no idea 
of the extent to which such a westernised and alternative brand would be accepted in 
Asia. 
In the early days, Anita and her husband Gordon, who is chairman of the company,  
were happy if anyone wanted to open a Body Shop.  Now they can pick from well 
over 10,000 applications received each year.  The potential franchisees must 
demonstrate that they are sincere, committed and share the business ethics, 
philosophies and value of The Body Shop.  They are expected to work with the Body 
Shop on a full- time basis and ideally live in the community where their shop is 
located. 
Prior to 1983, Downer had had lived in Singapore for two to three years.  Being an 
ex-nurse, Downer was attracted to The Body Shop’s naturally inspired skin and hair 
care products.  Downer received her initial training for three weeks in the U.K.  
Tyson, who was the first company’s international manager, recalled that as the Body 
Shop was, and is still, considered an alternative business; everything in the early days 
was done intuitively.  “At that time, it was a very oral business and the training was 
about how we do it here and not this is how you should do it.” 
Following the initial training, the Roddicks accompanied the first shipment of 
merchandise to Singapore.  Downer was provided discounts and 30 days credit on the 
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first order of the company’s product.  The Roddicks assisted Downer to look for the 
first site.  Even now, the Body Shop works intimately with all its overseas franchisees 
in all site selections and all overseas locations must be approved by the head office.   
The first store was a concessionary kiosk in the cosmetic section at Tangs, one of 
Singapore popular expatriate’s shopping centres in Orcha rd Road.  The first outlet had 
an overwhelming success and shortly after, it moved to take up a shop space at 
Centrepoint, one of Orchard Road’s upmarket shopping centres.  The success was due 
to the existence of some brand awareness by British expatriates and some 
Singaporeans who had travelled to the U.K.   
Downer performed “extremely well” in growing the brand rapidly in Singapore.  
Body Shop International (BSI) had so much confidence in Downer’s abilities that she 
was given the franchise rights for Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Taiwan.  “That was a mistake as we put too much on her,” says 
Tyson.  “We had a store in Manila and it might as well be managed from Singapore 
by Anne and we wouldn’t dream that it would grow to 20 to 30 stores in the 
Philippines.”   
The relationship between BSI and Downer deteriorated over the years.  Downer’s 
breakdown of her personal relationship with her partner had severely affected her 
professional work and she unlawfully appointed franchisees who were directly 
reporting to her. 
In 1991 Downer was given 18 months to sell the business but failed to do so 
because the purchase price was too exorbitant.  BSI had no alternative but to 
terminate the agreement with Downer on October 29 1993 and physically closed all 
the 12 stores in Singapore.  The outcome was “very acrimonious” as Downer took an 
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injunction against the Body Shop because she believed she had the rights to the brand 
in Singapore.  The case was eventually settled out of court. 
Six months after all the stores were closed in Singapore, the Body Shop returned to 
the country as company-owned stores.  “We didn’t plan to have it happened like that.  
However, it was the early 1990’s and it was an exciting and dynamic place to be in 
Singapore.  We want to have a presence here in Singapore and also we wanted a 
regional office here,” says Tyson. 
The regional office in Singapore, one of four regional business units in the world, 
carries full profit responsibility for the Body Shop’s 13 markets in Asia-Pacific (The 
Body Shop - Press Releases, 1999).  The head offices remain in Littlehampton and 
London and will continue to be the source of product and marketing ideas, in close-
cooperation with the regions.  The regional offices manage all of the retail and 
franchise activities within the region, while also interacting with the head offices to 
adapt the consumer offer to local needs.  The principle behind this organisation 
structure is to enhance the company’s ability to be closer to the markets.   
5.3.5 Hong Kong 
In 1984, the Body Shop appointed Margaret Tancock as the head franchisee of Hong 
Kong (The Body Shop: Timely Arrival in Hong Kong, 1991).  A resident of Hong 
Kong for 26 years, Tancock had already built her own fashion business of 12 “birds” 
garment outlets.  She later sold to Michel of Hong Kong and remained as managing 
director to expand the chain to 25 shops under the name of the M Group. 
Tancock was introduced to the Body Shop’s products by her daughter.  The 
products’ reasonable price, their quality and the green philosophy appealed to her and 
she went to see the Roddicks and “got on very well.  I think at that time, and perhaps 
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still now, they choose their franchisees very intuitively.” (The Body Shop: Timely 
Arrival in Hong Kong, 1991).   
Initially, Tancock acquired the franchise in partnership with the M Group, which 
was not convinced that the shops would be financially viable on their own.  The 
Roddicks made a special case and allowed the Body Shops to be set up as “corners” 
within the group’s existing stores.  However, these failed to make much impact on 
customers and even when the company established two small separate shops, sales 
remained slow. 
Tancock believed this was mainly due to their unsuitable locations, and in 1989, she 
decided to leave the fashion business and buy out the Body Shop franchise (The Body 
Shop: Timely Arrival in Hong Kong, 1991).  She opened her first Body Shop in the 
prestigious Landmark centre on Hong Kong island.  This was followed by a second 
shop in the heart of Kowloon’s Tsimshatsui shopping district and another in the 
nearby Ocean Centre mall. 
The new shops immediately began to do well.  In 1989, the operation showed a 331 
per cent increase in total sales over the previous year and this upward trend continued 
with a further 208 per cent increase for 1990.  To date, Tancock has 21 shops – 
mostly in prime locations (Annual Report and Accounts, 2000). 
Marketing the products in a variety of sizes and encouraging customers to bring 
back the plain plastic bottles keeps prices low enough to appeal to Hong Kong’s 
predominantly young population.  The Body Shop enjoys a loyal following, especially 
of women between 18 and 25 who made an average of three visits per month (Li, 
1999). 
One area that Tancock found difficult initially was staff training when she took over 
the Body Shop franchise.  Sales assistants in Hong Kong “tend to be shy about 
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coming forward to help the customers.” (The Body Shop: Timely Arrival in Hong 
Kong, 1991).  The solution has been to assign those with a less grasp of English to 
work in shops in predominantly Chinese areas.  The training videos and the Body 
Shop ‘bible’ that gives detailed descriptions of all the products are translated into 
Mandarin.  Also, staff training program such as outward bound courses for senior 
manager and shop managers are organised to help them overcome their fear and 
inhibitions. 
5.3.6 Selection and Training of Head Franchisees 
The selection of head franchisees of Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia  in the 
1980s had been largely done intuitively by the Roddicks.  The three most important 
attributes the Roddicks sought in a head franchisee were the ‘3Es’ - enthusiasm, 
entrepreneurial and environmentally concerned.   
Similar to Downer in Singapore and Tancock in Hong Kong, the Roddicks 
appointed Mariam Sulaiman and Mina Foong on those 3Es as the head franchisee for 
Malaysia in 1984.  “We started very small,” said Sulaiman (http://www.mir.com.my).  
“We didn’t have much money and all we had was a lot of enthusiasm, spirit, passion.  
We found out how to do things for ourselves.”  Between 1984 and 1995, Sulaiman 
successfully grew the business to 12 stores in Malaysia.   
As the business becomes increasingly larger, the selection of its overseas head 
franchisees has become more sophisticated and financially focused.  In the early days, 
the Body Shop was considered an alternative business and “therefore we were in 
secondary locations and didn’t cost too much.”  However, the  Body Shop is sited at 
all the prime locations and therefore there is need for a “financially stronger player.” 
When selecting its head franchisees, the Body Shop selectively seeks business 
people whom not only “have the commercial sense, financial ability, and managerial 
 134 
ability to do it but also liked-mindedness with a commitment to social and 
environmental change.”   
In countries such as Japan and Korea where the scale and cost of conducting 
business is high, it is essential to work with a corporate company rather than an 
individual.  These corporate companies may have managers who do not share the 
same the Body Shop’s philosophy.  In the case of Japan, the Body Shop’s head 
franchisee is Jusco (Jusco Reports 29pc First-half Drop Amid Collapse in Regional 
Demand, 1998).  Jusco is Japan’s third largest supermarket chain, which has stores in 
Japan, China, Thailand and Malaysia.  It also holds the Japanese franchise rights of 
Laura Ashley, another British high fashion concept. 
The Body Shop has a set of criteria for the initial screening of the head franchisees: 
· A love of trading/retailing. 
· Commitment to the Body Shop values. 
· The ability to protect and promote the Body Shop brand, business, principles 
and philosophies. 
· The ability to implement a viable shop opening strategy. 
· The ability to secure prime retail locations. 
· The ability to manage national retail operations. 
· The ability to fund the start-up and subsequent business development costs. 
· A knowledge of the cosmetic market and regulatory requirements. 
· Relevant retail and commercial experience and understanding of business 
and cultural practices in the market. 
· Experience of importation and national distribution. 
· The ability to manage and motivate staff – leadership and management 
skills. 
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The selection of suitable candidate follows a systematic and rigorous process, 
which consists of the following phases: 
Phase I: Applicants must obtain an initial enquiry form and formally apply 
to the Body Shop by completing and returning this form. 
Phase II: Suitable candidates will be invited to fill in an application form 
and return it to us within a certain time-scale.  The shortlisted 
candidates will be visited in their markets and subject to a 
personal, legal, financial and ethical due diligence assessment. 
Phase III: The shortlist is further reduced following those visits to 
approximately three candidates, who are asked to submit a 
comprehensive three-year business plan.  Guidelines for the 
business plan are provided.  The business plan is then presented 
to a selection panel consisting of main board directors and senior 
management of the company in the U.K. 
Phase IV: The selection panel will choose one candidate with whom formal 
discussions will be entered into.  This will lead to franchise 
contract negotiations and hopefully, completion of the head 
franchise agreement and other legal documentation. 
Phase V: Once appointed, the head franchisee’s principals and 
management will undergo a thorough training programme in the 
U.K.   
 
5.3.7 The Body Shop’s Strategy in Asia-Pacific 
In Asia-Pacific, the Body Shop is a well-established business.  The Asia-Pacific 
comprises 13 markets across North East Asia, South East Asia and Australasia.  There 
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were 29 new store openings in 1999, of which 13 were in Korea and eight in Taiwan 
(Annual Report and Accounts, 2000).  Of the 398 stores to date, 17 are company 
owned.   
The Body Shop practices “high market positioning” in Asia in terms of price and 
perception.  According to Tyson, it is important that the Body Shop is positioned as 
an international brand and possesses a prestige brand image.  However, the brand 
endeavours to be as inclusive as possible by targeting the 18 to 35s’ female segment, 
as “we wouldn’t be able to build over 350 stores if we only sell to Asians who are 
English educated.”  This has resulted in the Body Shop becoming a valuable 
alternative to the premium brands.    
Almost all of the Body Shop’s head franchisees in Asia, with the exception of 
Korea, do not appoint sub-franchisees and own all of their stores in their territories.  
Tyson attributes this desire by Asian head franchisees to own all their stores to the 
lack of lease premiums and Chinese family business (CFB) management style.  In 
Europe, lease premiums have to be paid by tenants when leasing retail space at prime 
locations.  The head franchisees would have to appoint sub-franchisees if they wanted 
to expand their business network quickly with limited funds.  However, in Asia the 
practice of lease premiums by landlords does not exist.   
The Body Shop’s head franchisees in Asia run their businesses according to the 
CFB style.  The CFB has become the dominant form of overseas Chinese business 
organisation and one of the major forms of Asian business (Chen, 1995).  Under this 
management style, the business owner tends to regard the business as the private 
property of the core family, and thereby is reluctant to share the ownership with 
others. 
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In Korea, sub-franchising by the Body Shop’s head franchisees is required.  
According to Tyson, it is difficult for the head franchisee to “own all the stores and 
make money because getting a good location requires a lot of cash.”  To overcome 
this problem, the Body Shop appoints leaseholders of premium sites to operate the 
business.   
The Asian head franchisee’s organisational style has become the preferred model to 
be used by the company in newer markets.  Sub-franchising suffers from three main 
disadvantages for the Body Shop: 
· Part of the franchise’s success is that it allows the principles behind the  
Body Shop to be passed on.  With sub-franchising, it reduces the 
relationship between the head office and sub-franchisees and consequently 
the ability of the head office to achieve this objective effectively.   
· Sub-franchising places an additional layer between the head office and the 
customers, which makes it very difficult for the head and regional offices to 
maintain an intimate relationship with its end consumers. 
· There is a note in the franchise contract that every five years franchisees 
have to revamp the shops and invest more money into them.  Although it 
places a legal obligation on all the franchisees to comply, not every one is 
motivated to do this.  It is both time and energy consuming having to 
convince the head franchisees and all the individua l sub-franchisees to abide 
by the contract. 
 
Tyson believes that managing the Body Shop’s franchisees in Asia is “all about 
relationship and therefore you have to spend more time with them than in Europe.”  
“In the West, you can get on with the business but in Asia, they don’t really tell you 
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what they are thinking as they are not confrontational, therefore you have to spend a 
lot of time with them to find out what it is,” says Tyson. 
5.3.8 The Future 
Roddick attributes the phenomenal success of the Body Shop cha in to franchising, 
good products and a sense of community (Schmidt, 1994).  She says franchising 
keeps the overheads down and attracts people who are motivated.  The Body Shop 
franchisees are selected for their people skills rather than formal business training.   
Over the years, the Body Shop has expanded its operations enormously.  However, 
it has yet to enter South or Central America, Africa or India.  In the 1999 company’s 
annual report, the Body Shop’s current and future strategy is to operate as a retailer in 
a select number of markets within all four regions – Asia-Pacific, Europe and Middle 
East, Americas and the U.K.  
The Body Shop is increasingly turning away from franchising in favour of 
partnerships.  Roddick (2000) admits in her autobiography ‘Business as Unusual’ that 
“franchising was a wonderful way of facilitating world-wide growth, but it may not 
make sense on a world-wide basis any more.”  Although the company will still use 
franchising as “the right way of working in some places, but in others we may be 
looking to buy back franchises or to go into partnership with head franchisees.”  Anita 
believes that this will give the company more control, the ability to adapt quickly and 
huge cost savings.   
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5.4 Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream  
Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream (Royal Copenhagen), started by an American 
entrepreneur Thomas Wykoff in 1983, operates premium ice cream stores in both 
street front and shopping centre locations.  Wykoff moved to Australia in 1969 and on 
one of his visits back to the U.S., he saw an old-fashioned gas-fired ice cream cone 
maker (Schlueter, 2001).  Subsequently, he founded Royal Copenhagen as he felt that 
Australia had no decent ice cream at the time.  It has also been reported that he was 
responsible to have introduced miniature golf to South Africa and Australia.   
Each shop produces its own ice cream and bakes its own fresh cones daily in front 
of customers.  Décor is Danish with warm colours, and staffs wear Danish looking 
uniforms.  Royal Copenhagen started franchising in New South Wales in 1985 and 
has grown to 30 outlets in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia 
and Western Australia.   
5.4.1 Royal Copenhagen’s Internationalisation 
Royal Copenhagen’s entry into international market began in 1991 when it expanded 
into Singapore.  Since then, it had sold franchises to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Japan and the Philippines.  From 1991 to 1997, the company had 23 stores in 
Singapore (3), Thailand (11), Malaysia (3), the Philippines (2), Indonesia (3) and 
Japan (1).  However, the 1997 Asian economic crisis had a severe impact on all its 
overseas franchises, which led to the complete withdrawal of the brand from all of its 
overseas markets. 
All foreign master franchisees of Royal Copenhagen stumbled on to the ice cream 
parlour when they visited Australia as tourists.  The company does not believe in 
actively soliciting for its master franchisees but instead prefers to rely on word-of-
 140 
mouth or unsolicited enquiries.  It believes that it is the most cost effective means of 
recruiting potential master franchisees, as the company does not have any resources to 
undertake international marketing. 
When Royal Copenhagen received an overseas enquiry, the screening process 
commenced with “getting the people to come to Australia for an interview to 
determine his background, retailing experience and money,” says Mel Steers, joint 
managing director of Royal Copenhagen.  “We would try our best to conduct a 
preliminary investigation but in places like Indonesia, it was difficult to check on the 
finances.” 
Steers further adds that the company would not enter into a master franchise 
agreement with anyone who has no retailing experience or the ability to function 
within the industry.  A brief description of Royal Copenhagen’s overseas master 
franchisees is provided in Table 14. 
Upon the second meeting, Royal Copenhagen would give the potential franchisee a 
copy of the proposal.  It included a description of the initial and continuing support 
the franchisor would provide and a copy of the franchise agreement.  The proposal 
would also provide the financial obligations of the franchisee that included the 
franchise fee, royalties, equipment, start-up capital, and working capital.  The 
franchisee would also have to pay for all the expenses for Steers to provide support in 
setting up the first store in the host country. 
When the negotiations had concluded, the franchisee would pay a third of the 
A$100,000 franchise fee upon signing of the franchise agreement.  The second 
instalment, which was a third of the franchise fee, would be paid when the first store 
commenced its construction.  Finally, the remaining balance would be paid upon 
completion of the store.  
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Table 5:8 
Royal Copenhagen’s Overseas Master Franchisees  
 
MARKET BRIEF CHARACTERISTICS 
· Singapore · A family business that owned and operated a 3-star hotel. 
· Indonesia  · An influential entrepreneur who was well connected to the 
country’s ex-president Suharto’s family.  He also owned other 
franchises and restaurants. 
· Malaysia  · Owner-manager of a direct marketing firm of skin-care 
products. 
· Thailand · Owner-manager of an employment agency that recruited, 
trained and contracted staff to Saudi Arabia. 
· The Philippines · Jollibee Foods Corp that owns the largest fast food hamburger 
chain in the country. 
· Japan · A restaurateur of a Japanese restaurant. 
 
Royal Copenhagen provided two weeks’ pre-opening training in Australia to their 
master franchisees and their staff.  Steers would travel to the company’s foreign 
markets to provide continuous training once or twice a year, at their expense.  In 
hindsight, Steers felt that perhaps he should have visited them more. 
With control and monitoring, the franchisor believes in adopting the flexible 
approach.  The sales figures from the foreign master franchisees were obtained 
monthly and royalties were received quarterly.  The royalties were six and three per 
cent for the first and subsequent stores respectively.   
The length of the franchise agreement was 50 years.  It did not include any annual 
review because Steers believes that “you wouldn’t stand a chance to enforce contracts 
in countries such as Indonesia.”  The company believes in not putting pressure on its 
master franchisees.   
“We are pretty flexible with design and local product adaptations but we wouldn’t 
change the cone,” says Steers.  “We have produced different flavours such as durian, 
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sweet corn, and ice cream that was less creamy for different Asian markets.  If they 
want durian, it’s fine even though I hate the smell.  I can show them how to make it.  
If they wanted a new uniform to go with the design, it’s fine.  I think it is the 
franchisor’s job to give and bend.” 
Steers further adds that franchisees become successful not because of 
standardisation but to learn from all the mistakes the franchisor has made.  It is the 
franchisor’s job is to “tell the franchisees what not to do so that they don’t have to 
reinvent the wheel.”   
5.4.2 Problems Encountered with Overseas Expansion 
Royal Copenhagen faced several problems with its overseas master franchisees 
largely due to communication barrier, Asian financial crisis and a lack of market 
research. 
5.4.2.1 Communication Barrier 
Although all of Royal Copenhagen’s master franchisees spoke English, with the 
exception of Japan, some of them were not able to communicate well.  Steers had to 
use interpreters to communicate with the master franchisees in Japan, Thailand and 
Indonesia.  This communication barrier had prevented Royal Copenhagen from 
directly communicating the philosophy and control measures to these franchisees. 
“In hindsight, our master franchisee in Japan not speaking English was the 
problem,” recalls Steers.  “He won’t listen to what I say.  There were lots of problems 
in trying to communicate to him what I wanted.  I had to talk to him through an 
interpreter.  We thought that there wasn’t any risk as he was willing to bankroll 
everything.  The difficulty was further acerbated by an earthquake, which severely 
damaged the store.  He also did not want to put any money into the business to 
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promote it.  He was more interested in taking money out of the franchise to promote 
his real estate business.” 
After the franchise agreement had been signed with most master franchisees in 
Asia, the business would often be assigned to a manager within the organisation.  This 
had presented a major problem for Steers as the managers often did not fully 
appreciate or understand the franchise’s philosophy.   
In the case with Indonesia, the manager would ignore Steer’s instructions and 
change things without seeking his approval.  She was the master franchisee’s sister-
in- law who was eager to exert her influence within the organisation.  Steers also 
experienced the same problem with Jollibee, Royal Copenhagen’s master franchisee 
in the Philippines.  He had to work with the vice-presidents and not with Tony Tan 
Caktiong, president of Jollibee Foods Corp.  “However if I needed to talk to Tony or 
something to happen, I would have access to Tony.”   
5.4.2.2 Asian Financial Crisis 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis had a severe impact on all of Royal Copenhagen’s 
overseas operations especially in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  The high 
interest rates on loans, rapid depreciation of stock market and property values, and 
tightening of the consumers’ pockets were driving most Asian retail businesses into 
financial difficulties. 
The Asian financial crisis was reportedly started with the unpegging of the Thai 
baht from the U.S. dollar on July 2 1997 (Lasserre and Schutte, 1999).  It 
subsequently fell and by November had fallen 45 per cent against the dollar.  From 
Thailand financial turmoil rapidly spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
later South Korea.  The immediate effect in these countries was a severe devaluation 
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of currencies (in Indonesia’s case, it was 70 per cent) and a massive fall in stock 
market values.   
Royal Copenhagen’s master franchisee in Thailand was paying his rent in U.S. 
dollar.  When the Thai baht suffered a dramatic devaluation against the U.S. dollar 
during the Asian economic crisis, it became unsustainable to conduct the franchise.  
The uncertainty over the baht had resulted in little money being spent by the 
consumers.  The business practice of paying lease in U.S. dollar was also the case 
with Royal Copenhagen’s other master franchisees in Indonesia, and the Philippines.   
5.4.2.3 Lack of Market Research 
Royal Copenhagen’s master franchisee in Thailand was an ethnic Indian businessman.  
According to Steers, it was a big mistake to have chosen someone not of Thai origin, 
as its master franchisee did not really possess the local knowledge as was being 
claimed.   
“He thought he knew who the customers were,” says Steers.  “He said if he sold 
anything Western, it would sell.  It’s not true.  The Thais are lactose intolerant and 
they have no familiarity with our product.  Also, they would not walk and eat at the 
same time and they just wanted to sit.  The pollution is so bad in the street that you 
wouldn’t want to eat in the street.  We didn’t have enough seats to cater to them.”   
Another problem faced by the Thai master franchisee was the students using the ice 
cream parlours as a ‘youth centre.’  “Our first store was very close to the university 
and we had 90 seats,” says Steers.  “The university students would spread their books 
on the tables and sit there the whole day.  We couldn’t turn the tables around and 
there wasn’t any space for others.”   
This phenomenon of teenagers or students using fast food restaurants as a meeting 
place has been observed to occur in most parts of Asia.  Watson (1997) in his 
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ethnographic study of McDonald’s in East Asia has found that from 3 to 6 p.m., 
McDonald’s restaurants are packed with teenagers stopping for a snack on their way 
home from school.  Large numbers of students use McDonald’s as a place to do 
homework and prepare for exams, often in groups.  Study space of any kind, public or 
private, is difficult to find in overcrowded cities such as Hong Kong or Singapore.   
In 1995, Jollibee Foods Corp, the Philippines’ dominant fast food chain, signed a 
franchise agreement with Royal Copenhagen with the responsibility of managing 
expansion into markets the franchisor did not serve (Philippines Jollibee -3: Plans to 
Enter Pizza Ice Cream Mkts, 1995).  Under the agreement, Jollibee could open stores 
or give out sub-franchises in any country other than Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand.   
When Royal Copenhagen entered the Philippines in 1995, analysts considered the 
ice cream market in the country to be tough because of stiff competition from two 
strong local players backed by foreign food multinationals (Philippines Jollibee -3: 
Plans to Enter Pizza Ice Cream Mkts, 1995).  They were Magnolia-Nestle Corp., an 
affiliate of local food and beverage conglomerate San Miguel Corp. and SA of 
Switzerland, and Selecta Dairy Products Inc., which linked up with Hershley Foods 
Corp. of the U.S. 
The failure in the Philippines was a combination of wrong locations and a failure to 
scan the environment.  “We had no choice with the locations of two stores which were 
to be the showcase to attract franchisees,” says Steers.  “Jollibee told us that they 
already got the locations and they had to build them.  They were all wrong locations.  
Also, the family-owned largest chain of shopping malls in the Philippines prohibited 
us to set up ice cream parlours in their complexes.  The father of the family business 
had given his daughter the exclusive right for ice cream parlours in all their shopping 
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malls.  They would not even allow us to take up 30 square metres of Jollibee 
restaurants in some of their malls.” 
In Malaysia, Royal Copenhagen’s master franchisee did not anticipate the 
abundance of new retail space that was added in Kuala Lumpur by the rapid 
development of mega shopping malls.  “We were in a new shopping mall and we did 
well for the first six months,” says Steers.  “Then, when a new shopping centre 
opened, all the business would move.  Supply exceeded demand which caused the 
inability of the business to sustain the rent.” 
5.4.2.4 Lessons Learned 
Having had the experience of entering Asia, Royal Copenhagen’s future master 
franchisees must possess the following characteristics: in the order of importance: (1) 
organisation so as “to make things happen,” (2) contacts with shopping centre 
managers and not just leasing managers (3) finance with access to at least A$500,000 
and (4) experience of take-away foods but not necessary ice cream. 
As Steers had encountered major communication problems with master franchisees 
or managers who were highly entrepreneurial, he would seek future candidates who 
are more compliant.  “They are buying our knowledge and they must realise that if 
they want to change, they shouldn’t buy into the system in the first place.” 
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6 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter interprets the results of the individual cases discussed in the ‘Research 
Methodology’ chapter and relates these results to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
and the conceptual model in Chapter 4.  Yin’s (1994) pattern matching and 
explanation-building was used when analysing the data.  Using Yin’s (1994) and 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach, each case is looked at as a separate entity for unique 
patterns, which can be generalised across cases to identify possible points of merger. 
The techniques for data display originally identified by Miles and Huberman (1994) 
were employed in this analysis.   
The coding analysis (reducing the data to key events in key categories) showed that 
four main categories were relevant.  In addition, two new categories were established 
– collectively coded as ‘marketing approach’ and ‘partnership management.’  Figure 1 
show the frequency distribution for the number of coded issues relating to each 
category as obtained from the analysis of the four cases.  This shows that Distance 
Management, Contract Enforcement, Cultural Adaptability, Host Country Risk 
Management, Marketing Approach and Partnership Management were the most 
frequently referred to categories and therefore should be considered as critical to 
successful international franchising in Asia. 
In the following section of this chapter, each of the categories will be discussed in 
detail in regard to the research findings.  The final model is displayed in the 
‘Conclusion and Recommendations’ chapter. 
6.1 Distance Management 
The ability to monitor and control franchisees over long distances has been 
empirically identified as an important capability that distinguishes domestic from 
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international franchisors (Shane, 1996a).  The management of distant locations  
involves a complex set of skills that may not be commonly possessed by 
entrepreneurs and may involve as much ‘art’ as ‘science’ which is often gained 
through experience (Aharoni, 1996).  Monitoring franchisees closely has also been 
found to be a good mechanism for controlling franchisee opportunism (Norton, 1988).  
Franchisors can monitor against opportunism by inspecting franchisee facilities, 
examining their records, and by specifying and verifying equipment usage or 
minimum standards 
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FIGURE 6:1  
Frequency Distribution of Issues Within Each Category
 Note: 1. Distance Management.  2. Contract Enforcement.  3. Cultural Adaptability.  4. Host 
Country Risk Management.  5. Marketing Approach.  6. Partnership Management 
 
Table 15 summarises this study’s evidence on distance management.  The 
constructs included control and monitoring, field support, key staff management, 
information exchange, and franchisee training. 
While it has been acknowledged that monitoring franchisees closely is effective for 
controlling franchisee opportunism, the means by which it is carried out is a delicate 
issue within franchising.  Too much control might be counter-productive (Stanworth, 
1995).  The desire for independence, autonomy and self- fulfillment remains a basic 
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motive for franchisees to join the franchise systems (Peterson and Dant, 1990).  
Hence, excessive levels of control might not be welcomed (Mockler and Easop, 1968) 
and may even impact adversely on franchisees’ performance levels.   
As Table 15 indicates, there is a high variation in the control and monitoring of 
master franchisees exercised by the four firms.  Dome, Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf 
(CBTL) and the Body Shop closely control and monitor their master franchisees’ 
foreign operations to ensure consistent quality.   
For example, Dome conducted regular audits to monitor the progress and 
performance of the franchise operations in all its overseas markets.  The audits are 
conducted quarterly during the first year, bi-annually during the second year and 
annually for subsequent years.  Each outlet is being audited comprehensively on 132 
items.  In contrast, there was little mention of control and monitoring by Royal 
Copenhagen of their previous foreign franchisees in Asia.   
In franchising, monitoring frequently requires the direct observation of the activities 
of franchisees (Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991).  The effect of distance intensifies the 
ability of the franchisor to closely monitor the foreign franchisees’ activities.  There is 
a need for international franchisors to have adequate human resources who have 
supervisory capability to undertake this observation (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 
1994). 
The data shown in Table 15 indicate that close control and monitoring is closely 
associated with the franchisor’s leve l of field support.  All firms, except Royal 
Copenhagen, have regional offices in Singapore to provide pre-opening, 
administrative and marketing support to the markets in the Asian region.  In the case 
of Dome and the Body Shop, managers are regularly sent  from the head or regional 
office to visit the outlets either for training or auditing.   
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TABLE 6:1 
Distance Management 
 
 
FIRM 
 
CONTROL & 
MONITORING 
 
FIELD 
SUPPORT  
KEY 
STAFF  
MANAGEMENT 
 
INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE  
 
FRANCHISEE 
TRAINING 
Dome Coffees · Provides four 
trademarked operating 
manuals to master 
franchisees. 
· A list of 132 individual 
items to audit 
individual stores. 
· Audits are conducted 
quarterly during the 1st 
year, bi-annually the 2nd 
year, and annual for 
subsequent years. 
· “Very clear do’s in our 
branding, image, taste 
of coffee and marketing 
principles.” 
 
· Director of 
International Sales. 
· Regional General 
Manager based in 
Singapore. 
· Outlet managers from 
home country who 
could work overseas.  
They were being sent to 
the first few outlets in 
each host country. 
· The franchisor would 
stay for a month in a 
host country often. 
· Master franchisees must 
seek the approval of the 
hiring of operations 
manager. 
· Assists master franchisees 
in recruiting key staff. 
· Extensive training of key 
staff for a month in the 
regional head office. 
· “Phil (the franchisor) is 
very happy and 
generous to share his 
experience with me.”   
· Communicates clearly 
what the do’s and 
don’ts of the company 
are to the master 
franchisees. 
· Provides training to the 
inaugural team in 
Singapore for a month 
· Provides training on 
coffee brewing in the 
host country four 
months leading to the 
opening of the first 
outlet. 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
 
 
 
FIRM 
 
CONTROL & 
MONITORING 
 
FIELD  
SUPPORT 
KEY 
STAFF 
MANAGEMENT 
 
INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE 
 
FRANCHISEE 
TRAINING 
Coffee Bean & 
Tea Leaf 
· Coffee is roasted in 
LA, which is vacuum 
packed and distributed 
to all its markets. 
· The firm’s highly 
popular ice-blended 
mix, which is a 
company’s trade secret, 
is shipped to all its 
overseas markets. 
· Had 43 company-
owned stores in LA 
prior to expanding to its 
first overseas market in 
Singapore. 
 
· The previous owner 
visited Singapore for 2 
weeks to assist in the 
opening of the first 
store. 
· The company has 
established a regional 
office in Singapore to 
provide training and 
recruitment support for 
the region. 
· The previous owner 
provided no assistance 
in recruitment of key 
managers.  They were 
recruited with the 
assistance of a local 
consultant. 
· Regular 
communications were 
made between the 
franchisor and 
franchisees during the 
early stages of 
expansion into 
Singapore. 
· The first master 
franchisee and key 
managers spent 6 
weeks training in the 
US. 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
FIRM 
 
CONTROL & 
MONITORING 
 
FIELD  
SUPPORT 
KEY 
STAFF 
MANAGEMENT 
 
INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE  
 
FRANCHISEE 
TRAINING 
The Body Shop · The firm had 1,730 
stores in the world and 
therefore would have 
acquired extensive 
experience and 
expertise in control and 
monitoring. 
· The firm does not 
believe in controlling 
the franchisees in a 
dogmatic manner but 
seek cooperation by 
regular communication. 
· The regional office in 
Singapore enables the 
firm to be closer to its 
head franchisees and 
customers in Asia. 
 
· In the early days, the 
founders would travel 
to the market to assist 
in opening the first 
store.   
· Since it has become a 
public-listed company, 
it has tremendous 
human resources to 
support its master 
franchisees. 
 
· The firm assists the 
head franchisees to 
recruit key managers. 
· The key managers must 
be able to speak 
English. 
· The firm regards 
regular communication 
with its overseas 
franchisees critical in 
strengthening 
relationships. 
· “…in Asia, they don’t 
really tell you what 
they are thinking as 
they are not 
confrontational, 
therefore you have to 
spend a lot of time with 
them to find out what it 
is.” 
· The head franchisee’s 
principals and 
management will 
undergo a thorough 
training program in the 
UK. 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
 
 
 
FIRM 
 
CONTROL & 
MONITORING 
 
FIELD  
SUPPORT 
KEY 
STAFF 
MANAGEMENT 
 
INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE  
 
FRANCHISEE 
TRAINING 
Royal 
Copenhagen Ice 
Cream 
· A very flexible 
approach to control and 
monitor the business.   
· Only one person, the 
joint managing director, 
was responsible for the 
international operation. 
 
· As the firm had no 
input in selecting the 
key managers, it 
presented a major 
problem as they often 
did not fully appreciate 
the franchise’s 
philosophy. 
 
· Little communication 
occurred between the 
franchisor and the 
master franchisees. 
· The master franchisees 
and key staff were 
provided two weeks’ 
pre-opening training. 
· The franchisor would 
travel to the host 
market to provide 
continuous training 
once or twice a year at 
their expense. 
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In the early days of Dome’s operation in Singapore, the franchisor spent 
considerable time working with the local key managers to “fine-tune” the business 
format.  This suggests that the franchisor should be running a successful domestic 
operation, with strong administrative and management support, that allows him or her 
to spend considerable time away from the business.  Shane (1996a) pointed out that 
the higher the growth of the franchisor, the more successful it is, and therefore the 
more resources it may have to devote to its globalisation efforts.  This is likely to be a 
challenge for small firms that lack adequate managerial resources to permit time for 
such intensive commitments to offshore franchise developments. 
As Table 15 indicates, the master franchisees of the four firms are corporations that 
run businesses in different industries in Asia.  For example, Dome’s Malaysian master 
franchisee owns a chain of high fashion retail shops and the Body Shop’s master 
franchisee in Japan runs the third largest supermarket chain in that country.  This 
suggests that the franchisor will be working with company managers rather than the 
master franchisee that often has interests in other businesses.  Therefore, it is 
important to ensure that the master franchisees hire key managers who are qualified 
and appropriate in running the franchise business.   
For example, Dome works intimately with its master franchisees in recruiting and 
interviewing key staff, especially the operations manager.  In the franchise agreement, 
the master franchisee should seek the approval of the appointment of the operations 
manager, who is solely responsible for the overall performance of the business. 
Sachdev, Bello and Pilling (1994) referred to the provision of information by the 
franchisor to the franchisees as a device for influencing franchisee behaviour.  This is 
seen as an indirect form of control.  Dant, Li and Wortzel (1995) have also found that 
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information exchange can contribute significantly to improving the quality of 
franchisor- franchisee relationship. 
When asked about information exchange between franchisor and franchisees, 
Dome’s regional general manager said: “Communications between the franchisor and 
the foreign master franchisees are at most times confined to the top management 
only.”  In some instances this results in a breakdown in communication as the 
message filters from top management to the frontline staff.  To prevent such an 
occurrence, the Dome manager ensures that every staff member at all the foreign 
outlets knows him personally.  As the level of knowledge amongst the operational 
staff is relatively low in these markets, he frequently receives a telephone call from an 
outlet manager or a cook when a problem arises.  While this process of intensive 
personal contact between the franchisor and master franchisee staff is feasible for a 
relatively small firm such as Dome, it may pose challenges for larger companies or 
serve as an impediment to growth among expanding operations. 
This evidence on regular communication is also found with the Body Shop.  The 
firm’s head of franchising believes that managing franchisees in Asia is “all about 
relationship.”  He further adds “in Asia they don’t really tell you what they are 
thinking as they are not confrontational, therefore you have to spend a lot of time with 
them to find out what it is.” 
Dependency of the franchisee on the franchisor for training has been identified as 
one of the mechanisms available to the franchisor to ensure compliance and so 
mitigate against dilution of goodwill (Burton, Cross and Rhodes, 2000).  A study on 
386 franchisors in the U.S. undertaken by Arthur Andersen (1996) found that a large 
proportion brought their international franchisees to the U.S. for training.   
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As Table 15 indicates, the initial pre-store training of the master franchisees for the 
four firms was also conducted in the home country.  For example, the Singaporean 
master franchisee and key managers of CBTL spent six weeks training in the U.S.  
Dome’s key managers were trained in Singapore for a month.  However, the 
difference between the first three firms and Royal Copenhagen was the level of 
continuous training provided to the master franchisees.   
For example, Dome in Malaysia has a full- time local training manager, who works 
very closely with the franchisor’s regional general manager, dedicated to managing 
the continuous training needs of all the staff.  In contrast, Royal Copenhagen visited 
its master franchisees only once or twice a year to provide continuous training. 
6.2 Contract Enforcement 
An important aspect of distance management is the structure of the international 
franchise contract (Rubin, 1978; LaFontaine and Kaufmann, 1994).  As a means of 
channel management the contractual arrangements of a franchise facilitate a high 
degree of organisational and operational control by firms over their outlets (Pilotti and 
Pozzana, 1991).  This ability to exercise close control can ensure the imposition of 
more consistent and uniform standards across a network compared with those 
attainable from looser forms of third-party distribution such as dealers, licenses and 
tenants (Wicking, 1993; Mendelsohn, 1992). 
Contract details such as fees, royalties, advertising contributions and length of 
agreement vary little within the domestic context (Abell, 1990).  However, in the 
international environment, the franchise contract varies substantially.  In addition to 
laws specifically governing franchising, a wide range of other statutes may affect 
franchising in various countries (Maynard, 1995).  They cover trademarks, antitrust 
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issues, taxes, contracts, technology transfer, currency control, foreign investment, and 
import and export restrictions.  Therefore having the ability to negotiate contractual 
modifications (Root, 1987) and handle contract enforcement is important for 
successful international development (Hood and Young, 1979).   
Table 16 summarises this study’s evidence on contract enforcement.  The constructs 
include negotiated contractual modifications; fees, royalties and levies; protecting 
intellectual property; and proprietary capabilities. 
This study did not find strong evidence of all the franchisors having the ability to 
negotiate contractual modifications and contract enforcement.  This is concerning as 
the prolonged nature of the franchise contract (usually 10 to 20 years) exposes the 
franchisor to problems associated with choosing the wrong master, ensuring quality 
and being sued by the master franchisee’s constituents (Justis and Judd, 1986).  
However, the data in Table 16 suggest that the negotiating power of a franchisor is 
commensurate with the degree of success the franchise brand enjoys within the 
market.   
Dome’s schedule of fees for its Indonesian master franchisee is considerably 
different to its previous master franchisees.  The firm was able to insist on a higher 
franchise fee, from A$175,000 to A$200,000, because of its successful track record in 
Asia.  Similarly, the Body Shop has the power to impose on its franchisees a 
contractual obligation to revamp their stores and invest more money into them every 
five years. 
Overall Dome, CBTL and Royal Copenhagen appear to be making few 
modifications to their international franchise agreement, which is the template used 
for domestic franchising.   These small firms rely heavily on the professional 
expertise and advice of their solicitors who specialise in domestic and international 
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franchising.  Therefore, having an appropriate solicitor who specialises in 
international franchising will compensate for the lack of ability to negotiate 
contractual modifications and handle contract enforcement.   
According to Norton (1988), the franchisor has the right to revoke the franchise 
agreement without return of the franchise fee if the franchisee does not adhere to his 
or her contractual obligations.  As Table 16 indicates, the franchisor has also the right 
to revoke the franchise agreement if the franchisee does not achieve its performance 
schedule.   
This is consistent with Negre (1997) empirical study of U.S. master franchisees 
operating in France from 1985 to 1991.  This study identified that one of the key 
variables associated with failure was the extremely strict opening quota for master 
franchisees no matter what happened in the market.  He suggested that there is a need 
for more flexibility in the franchise agreement to take account of the changing market 
environment. 
In the case of Dome and CBTL, the performance schedule of three outlets in a 
market within 18 months seems to be a reasonable target to demand of a foreign 
master franchisee in Asia.  In contrast, there was little mention of performance 
schedule or annual performance review by Royal Copenhagen, as the firm believes in 
not putting pressure on its master franchisees.  Further, the firm’s joint managing 
director believes that it would be futile to impose any performance standard, because 
“you wouldn’t stand a chance to enforce contracts in countries such as Indonesia.” 
When business relationships are established between two independent entities in a 
market setting, each party has an incentive to act opportunistically (Williamson, 
1985).  This is especially found to be prevalent in international transactions (Huszagh 
et al., 1992).   
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TABLE 6:2 
Contract Enforcement 
 
 
FIRM 
NEGOTIATE  
CONTRACTUAL  
MODIFICATIONS  
FEES ,  
ROYALTIES &  
LEVIES  
PROTECTING  
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
PROPRIETARY 
CAPABILITIES  
Dome · Works with an experienced 
solicitor in modifying the 
contract, which is the template 
used for domestic franchising.  
· “Not many modifications 
being made in our 
international franchise 
agreement compared to our 
domestic one.” 
· Franchise fee and term of 
agreement for Indonesia are 
different to the other markets, 
as experience has shown that 
the current fees are inadequate 
for providing the support 
needed. 
· Performance schedule of 3 
outlets within 18 months in 
each market. 
· All product innovations are to 
be approved by the franchisor.  
This is not done in a dogmatic 
manner but in a manner that is 
regarded as adding value. 
 
· Franchise fee of A$175,000 
(non-refundable) and royalty 
of 3% of gross sales.  They are 
considered to be competitively 
priced. 
· The master franchisee in 
Singapore has partly hijacked 
the brand by refusing to pay 
royalties for a concept 
borrowed from the franchisor. 
· The Singaporean partner had 
set up a concept similar to 
Dome on its own without 
paying any fees or royalties 
for it.  Subsequently, he had 
sold it as a franchise to 
Malaysia. 
· “Our Singaporean partners 
took Dome’s agreement and 
changed a few words, 
substituting Dome with Olio 
Dome.” 
· Conducts a comprehensive 
audit to monitor and protect its 
intellectual property. 
· “We don’t allow our future 
master franchisees to use 
Dome in their company name 
so as to protect our intellectual 
property.” 
 
· When the support of roasting 
and supplying coffee was 
withdrawn twice from 
Singapore twice, sales 
suffered.  
· Constantly bring to the 
relationship knowledge, 
experience and expertise so as 
to be regarded by the master 
franchisee as an asset. 
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TABLE 16 (continued) 
 
 
 
FIRM 
NEGOTIATE  
CONTRACTUAL  
MODIFICATIONS  
FEES ,  
ROYALTIES &  
LEVIES  
PROTECTING  
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
PROPRIETARY 
CAPABILITIES  
Coffee Bean & Tea 
Leaf 
· Performance schedule of 8 
outlets in 12 months. 
· It is understood that franchise 
fees and royalties were being 
paid but the details are not 
available. 
· The intellectual property rests 
with the franchisor.. 
· The company has capabilities 
in producing a wide range of 
coffee products, especially its 
ice-blended which is hugely 
popular. 
The Body Shop · In the early days, no contracts 
were signed between the 
franchisor and franchisees.  
However, as the company has 
gone public, negotiating 
contractual modification has 
become more sophisticated. 
· The company terminated the 
agreement with the former 
master franchisee in Singapore.  
The outcome was “very 
acrimonious” which forced the 
firm to physically close all the 
12 stores 
· In the early years, no franchise 
fees or royalties were charged.  
Most of the earnings came from 
wholesaling of the 
merchandise. 
· There is a note in the franchise 
agreement that every 5 years 
the franchisees have to revamp 
the shops and invest more 
money into them.  Although it 
places a legal obligation on all 
the franchisees, not everyone is 
motivated to follow suit. 
 
· Regular communication and 
monitoring to ensure that its 
property rights are not violated. 
· The head franchisee is 
provided the license to use the 
company’s name. 
· The company has 
capability in creating and 
manufacturing naturally 
inspired hair and skin care 
products.  
· The company does not 
engage in any advertising 
but tremendous publicity 
from its social 
responsibilities. 
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TABLE 16 (continued) 
 
 
 
FIRM 
NEGOTIATE  
CONTRACTUAL  
MODIFICATIONS  
FEES ,  
ROYALTIES &  
LEVIES  
PROTECTING  
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
PROPRIETARY 
CAPABILITIES  
Royal Copenhagen 
Ice Cream 
· The firm used the same 
franchise domestic agreement 
template with great 
flexibilities. 
· The contract did not include 
any annual review because the 
franchisor believes that “you 
wouldn’t stand a chance to 
enforce contracts in countries 
such as Indonesia.” 
· The franchisor believes in not 
putting pressure on its master 
franchisees 
 
· The franchisee would pay the 
A$100,000 (non-refundable) 
franchise fee in 3 equal 
installments: upon signing of 
the agreement, when the first 
store commenced its 
construction and upon 
completion of the store. 
· The firm adopted a very 
flexible approach in managing 
the overseas foreign master 
franchisees. 
· Standard clauses in protecting 
intellectual property.   
· Minimal supervision to ensure 
that property rights were not 
violated. 
· The firm has capability in 
producing its proprietary ice 
cream and cones. 
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Given the greater potential for opportunism in the international area, franchisors 
that intend to expand overseas need to create incentives for franchisees not to act 
opportunistically.  One way to control opportunism is through the use of ex-ante 
bonding in a contract (Norton, 1988).  If a franchisee has to pay bond that is forfeited 
if he or she acts opportunistically, the franchisee has a financial incentive to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour.  Typically, franchisees pay franchisors the use of their 
franchise system in two ways – through an up-front fee and ongoing roya lties and 
advertising levy as a percentage of sales revenue.   
As Table 16 indicates, all the four firms demand that master franchisees pay an 
upfront franchise fee of between A$100,000 to A$200,000 and ongoing royalties as a 
percentage of sales revenues.  It is interesting to note that the Body Shop did not 
impose franchisee fees and royalties on their international franchisees in the early 
days.  Most of the earnings came from wholesaling of the merchandise.   
Prior research has shown that the higher the franchise fee relative to the size of the 
royalty and advertisement payments, the greater the cost to the franchisee of 
agreement termination, and the more the franchisee needs to adhere to the franchise 
system (Carney and Gedajlovic; Norton, 1988; Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994).  
The data gathered from the cases do not appear to support this finding.  It appears that 
the bond or franchise fee may not serve as an effective tool in Asia when the master 
franchisee is more likely a company with strong financial resources.   
The Dome’s case illustrates the ineffectiveness of the ex-ante bond to reduce 
franchisee opportunism.  The Singaporean master franchisee had “hijacked” the brand 
on numerous occasions, which the company’s international director claimed that it 
was “their plan or end game” right from the start.  According to the firm’s regional 
general manager, it is a phenomenon that is not uncommon among franchisees in 
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Asia.  He said: “The problem with franchisees in Asia is that at one stage in their 
business, they think they know better than the franchisors with their local knowledge.  
When they get bolder, they will likely to hijack the brand.”   
Why do Asian franchisees exhibit such ‘brand hijack’ behaviour?  This could be 
attributed to three reasons.  The first, as previously mentioned, relates to the 
ineffectiveness of the ex-ante bond.  The second could be due to the unsophisticated 
level of legislative protection of intellectual property rights found in most parts of 
Asia (Deng, Townsend, Robert, and Quensel, 1996).  Finally, the franchise concept in 
Asia could differ greatly to the franchisor’s original business format in the home 
country.  This is perhaps due to the modifications that the master franchisees forced 
upon the franchisors to make to adapt to Asian consumers.  
According to Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994), the bond serves as a particular 
effective tool when the franchisee invests a large percentage of his or her money in 
the purchase of the outlets.  Under these circumstances, termination of the franchise 
agreement often results in great financial hardship for the franchisee.  The preference 
shown by most master franchisees in Asia to own all their stores within their 
territories requires the franchisor to work with a company rather than an individual.  
The franchise fee would have to be a significant amount, in order to operative as an 
effective tool to prevent a company from acting opportunistically.   
When asked why Dome would not charge considerably more than A$175,000, the 
international director said: “We would like to charge much more, but it is a price that 
we think is competitive.  We are not the only ones offering the franchise and we are 
not big enough to be able to charge an amount much higher than that.”   
This inability to charge a high upfront fee presents a problem for any smaller 
franchise company, especially when it enters Asia for the first time.  It would be 
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difficult for the franchisor to justify the high upfront fee without any past record of 
success in the region.   
It is common for franchise agreements to include clauses prohibiting master 
franchisees from operating a similar business in a given territory and/or time period 
once the agreement terminates (Burton, Cross and Rhodes, 2000).  However, the 
threat remains that, once fully conversant with the format, the master franchisees may 
establish operations in direct competition with the franchisor, before or after the 
contract officially ends.  Nevertheless, in each market entered, franchisors can incur a 
once-off sunk cost as they take steps to legally safeguard the intellectual property 
embodied within their franchise format, as well as incurring continuing costs to ensure 
that property rights are not violated ex-post by any local enterprise (Falbe and 
Dandridge, 1992). 
All firms examined in this study took steps to legally safeguard their firms’ 
intellectual property in each market they entered.  However, not every firm has been 
vigilant in ensuring that its property rights are not violated ex-post by the master 
franchisee.  Strong evidence of continuing vigilance has been found with all the four 
firms except Royal Copenhagen.  The other three firms have field representatives 
based in the region who monitor their franchisees closely.  As Dome’s regional 
general manager put it succinctly: “I have become the custodian of Dome concepts 
and ideals.” 
Dome’s international director said: “What we are selling is not the coffee, 
muffins…but our intellectual property.  If we are vigilant in our franchisees following 
closely to the our intellectual property which includes the logo, corporate colour, 
uniforms, chairs, etc. then when the franchisee succeed, we can say to them: ‘Well, 
didn’t I say so that if you follow everything in the format, you are going to be 
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successful.’  But if we are slack about our intellectual property, for example not 
having to follow exactly the right colour coded green in the logo, then when they 
succeed, they can point to us and tell us that they don’t need us any more, they can do 
it by themselves.” 
In contrast, there was little mention of continuing monitoring by Royal Copenhagen 
to ensure that its property rights were not violated.  What was mentioned suggested 
that the franchisor did not incur continuing costs to protect the firm’s intellectual 
property rights.  For example, the joint managing director provided two weeks’ pre-
opening training in Australia to their master franchisees and their staff.  This would be 
followed by a visit to these franchisees only once or twice a year for training.   
The study found that in Asia, master franchisees are often tempted to “hijack” the 
brand once they have gained the operational know-how in running the business.  This 
is consistent with the study by Hall and Dixon (1988), which found that franchisees 
resent the continued control on their business by the franchisor once they become 
competent with the system in which they are working.  Then they begin to question 
the fees being paid to the franchisor and the standards and policies of the franchisor 
(Knight, 1986).  One suggested solution used by Dome to manage conflict is to 
continuously provide value to the master franchisees so as to avoid being regarded as 
irrelevant.  The key to value adding is “the degree of knowledge, experience and 
expertise the franchisor can constantly bring to the relationship.”   
The other firms have also found to use proprietary capabilities in their control of 
their master franchisees in Asia.  In the case of Dome, the master franchisee had tried 
secretly to roast coffee by himself but sales suffered significantly as a result of that.  
This evidence of controlling by the use of proprietary capabilities is also found with 
the other three firms: CBTL with its expertise in developing its trademarked ice-
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blended coffee, the Body Shop with its range of natural skin and hair care products 
and Royal Copenhagen with its special taste of ice-cream and cone.   
6.3 Cultural Adaptability 
Table 17 provides a summary of this study’s evidence on the need of the franchisor to 
adapt its concept, bus iness format, and products to the culture of the host country.  
The data from this research indicate that franchisors practice both standardisation and 
adaptation in their international efforts.   
The cultural environment adds complexity to franchising in a foreign country 
(Huszagh et al., 1992).  Culture impacts the negotiation of contracts, the daily 
operations, the hiring of personnel, as well as the format of the franchise (Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 1996; Justis and Judd, 1989).  The very strength of the franchise format, its 
standardisation, makes its successful replication in foreign markets difficult (Aydin 
and Kacker, 1990).  Frequently, modifications may be needed not just in the recipes 
and menu selections, but in the operations as well (Sadi, 1994). 
The debate over standardisation versus adaptation is an ongoing one within the 
international marketing and internationalisation literature.  Franchising requires a high 
degree of standardisation to be effective, however, in foreign markets the pressure to 
adapt the product or service is frequently great.  The local partner (with local 
knowledge) is frequently the party with the greatest ability to find suitable adaptable 
strategies.  This may result in the power of the relationship shifts towards the master 
franchisee in countries where the level of adaptation is greatest.  For smaller firms, 
with limited managerial and financial resources, the power of a master franchisee can 
be substantial enough to cause the type of problems experienced by Dome. 
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TABLE 6:3 
Cultural Adaptability 
 
 
FIRM 
 
CONCEPT 
STANDARDISATION  
MODIFYING 
BUSINESS 
FORMAT 
 
PRODUCT 
MODIFICATIONS  
Dome · Coffee remains a sacred cow that is precluded 
from being altered. 
· “Our branding, image and marketing principles 
must be strictly adhered to by all our 
franchisees.” 
· Modified the business format to include 
a wider range of hot food items, which is 
essential as it is nearly impossible to 
survive just by selling coffee alone. 
· Develops coffee kiosks in shopping 
malls and commercial areas. 
· Special training is provided to staff to be 
more forward in approaching the 
customers. 
 
· 30 per cent of the menu has been allowed 
on foods to suit local taste. 
· The chefs from the home country are 
working with the chefs in host country to 
create a range of distinctive dis hes. 
Coffee Bean & Tea 
Leaf 
· Branding and image are consistent in host 
markets are consistent with that of home 
market. 
· “I wanted to expand the menu to include 
sandwiches as Singaporeans need to have 
food with their coffees.” 
· Special training is provided to staff to be 
more forward in greeting and helping the 
customers. 
 
· “I felt the drinks were too sweet for 
Asians, so I proposed some changes.” 
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TABLE 17 (continued) 
 
 
 
FIRM 
 
CONCEPT 
STANDARDISATION  
MODIFYING 
BUSINESS 
FORMAT 
 
PRODUCT 
MODIFICATIONS  
The Body Shop · Branding, image, shop design format and 
products are uniform worldwide.   
· Special training is provided to staff in 
Asia to be more forward in helping the 
customers. 
· The company’s training videos and 
‘bible’ that give detailed descriptions of 
all the products are translated in 
Mandarin. 
 
· There are no modifications to all its 
products sold worldwide.  The only thing 
that is different is the retail-mix.  For 
example, skin care products are more 
popular than bath products. 
Royal Copenhagen Ice 
Cream 
· The company had no clear branding or 
image and did not insist on the master 
franchisees to adopt a uniform 
positioning. 
· The firm was very flexible in the altering 
of the concept by the master franchisees.   
However, one thing that it will not 
changed was its cone. 
· “We are pretty flexible with design and 
local product adaptations.” 
· “If they wanted a new uniform to go with 
the design, it’s fine.  I think it is the 
franchisor’s job to give and bend.” 
 
· The firm gave the master franchisees 
great flexibility in designing the shop 
design to suit local conditions. 
· No special training was provided to the 
staff in Asia to overcome their lack of 
confidence. 
 
· “We have produced different flavours 
such as durian, sweet corn and ice cream 
that was less creamy for different Asian 
markets.” 
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This is consistent with the findings of Hopkins (1996), which found that 75 per cent 
of his sample indicated that both standardisation and adaptation were important.  
Furthermore, despite the expectations that cultural differences may affect the demand 
for their products or services, most franchisors felt that maintaining standardisation 
was more important than adaptation.  Hopkins (1996) suggested that too many 
alterations to the franchise’s core product or service will threaten the standardisation 
which customers come to expect with a particular franchise.   
Standardisation is enforced by Dome, CBTL and the Body Shop on branding to 
ensure that the brand image and value is being perceived consistently by its target 
customers in all markets.  In contrast, Royal Copenhagen was not vigilant about its 
brand image in all its overseas markets.  The firm’s joint managing director said: “We 
are pretty flexible with design and local product adaptations.  If they wanted a new 
uniform to go with the design, it’s fine.  I think it is the franchisor’s job to give and 
bend.” 
The Dome’s case illustrates the practice of brand standardisation.   In Australia, 
Dome’ brand image is one of style and sophistication, which is reflected in its store 
design, products, ambience and packaging.  The early cafes in Asia resembled the 
Australian cafes in every detail, from the design and interiors right down to the chairs.  
Dome’ regional general manger explained: “Our branding, image and marketing 
principles must be strictly adhered to by all our franchisees…we may lose some 
customers but they will come back as they associate us with the good things in life.  It 
is a place to see and be seen.” 
The data shown in Table 17 indicate that all firms, except Royal Copenhagen, 
provide special training to frontline staff in Asia to be more forward in greeting and 
helping the customers.  The reason is largely attributed to culture and language 
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difficulties.  The Body Shop in Hong Kong has found sales assistants generally shy 
about coming forward to help the customers because of their poor grasp of English 
and it is not a cultural norm to be assertive.   
Adaptation has also been applied to the product offering by Dome, CBTL and 
Royal Copenhagen.  In their home countries these firms have a limited range of food 
items in their outlets.  However, they had to include a wider range of hot food items in 
Asia as Asians need to have food with their coffees and the high rental costs would 
make it nearly impossible to survive just by selling coffee alone.   
In the case of Dome, all master franchisees are not allowed full autonomy in 
modifying the menu to suit local tastes.  However, the company keeps a close watch 
on any new product innovations that are being introduced by the franchisees.  This is 
critical to maintain the integrity of Dome’s concept as foreign master franchisees are 
often tempted to introduce local fare to satisfy its customers.  The solution is to 
‘domify’ the local food by giving it a Dome appearance.  The food must be 
“colourful, sexy” and “jazz it up to give a fusion theme” so as “to maintain the 
European presence.” 
This limited flexibility to alter its menu is also being practiced by fast food giants 
such as McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) (Watson, 1997; Tanzer, 
1993).  McDonald’s around the world offers the standard menu of hamburgers, 
chicken and fish sandwiches along with its world famous french fries.  Some markets 
offer one or two local items to appeal to customer preferences and to offer variety.  
Examples are durian milk shakes in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, spaghetti in 
the Philippines, mutton burgers and vegetable dishes in India, and corn soup and 
teriyaki burgers in Japan. 
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In contrast, the Body Shop makes no modifications to all its products sold 
worldwide.  The only thing that is different is the retail-mix.  For example, skin care 
products are more popular in Asia, where it is mostly hot and humid, than bath 
products.  Unlike food which is culturally sensitive, hair and skin-care products can be 
considered a ‘global product’ that requires no modification to suit cultural differences. 
6.4 Host Country Risk Management 
Previous research on international franchising has suggested that risk management 
issues such as government policies, regulations, macroeconomic variations and 
monetary uncertainties are important to franchisors (Miller, 1992; Hacket, 1976).  In 
recent years, the greatest growth in international franchising occurred in Asia, South 
America, Central America and Mexico (Arthur Andersen, 1996).  This is because the 
markets of most of the developed countries became increasingly saturated and 
competitive.  Therefore, as more and more foreign franchisors expand to culturally 
diverse countries such as East Asia, host country policy evaluation and foreign 
exchange management are fundamental capabilities that are important for franchisors 
to develop. 
Understanding host country government policies concerning the transfer and 
repatriation of dividends, fees and royalties has been found to be an important 
capability for the international franchisor (Aydin and Kacker, 1990; Lafili and Van 
Ranst, 1990).  The data from this research indicated a different view.  These findings 
are summarised in Table 18.  All the firms, except the Body Shop, conduct very little 
host country government policy evaluation.  The reasons for this could be attributed to 
a lack of resources and a reactive approach to market expansion.   
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TABLE 6:4 
Host Country Risk Management 
 
 
FIRM 
EVALUATE  
GOVERNMENT  
POLICIES  
FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE  
RISK 
Dome · Initially, no active evaluation was conducted as 
most enquires were made unsolicited.  On those 
occasions where information were needed, the 
franchisor had used Austrade and other 
governmental agencies. 
· The regional general manager conducts 
evaluation of government policies after the 
agreement has been signed between the franchisor 
and franchisees. 
· Negotiates and agrees on a fixed US$ for a period 
of between three and six months. 
Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf · Very little evaluation was undertaken by the 
previous owner in their entry into Singapore.  
They didn’t even know where Singapore was.  
· For the current owner, he undertakes evaluation 
of government policies on a ad hoc manner 
because he believes in unsolicited enquires only  
· The franchise fees and royalties were paid in US 
dollars but the details of managing the exchange 
rate are unknown. 
The Body Shop · In the early days, the evaluation of government 
policies was done haphazardly.  However, since 
the company has gone public, it has the resources 
to conduct the evaluation effectively.  
· A very sophisticated exchange risk management 
with the use of forward foreign currency 
contracts. 
Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream · No active evaluation was conducted as most 
enquires were made unsolicited. 
 
· No exchange risk management. 
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If the ability to monitor and evaluate the host country government policies is found 
to be important by previous studies, then this research suggests that the smaller firms 
will be disadvantaged in relation to larger firms.  It may also raise the possibility that 
the smaller firms will rely more heavily on their local master franchisee in the target 
market.  This again increases the power of the master franchisee. 
The complexity of foreign regulations can prove to be difficult fo r a franchisor to 
grasp, as it requires time and money to develop such an expertise.  Advice on such 
issues is available from many franchise consultants and government agencies, but 
may be too expensive for smaller franchisors (Fladmoe-Linquist, 1996).   
In contrast, the Body Shop, which is a public-listed company, is able to evaluate 
foreign government policies effectively because it has both human and financial 
resources to undertake the task. 
As Table 18 indicates, all the firms, except the Body Shop, prefer unsolicited 
enquires to enter into new markets.  They believe that when a potential franchisee has 
taken the initiative in making the first approach, he or she would be aware of the 
magnitude of risk entering the chosen foreign marketplace.  The franchisor also relies 
on potential master franchisees’ knowledge and information on foreign market risk.  
The joint managing director of Royal Copenhagen said: “We never go to them, they 
came to us as…it is the most effective means of recruiting potential master 
franchisees, as we don’t have any resources to undertake international marketing.”   
As the evidence of this study and past research have shown that the desire to 
internationalise was often motivated by a third party, such as a franchisee or a foreign 
national (Welch, 1992), franchisors should analyse the environments of a host country 
in order to evaluate the receptivity of the franchise system.  Furthermore, an erroneous 
decision about a host country can be embarrassing, at best, and detrimental to the  
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brand equity of the franchisor, at worst.  It is suggested that franchisors make use of 
the macro environmental model of international franchising developed by Alon and 
McKee (1999) to evaluate and rate international locations.  The model divides the 
host country factors into economic, demographic, distance and political dimensions.   
The need to mange the effects of exchange rate movement arises from the impact of 
fluctuating home and host country exchange rates on franchise contracts (Huszagh, 
Huszagh, and McIntyre, 1992).  Many franchisors require that some inputs into the 
franchise operation be imported from the home country.  Therefore, any major change 
in the exchange rate can increase the franchisor’s economic exposure.  
As Table 18 indicates, there was no evidence of franchisors, with the exception of 
the Body Shop, possessing this particular capability in managing exchange rate 
movements.  This could be attributed to the complexities in managing exchange rates 
that fluctuate on a daily basis.  Dome negotiated and agreed with all the master 
franchisees on a fixed U.S. dollar exchange rate for between three to six months.  
Meroni (1990) has also found this periodic rate adjustment approach being used by 
international franchisors (Meroni, 1990).   
Dome’s international director explained: “You can have a sophisticated system of 
managing exchange risk, but fixing a rate for a certain period is uncomplicated to 
administer and understand.”  In contrast, the Body Shop has a very sophisticated 
exchange risk management system that involves the use of forward foreign currency 
contracts. 
6.5 Marketing Approach 
Several market entry strategies have found to be used by franchisors in managing their 
foreign franchisees when expanding into Asia (TDB and Arthur Andersen, 1996; 
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Chan and Justis, 1990).  They include master franchising, joint venture, establishing a 
franchising agreement with the local government as master franchisee and regional 
franchising. Table 19 summarises this study’s evidence on the marketing approach 
that is essential to gain a competitive advantage for the franchisee in the foreign 
market.  The constructs included market entry, site location, and market positioning. 
As Table 19 indicates, the most popular form of franchising used in Asia appears to 
be master franchising.  This is consistent with a recent study conducted on U.S. 
franchisors which found that master franchising was the most popular mode of entry 
into distant and cultural dissimilar markets such as Asia (Arthur Andersen, 1996).  
There is, nevertheless, evidence that the sale of a master franchise as a quick ‘off the 
peg’ method of establishing a franchise operation has often encountered problems 
relating to differences in the social, economical and cultural environment of the two 
countries which have necessitated substantial adaptations and modifications to the 
original product, systems and marketing (Forward and Fulop, 1993). 
Many large international franchisors, such as McDonald’s and Kott Koatings, have 
reported to object to master franchising because of the fear of losing control of their 
franchise systems (Ryans Jr., Lotz and Krampf, 1999; Lowell, 1991).  These major 
firms prefer to make investments with their partners or franchisees because it changes 
the relationship and gives them greater control as shareholder of the operating 
companies.  In contrast, master franchising seems to be a popular mode of market 
entry for the four firms in Asia.  This is largely attributed to their lack of financial 
resources to make investment in their overseas operations.   
The study reveals that a unique form of master franchising is practiced in Asia.  
Instead of sub-franchising the units, the master franchisees prefer to own and run the 
entire units.  When the CEO of CBTL was asked why, he said: “The reason is 
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attributed largely to the limited size of the marketplace as the products are targeted at 
specific niche markets rather than the general public…coupled with the high cost of 
rent, franchisees will not be able to be financially viable if the ownership is limited to 
one or two stores.”   
This form of master franchising comes close to what Burton, Cross and Rhodes 
(2000) describe as an area development franchise.  In an area development franchise, 
the area developer is permitted only to establish and operate its own units.  Therefore, 
it is important that the master franchisee is a business or conglomerate corporation, 
rather than an individual, which has the financial and administrative resources to build 
and manage a multi-unit operation.  However, the balance of power in the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship in this case may perhaps be tilted toward the 
franchisee.  Past studies have identified several sources of franchisee power (Hough, 
1986; Brandenberg, 1989; Ralston, 1989; Smith, 1990).  Franchisors are dependent 
upon their franchisees to follow the business format as stipulated so as not to bring the 
franchisor’s name into disrepute (Fulop and Forward, 1997).  Franchisors may also be 
reluctant to challenge disgruntled franchisees for fear of provoking court cases, 
adverse publicity and increased legislation.  Not least, the power of franchisees has 
been enhanced via the increasing growth of multi-outlet and area franchisees in many 
networks (Ralston, 1989). 
Location, widely acknowledged as a determinant of outlet performance, has 
attracted limited attention in the franchising literature (e.g. Falbe and Dandridge, 
1992).  Given the retail focus of franchising, generally and of this study, location 
should be examined as a determinant of outlet performance.  Location is commonly 
cited as “the three secrets of success” for retail business and a “key component of the 
retailing mix” (Brown, 1994, p. 542).   
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TABLE 6:5 
Marketing Approach 
 
FIRM 
MARKET 
ENTRY 
SITE  
LOCATION 
MARKET  
POSITIONING 
Dome · Joint venture with a Singaporean firm 
to expand into seven Asian markets. 
· Master franchising is used to enter 
other markets. 
· The master franchisees in all Asian 
markets own all the outlets rather than 
sub-franchising them. 
· Site approval and help with 
negotiation with the landlord. 
· The first site at each market was 
situated at key strategic locations with 
high visibility. 
 
· European Café concept. 
· “Expensive and exclusive.” 
· “Customers don’t come to Dome to 
eat completely local food.  We’ll give 
it a Dome appearance.  We must 
maintain our European presence.” 
· Positions at the top end. 
· Targets the PMEB. 
· The firm has gone into a suburb and 
has been accepted quite successfully. 
Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf · It entered Singapore, Malaysia and 
Taiwan by master franchising. 
· Prefers to use company-owned stores 
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia and 
US.  Whereas for complex markets 
such as Japan, the Philippines and the 
Middle East, franchising is preferred. 
· The current owner does not allow the 
master franchisees to sub-franchise in 
Asia.  
 
· The first outlets in Singapore and 
Malaysia are in key strategic 
locations with high visibility. 
· The firm targets the youth, who are 
the teens and working adults in their 
twenties. 
· Aligns itself with other major brands 
targeting the youth market. 
· Image to encourage trail but it must 
have good products to achieve brand 
loyalty. 
· The firm has established outlets in the 
suburbs to try and appeal to the 
critical mass. 
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TABLE 19 (continued) 
 
 
FIRM 
MARKET 
ENTRY 
SITE  
LOCATION 
MARKET  
POSITIONING 
The Body Shop · A majority of the firm’s overseas 
stores are franchises. 
· Initially entered Singapore by master 
franchising.  When the franchise 
agreement was terminated, the mode 
changed into company-owned. 
· To allow the head franchisee to own 
all the stores rather than to sub-
franchise them. 
· The fist few outlets in Singapore and 
Hong Kong were in strategic 
locations where British expatriates 
shopped.  
·  In the early days, the business was 
located in alternative sites.  However, 
these days it is situated at all the 
prime locations and there is need for a 
financially stronger player. 
· The brand is positioned as an 
international brand and possesses a 
prestige brand image. 
· The brand also tries to be as inclusive 
as possible by targeting the 18 to 35’s 
female segment. 
Royal Copenhagen Ice Cream · The firm used master franchising 
only when entering the Asian 
markets. 
· The first few locations were not in 
strategic sites and did not serve as a 
showcase to attract franchisees. 
 
· No clear market positioning. 
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As Table 19 indicates, all the stores of the first three successful firms were located 
at high traffic, high visible locations in each Asian market.  This suggests that it is 
critical for an international franchisor to work with an overseas partner in Asia who is 
able to access premium sites, especially for the early ones.  As prime retail space is 
precious and rents are prohibitive, it is important that the foreign partners have real 
estate contacts and financial strength to undertake such a task.  One reason may be 
that in most Asian countries, the cities are the main centers where tourists, expatriates, 
youth and professionals go to for shopping, socialising and entertaining.  
For example, the first site of CBTL was in one of Singapore’s prestigious shopping 
centers in the city.  This was followed by a string of 34 stores located at prime 
shopping sites all over the island state.  Another example is the Body Shop in Hong 
Kong.  Sales of the early stores were disappointing due to their unsuitable locations.  
When the master franchisee decided to locate the stores in Hong Kong’s prestigious 
high-visibility sites, the business experienced a phenomenal increase of over 300 per 
cent in turnover.   
In contrast, the failure of Royal Copenhagen at most of its Asian markets was due to 
wrong locations.  The joint managing director claimed: “We had no choice with the 
locations of two stores which were to be the showcase to attract franchisees…Jollibee 
told us that they already got the locations and they had to build them   they were all 
wrong locations.” 
This has found to be consistent with the location strategy undertaken by a highly 
successful global franchise giant such as McDonald’s.  For example, the master 
franchisee of Japan ignored McDonald’s advice to begin building the stores in the 
suburbs in 1971 (Love, 1995).  McDonald’s first unit in Japan, he argued, had to go in 
the Ginza, the international shopping bazaar in downtown Tokyo.  It is where all new 
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imported products get their initial exposure to the Japanese market.  It is also where 
one million people pass each day, including thousands of Americans.  Since then, 
McDonald’s Japan had expanded to more than 2,400 outlets.   
The data shown in Table 19 indicates that master franchisees are generally expected 
to seek approval from their franchisors in locating new stores.  This suggests that 
franchisors should possess the capability and experience in site selection, as location 
is often the most important ingredient of success for retail business.   
Strong market positioning by the western fast food restaurants has been found to be 
one of the key factors for success in Asia (Love, 1995; Watson, 1997; Wee, 1997).  
This is illustrated by examining the introduction of Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) 
and McDonald’s in Hong Kong (Li and Khan, 1995).  KFC opened the first store in 
Hong Kong in 1973.  Within a short span of 12 months, the firm added 10 units.  
However, two year later KFC closed down all 11 units and withdrew the concept from 
Hong Kong.  It could be attributed to a combination of poor locations and uncertain 
market positioning and pricing.   
The same year that KFC left, McDonald’s arrived, bringing with it an approach 
different from KFC’s.  First, McDonald’s made massive advertising and marketing 
efforts toward its target customers-children and teenagers.  Second, new units were 
added carefully and gradually after intense market research.  Third, a competitive 
pricing strategy positioned the restaurants well in the target market. 
As Table 19 indicates, the three successful firms have very clear ideas of what their 
target markets or niches are.  According to Alexander (1997), niche retailers are 
among the most successful international operations.  Dome’s positioning is 
“expensive and exclusive” as its target market is the professionals, managers, 
executives and businessmen (PMEBs).  CBTL targets the youth market, who are the 
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teens and working adults in their twenties.  The Body Shop is positioned as “an 
international brand and possesses a prestige brand image.”  In contrast, there was little 
mention of market positioning or target market by Royal Copenhagen. 
6.6 Partnership Management 
Franchising provides a unique organisational relationship in which the franchisor and 
franchisee each bring important qualities to the business or partnership (Falbe and 
Dandridge, 1992).  The franchise system enables the advantages of a proven business 
format offered by the franchisor and the local knowledge of the franchisee to join 
together (Stanworth, 1988).  Their joint contribution and interdependence have made 
franchising a very powerful form of organisational structure.   
Table 20 summarises this study’s evidence on the partner relationship management.  
The constructs included partner recruitment, desired characteristics, and relationship 
management.  
Previous research suggests that companies receiving inquiries or proposals from 
prospective or existing franchisees’ or unsolicited enquires was cited by a large 
number of respondents as a key motivator for foreign expansion of U.S. franchisors 
(Arthur Andersen, 1996; Walker, 1989; Hackett, 1976; Walker and Etzel, 1973).   
The data shown in Table 20 indicates that unsolicited enquiries are also likely to be 
a popular means of franchisee recruitment in Asia.  Why do firms in the study show a 
strong preference to use unsolicited enquiries to recruit master franchisees in Asia?  
One reason may be due to a lack of financial resources.  All of the firms did not have 
a budget to actively advertise or exhibit to recruit potential foreign master franchisees.   
The unsolicited approach from a third party was considered to be a highly cost 
effective means to recruit.  The approach in all cases came about accidentally by 
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master franchisees discovering the concepts while holidaying in the home countries or 
one of the firms’ host markets.  For example, Domes Coffee’s Singaporean master 
franchisee discovered the concept after he immigrated to Australia.  The Malaysian 
and Indonesia master franchisees came upon the concept in Singapore.  The Filipino 
franchisee was introduced to Dome by the Malaysian master franchisee.  
The second reason may be the “mouse-trap” mentality adopted by the franchisor.  
This notion stems from the belief that if one builds a better mouse-trap, consumers are 
going to beat a path to the creator.  The unsolicited approach from a third party was 
considered to be more beneficial than actively pursuing potential franchisees through 
advertisements.  The company’s preference for this approach was based on the belief 
that a potential franchisee who initiates the first contact, has normally given a lot of 
thought to the venture, in terms of the degree of risk involved and the amount of 
financial resources required to make it a success (Quinn, 1998).  It was felt that such a 
franchisee would be more likely to take up the franchise, because “he would have 
already liked the concept,” than someone just simply replying to an advertisement in 
the press.   
Although the Body Shop relied on unsolicited enquiries in its early days, it is 
currently pursing a more aggressive approach to attracting franchisees.  As the 
competition within the natural, environmentally friendly cosmetics and toiletries 
market becomes increasingly intensified, there is a need for the firm to be more 
selective in attracting more experienced and higher quality operators.   
The firm’s head of franchise explained: “In the early days, the Body Shop was 
considered an alternative business and therefore we were in secondary locations and 
didn’t cost too much.  However, the firm is sited at all the prime locations and 
therefore there is a need for a financially stronger player.”   
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TABLE 6:6 
Partnership Management 
 
FIRM 
PARTNER 
RECRUITMENT 
DESIRED 
CHARACTERISTICS 
RELATIONSHIP 
MANAGEMENT 
Dome · Unsolicited enquiries.   
· Usually works with those who enquired and 
no ‘trawling’ of the market for any other 
potential candidates 
· These days, the franchise selection process 
is more sophisticated which requires a 
potential franchisee to pay a deposit of 
US$5,000 when submitting the application 
form and business plan. 
 
· The master franchisee’s characteristics the 
firm looks for are financial ability, 
corporate structure and passionate about 
coffee. 
· The master franchisees are entrepreneurial 
individuals in businesses ranging from food 
and beverage and high fashion in Asia. 
· The master franchisees in all markets 
strongly believe in the brand 
 
· Hired a local regional GM who is a highly 
experienced, entrepreneurial and skilful 
manager in the local food industry.  “I’ve 
become a custodian of Dome concepts and 
ideals.” 
· The regional GM is accessible not only to 
top management but also the middle 
managers as well.  
· Established a regional head office in 
Singapore to service the Asian markets. 
· To support the master franchisee in making 
its operation profitable. 
· The regional general manager acts as 
conduit between the franchisor and 
franchisees. 
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
 
 
FIRM 
PARTNER 
RECRUITMENT 
DESIRED 
CHARACTERISTICS 
RELATIONSHIP 
MANAGEMENT 
Coffee Bean & Tea 
Leaf 
· Unsolicited enquiries. 
· A strong believer of the potential franchisee 
making the approach first. 
· The master franchisee has tremendous 
financial resources to operate about 50 
stores in Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. 
· The Asian operations are run by an 
entrepreneurial family who owns an 
entertainment and designer retail company 
· The current owner would look for master 
franchisees who owns a public-listed 
company, has the fund to open between 30 
to 40 outlets and runs a successful business.  
The most important thing he looks for is the 
passion for coffee. 
 
· After the acquisition, a regional office has 
been set up in Singapore to recruit, train 
and support master franchisees in Asia.  
· Having born and lived in Singapore, the 
current owner has extensive knowledge of 
operating in Asia. 
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
 
 
FIRM 
PARTNER 
RECRUITMENT 
DESIRED 
CHARACTERISTICS 
RELATIONSHIP 
MANAGEMENT 
The Body Shop · The early days’ franchisees were recruited 
by unsolicited enquiries.  As the business 
grows larger, it takes on a more proactive 
role in franchisee recruitment. 
· Since the business has grown larger, the 
selection process has been more 
sophisticated and financially focused. 
· Potential head franchisees undergo a 
systematic and rigorous process that 
includes developing a three year business 
plan. 
 
· In the early days, the franchisor selected 
their master franchisees because they were 
liked.  Also, they must be liked-mined on 
what the company was about.  They must 
also be working on the business full-time. 
· The master franchisees are entrepreneurs 
who are liked-mindedness with a 
commitment to social and environmental 
change. 
 
 
· The firm set up a regional office in 
Singapore to carry full profit responsibility 
for its 13 markets in Asia-Pacific. 
· The regional office in Asia is headed by an 
experienced international manager who has 
spent numerous years in the region. 
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TABLE 20 (continued) 
 
 
FIRM 
PARTNER 
RECRUITMENT 
DESIRED 
CHARACTERISTICS 
RELATIONSHIP 
MANAGEMENT 
Royal Copenhagen 
Ice Cream 
· Unsolicited enquiries. 
· The comp any does not believe in actively 
soliciting for its master franchisees. 
· Worked with those who enquired only 
without trawling the market for other 
potentials. 
· Used to select master franchisees who 
primarily had the money.   Now, it would 
not work with anyone who has no retailing 
experience or the ability to function within 
the industry. 
· Worked with master franchisees who could 
not speak English and they presented 
tremendous communication barriers. 
· An ethnic Indian was selected as the master 
franchisee in Thailand who claimed he had 
local knowledge, which he didn’t. 
· Master franchisees must possess these 
characteristics: an organisation, contacts 
with shopping center manages, access to at 
least A$500,000 and experience of take -
away foods. 
 
· No regional field support was provided 
when the firm expanded into Asia. 
· The franchisor fundamentally left the 
running of the business according to the 
master franchisees who possessed the local 
knowledge 
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The evidence of the franchisor becoming more selective in the appointment of its 
overseas master franchisee as the performance of its foreign operations grows is 
consistent with that at Dome.  For example, Dome was unheard of in Asia when it 
first entered Singapore in 1993.  As the number of stores grew in Singapore, it 
attracted numerous unsolicited enquires from travellers around the region.  This has 
enabled Dome to consider several potential candidates in each of its recent markets, 
such as Indonesia and Dubai, to eventually select the right overseas partner. 
As Table 20 indicates, all the cases used master franchising as a means to enter 
markets in Asia.  Therefore it may become critical for a franchisor to identify the 
master franchisee characteristics that are required for success in Asia.  There have 
been several stud ies conducted in determining desired franchisee characteristics 
(Anderson, Clarence and Dunkelberg, 1992; Hing, 1995; Knight, 1986; Stanworth, 
1995; Withane, 1991).  However, no research has hitherto been done, especially in 
Asia, on determining master franchisee characteristics.  The published articles on this 
matter tend to be mostly of the trade magazine variety.   
The data in Table 20 show that the master franchisee characteristics associated with 
success in Asia are financial strength, entrepreneurial and like-mindedness.  As Table 
19 indicates, master franchisees in Asia, instead of practicing sub-franchising, prefer 
to own and operate all their stores.  Therefore, it is critical that the master franchisee 
has the financial resources to own multiple units.  This suggests that the master 
franchisee is likely to be a business or conglomerate corporation.   
For example, the master franchisee of CBTL, who owns a highly successful luxury 
watch distributorship and regional entertainment company in Asia, owns and operates 
63 outlets in Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan.  Another example is the Body Shop’s 
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Japanese master franchisee, which has the country’s third largest supermarket chain, 
owns and operates 114 shops in Japan.   
In a study of 36 New Zealand franchisees within a single retail franchise system, 
Fenwick and Strombom (1998) found that higher performing franchisees behaved 
more as employees of the franchisor rather than as independent entrepreneurs.  This 
finding is consistent with the view that franchisees are midway between independent 
entrepreneurs and employee managers on an independence-dependence continuum, 
with greater motivation and commitment than expected from an employee manager 
(Knight, 1984; Withane, 1991).   
The franchisee’s decision-making independence does allow for entrepreneurship in 
local market development and may benefit the franchisor indirectly (Dandridge and 
Falbe, 1994).  Whether the entrepreneurial behaviour  results in better than average 
performance for the franchisee will depend upon the peculiarities of the local market, 
the abilities of franchisee and the effectiveness of the franchise system itself (Fenwick 
and Strombom, 1998). 
Although these studies were conducted on domestic franchisees, they imply that a 
master franchisee’s entrepreneurial flair will have an impact on a franchisor’s 
overseas performance.  This has been evident with the case of McDonald’s.  The 
company’s phenomenal international growth by recruiting and training individuals 
with motivation and entrepreneurial talent has been reported in several sources 
(McDonald’s: Hong Kong Individuals Before Investors, 1991; Love, 1995; Watson, 
1997).  This practice has also been found to be consistent with the findings of the four 
firms. 
The data shown in Table 20 indicate that the success of the franchisor operating in a 
completely different culture in Asia may depend on the entrepreneurial ability of the 
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overseas partner.  The partner should be able to give the foreign brand a homegrown 
flavour without deviating from the fundamentals that made the concept work in the 
home country.   
For example, CBTL’s ex-master franchisee in Singapore started working in the 
family business when he was 15 years old.  When his father died, he inherited the 
business at 29 years old.  The family business owns a luxury watch distributorship in 
Indonesia, music retail in Malaysia and a regional entertainment company in 
Singapore.  Four years after opening the first store in Singapore, the business has 
grown to 63 outlets in the Asian region.  In December 2000, he was awarded 
Entrepreneur of the Year by Singapore Tourism Board.   
Another example is the co-founder of The Body Shop franchise in Malaysia.  Since 
she opened the first store in 1984, the business has grown to its current 29 outlets.  In 
recognition of her efforts in the world of business, she was awarded the 1993 
Entrepreneur of the Year by PENIAGAWATI (The Association of Bumiputra 
Business and Professional Women). 
Although it is important that master franchisees in Asia demonstrate great 
entrepreneurial talent, the data in Table 20 indicate that they should also be able to 
“take instructions” from the franchisors.  This is consistent with Knight’s (1984) and 
Withane’s (1991) view that the franchisee is an intermediate between an employee 
manager and independent owner in terms of decision-making independence.  The 
extent of this independence will vary between franchise systems according to the 
constraints imposed by each franchise agreement. 
The Royal Copenhagen case illustrates that the entrepreneurial flair of the foreign 
master franchisees should be closely managed by the franchisor to achieve success.  
All the firm’s ex-master franchisees in Asia were considered as entrepreneurs in their 
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own rights.  However, they were given great latitude in managing the franchise 
operations in their own markets.  This has resulted in poor sales performance and 
inconsistent brand image in all the firm’s markets in Asia.   
Although the first two characteristics are highly desired, all the four franchisors, 
except Royal Copenhagen, hastened to add that the most important ingredient they 
seek in a foreign partner is like-mindedness.  This enables the franchisor not only the 
ability to develop a bond with the franchisee quickly but also the opportunity to 
develop “brand champion.”    
The Body Shop case illustrates the importance of franchisors working with like-
minded partners.  When selecting its head franchisees, the Body Shop selectively 
seeks business people whom not only “ have the commercials sense, financial ability, 
and managerial ability to do it but also like-mindedness with a commitment to social 
and environmental change.”  The founder and all the master franchisees share the 
company’s principle of commitment to the environment and community.  Each shop 
encourages its employees to participate in community service projects and allows 
them up to four paid hours per month to do so.   
The strong shared va lue between the franchisor and franchisees has also resulted in 
the franchisees becoming brand champions of the Body Shop.  For example, during 
the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the master franchisee in Hong Kong, who is a great 
believer of the brand, was undeterred in the face of a retail slump to continue her plan 
to open six new stores (Gopalan, 1997).   
In contrast, Royal Copenhagen’s ex-master franchisees in Asia were principally 
interested in “making money” and lacked the “passion” for the brand.  Consequently, 
when the retail slump occurred as a result of the Asian financial crisis, the firm’s ex-
master franchisees immediately abandoned the stores to concentrate on their other 
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businesses.  This evidence is supported by the experience of several U.S. international 
franchisors who have failed in certain overseas markets because their selection of the 
master franchisees were based strictly on their ability to invest (Maynard, 1995).   
Variations in cultural norms such as power distance, Confucian dynamism, and 
individualism can affect local implementation by international firms (Hofstede, 1990; 
Hofstede and Bond, 1988).  According to Perlmutter and Hennan (1986), 
compatibility between partners is the most important factor in the endurance of a good 
alliance and differences between national cultures, if not understood, can lead to poor 
communication, mutual distrust and the end of the alliance.  As Table 20 indicates, all 
the firms, except for Royal Copenhagen, have representatives based in Singapore who 
have extensive knowledge of business practices in Asia who acts as “a conduit 
between the franchisor and master franchisees.”   
The regional general manager of Dome is a Singaporean who is a highly 
experienced manager with an intimate knowledge of the Asian culture.  He considers 
this as an important lesson for foreign franchisors when dealing with master 
franchisees in Asia.  Due to cultural differences, the foreign franchisor is often 
regarded by the master franchisee never to fully understand the intricacies of the 
Asian culture.  Therefore, most franchisor’s ideas, policies and suggestions are 
viewed as questionable in their application to the local market environment. 
The research of culture that has consistently received recognition by both scholars 
and practitioners is the work of Hofstede (1980; 1983; 1984).  Hofstede’s four 
dimensions of individualism versus collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, 
and power distance have been well documented in the literature in the past two 
decades (Abratt, Nel and Higgs, 1992; Geletkanycz, 1997; Vitell, Nwachukwu, and 
Barnes, 1993).  Hofstede and Bond (1988) recently developed a fifth dimension, 
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Confucian Dynamism, which is designed to assess a culture’s tendency toward certain 
Confucian traits such as concept of time.   
Studies conducted by Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede and Bond (1988) suggest that 
Asian managers, as opposed to their Western counterparts, are large power distance, 
weak uncertainty avoidance, collectivistic, moderately masculine, and long-term 
orientation individuals.  For instance, the foreign franchisor may be task-oriented and 
favour quick results, while the Asian master franchisee has a long-term view and is 
more oriented towards building a long-term relationship with the franchisor.  Such 
cultural differences will likely create tensions and increase the probability of conflict 
between the partners (Moran, 1980).  Successful franchising in East Asia, therefore, 
requires both an understanding of the business and the partners’ cultures.   
When the regional head of franchising of the Body Shop was asked on managing 
partners in Asia, he said: “It is about relationship and therefore you have to spend 
more time with them than in Europe.  In the West, you can get on with the business 
but in Asia, they don’t really tell you what they are thinking as they are not 
confrontational, therefore you have to spend a lot of time with them to find out what it 
is.”   
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7 FINDINGS 
 
All of the four proposed relationships were strongly supported except for P4.  This 
could be attributed to three out of four cases, being small firms, were found lacking 
either in having the resources or capability in managing host country’s risk.  
However, the Body Shop, which is a large multinational company, has been found to 
have this particular capability.  However, the results from this study indicate that this 
capability will improve with time as a firm gains resources and international 
experience.  The study has made a significant contribution in identifying two new 
categories that have mostly been neglected by researchers in international franchising.   
7.1 Propositions Discussed 
The four research propositions are discussed in this section.  The first proposition 
addressed was as follows: 
P1: The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in distance management. 
Strong capability in distance management, which includes the constructs of control 
and monitoring, field support, key staff management, information exchange, and 
franchisee training, was found to enhance success in international franchising in East 
Asia.  This ability also serves as an effective mechanism for controlling franchisee 
opportunism (Norton, 1988).  From the four cases, the results indicate that a foreign 
franchisor needs to spend considerable time with the master franchisees in East Asia 
in order to master this capability of distance management that is unique in the region.  
This suggests that the franchisor must own a successful domestic operation, with 
strong administrative and management support, that allows one to spend considerable 
time away from the business.   
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The second proposition addressed was as follows: 
P2 The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in handling contract 
negotiations and enforcement. 
With regards to contract enforcement, the study found that it is not the franchisors, 
but their solicitors, who are important in having the ability to negotiate contractual 
medications and contract enforcement.  This indicates that having the appropriate 
solicitor who specializes in international franchising will compensate for the lack of 
ability of the franchisors to negotiate contractual modifications and handle contract 
enforcement.  The negotiating power of a franchisor is dependent on the degree of 
success the franchise brand enjoys in the region.  Therefore, it will be extremely 
difficult for a foreign franchise firm, which expands into East Asia for the first time, 
to impose a high upfront franchise fee to reduce franchise opportunism.   
This should be worrying for any potential foreign franchisor, especially when it is 
found that most East Asian master franchisees have a tendency to highjack the 
franchise brand.  The possible solutions to this predicament are to (1) have a highly 
reputable and experienced solicitor in international franchising to handle contractual 
negotiations with East Asian master franchisees, (2) ensure that intellectual property 
laws are enforceable in the host countries, and (3) avoid making drastic modifications 
to the business format in the host countries that becomes significantly different to the 
original one.  However, lawyers often are adversarial and can potentially complicate 
understandings between the franchisor and franchisees with legal terminology (Lane 
and Beamish, 1990).  This suggests that there is a need for a franchisor to develop 
capabilities in contractual modifications and negotiation over time. 
The third proposition addressed was as follows: 
P3 The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in cultural adaptability. 
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Cultural adaptability was found to influence the performance of international 
franchisor in East Asia.  This indicates that the franchisor should not only adapt the 
product, price and business format but the way franchisee relationship is traditionally 
being managed in the domestic market if success is to be had in East Asia.  The study 
also found that franchisors practice both standardisation and adaptation in their 
international operations in East Asia.  This practice emanates from the concern of the 
franchisors in losing the integrity of the franchise concept, which is found in the 
standardisation of the business format, if too many alterations to the franchise’s core 
product or service are being made.  Standardisation is found in the franchise brand 
image and value while adaptation, albeit allowed on some of its products or services, 
is being closely monitored by franchisors. 
The fourth proposition was as follows: 
P4 The success of international franchising in East Asia will be 
contingent on having a strong capability in host country risk 
management, including host country policy evaluation and foreign 
exchange management. 
This study has found that smaller franchise firms do not possess strong capability in 
host country risk management.  The complexity of foreign regulations can be difficult 
for a smaller franchise firm to grasp, as it requires a considerable amount of time and 
money to develop such a capability.  This research indicates that the smaller firms 
rely heavily on their local master franchisees in the target market.  This behaviour  
results in smaller franchise firms preferring unsolicited enquiries when entering into 
cultural distant markets such as East Asia.  Therefore, it is important for a smaller 
franchise firm to work with a master franchisee in East Asia who has the capability to 
evaluate foreign country government policies.  However, as the Body Shop indicates, 
large firms are found to possess the capability to effectively evaluate foreign 
government policies and mange foreign exchange risk.  Therefore, this proposition is 
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not being rejected, as it deserves to be researched further with the inclusion of large 
franchise firms in the sample. 
7.2 The Model 
Using coding techniques (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 1993), key categories 
were first identified from the literature research and then further developed with 
findings from the primary research.  Two new categories called ‘Marketing 
Approach’ and ‘Partnership Management’ have emerged from this research.   
This model (Figure 2) shows the six main categories and factors as found in the 
research.  The key factors within each category are listed below to show the areas of 
activity that should be performed by an international franchisor to achieve success in 
East Asia.   
Category: Distance Management 
Factors: 
· Have adequate resources to provide control and monitoring system (including a 
detailed audit and reporting system) to ensure product consistency and quality. 
· Have adequate resources to provide local field support. 
· Have the resources and capability to manage key staff of master franchisees. 
· Need to exchange information or communicate regularly with the master 
franchisees. 
· Have the resources to provide franchisees training (initial and continuous) in 
foreign markets. 
 
Category: Contract Enforcement 
Factors: 
· Have a solicitor who specializes in international franchising law to negotiate 
contractual modifications. 
 197 
· Need to work very hard to achieve success quickly in the early markets to gain the 
power to negotiate with future master franchisees to obtain higher fees, royalties 
and levies. 
· Need to ensure that intellectual property is well protected when operating in East 
Asia. 
· Need to possess a high level of proprietary capabilities to reduce franchisee 
opportunism in East Asia. 
 
Category: Cultural Adaptability 
Factors: 
· Have clear concept standardisation (including brand and product policies) that is 
strictly adhered to by all master franchisees. 
· Work closely together with master franchisees in East Asia to make limited 
modifications to the business format and products to suit local market needs. 
· Monitor closely any product modifications and innovations introduced by the 
master franchisees to maintain the integrity of the concept. 
 
Category: Host Country Risk Management 
Factors: 
· Work with master franchisees who have the capability to undertake evaluation of 
foreign country government policies. 
· Develop a cost effective system of managing foreign exchange risk, which is 
uncomplicated to administer and understand. 
 
Category: Marketing Approach 
Factors: 
· Need to adopt a relatively riskier market entry mode (i.e. master franchising to 
joint ventures) as international experience and resources grow to gain greater 
control and financial returns. 
· Need to have site locations that are situated on premium sites in East Asia.  
· Need to have clear market positioning in East Asia. 
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     FIGURE 7:1 
 A Model of CSFs of International Franchising in East Asia 
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Category: Partnership Management 
Factors: 
· Need to adopt a more aggressive proactive approach in recruiting of potential 
overseas master franchisee or partner. 
· Have master franchisees who possess the characteristics of financial strength, 
entrepreneurial and like-mindedness. 
· Need to demonstrate a commitment to establish a long term working relationship 
with the master franchisees in East Asia. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study attempts to answer several research questions, based on concepts discussed 
in international franchising literature.  The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the 
findings from the research to determine the critical success factors of international 
franchising in East Asia.  Firstly, the three research questions are answered.  Then, 
this is followed by a presentation of the conclusions.  Finally, various 
recommendations for future research are made. 
8.1 Answering the Research Questions 
The first question examines how foreign franchisors expand into East Asia.  As 
previously discussed, master franchising has been the most popular market entry 
mode used by foreign firms to franchise into distant and culturally dissimilar countries 
such as East Asia.  The franchisor is able to expand rapidly in a foreign market by 
taking advantage of the foreign franchisee’s capital and local knowledge.  Although 
this market entry mode is low in risk, it also suffers from low in control and returns.  
This has led to large international franchisors such as McDonald’s (Ryans Jr., Lotz 
and Krampf, 1999) and Kott Koatings (Lowell, 1991) preferring to use joint venture 
to gain greater control and returns of their overseas operations.   
As firms gain in international experience and financial strength, it is evident that 
they would switch to market entry modes (i.e. joint venture or sole venture) that 
would provide them greater control and returns of their overseas operations, as is seen 
in the Body Shop and Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf cases.  Dome may well need to 
consider adopting joint venture if it desires higher control and returns in the future.  
However, master franchising appears to be a popular mode of market entry for 
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franchisors, especially for small-  to medium-sized firms, in their initial entry into East 
Asia.   
This study suggests that a unique form of master franchising is being practiced in 
East Asia.  The master franchisees prefer to own and manage, rather than sub-
franchising, all the units in their territories.  The reason is largely attributed to the 
limited size of the marketplace as these foreign products are targeted at niches, which 
would make the venture financially unviable if the ownership is limited to one or two 
stores.  Therefore, it is important that the master franchisee is a business or 
conglomerate corporation, rather than an individual, which has the financial and 
administrative resources to develop and manage multiple units.  In the case of Dome, 
its master franchisees in East Asia are operators of successful businesses in high 
fashion, real estate development and food and beverage.   
The second question deals with how foreign franchisors manage their overseas 
partners in East Asia.  It is evident from the cases that effective partnership 
management in East Asia commences with the franchisor recruiting the right partners 
with the desired characteristics and subsequently developing a long-term mutually 
beneficial working relationship with the partners.   
This study indicates that there is a difference between the approach to overseas 
expansion between small and large franchises.  Small franchises tend to adopt a 
reactive approach via unsolicited enquires in their early stages of their overseas 
expansion.  The reasons appear to be two fold.  One relates to a lack of financial 
resources.  All the firms, except the Body Shop, did not have a budget to actively 
advertise or exhibit to recruit potential master franchisees.  The second stems from the 
belief that a potential franchisee who initiates the first contact is likely to take up the 
franchise because he or she has already experienced the concept and liked it.    
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As a firm’s size, international experience and financial resources grow, it is evident 
that it increasingly adopts a more aggressive approach to recruiting franchisees, as is 
seen in the Body Shop and Dome cases.  This is due to a need in attracting more 
experienced and higher quality operators to achieve a strong competitive foothold in 
the overseas markets.   
This evolutionary, sequential build-up of foreign commitments by franchises over 
time is consistent with the “theory of export internationalisation” widespread in 
export behaviour research (Bilkey, 1978; Cavusgil, 1984; Reid, 1981).  According to 
this theory, a firm’s resource commitment towards its overseas expansion increases as 
its foreign market experience and knowledge increases over time. 
The study has found that the master franchisee characteristics most associated with 
success in East Asia are financial strength, entrepreneurial and like-mindedness, as 
evident in the cases of Dome, the Body Shop and the Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf.  It is 
important to note that all these three characteristics should be found in a master 
franchisee.   
An excellent example is Royal Copenhagen, which failed in East Asia because its 
ex-master franchisees, albeit highly entrepreneurial, had little financial resources and 
were not like-minded.  Therefore, not only should the master franchisee be financially 
strong and highly entrepreneurial, it should also share the same value with the 
franchisor.  This will result in the franchisees becoming “brand champions” so that 
they will not abandoned the stores to concentrate on their other businesses during 
tough economic times, as evidence in the cases of Dome, Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf 
and the Body Shop. 
This study reveals that the success of managing partners in East Asia depends on 
the ability of the franchisor to reduce franchisee opportunism, by constantly adding 
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value to the relationship and demonstrating a commitment towards a long-term 
meaningful working relationship with the partners.  The failure of the franchisor to 
successfully manage partners in East Asia may result in its intellectual property being 
clandestinely “hijacked,” brand equity considerably reduced, and concept 
significantly altered. 
As previously discussed, the franchisor may reduce franchisee opportunism by legal 
enforcement, the payment of an upfront franchise fee, and close control and 
monitoring of franchisees.  The study indicates that the power of the franchisor to 
impose these conditions positively relates to the performance of its concept in East 
Asia, as evidenced in the case of Dome and the Body Shop.  Although previous 
studies have found the ability of the firm to negotiate contractual modifications (Root, 
1987; 1992) and handle contract enforcement as important for successful international 
development, this study did not find strong evidence among the cases studied of such 
ability.  This perhaps could be attributed to the size of the firms, which prevents the 
hiring of an in-housed legal counsel, and the inability of the franchisor to comprehend 
the complexities of international law.  Therefore, small- to medium-sized firms rely 
heavily on the professional expertise and advice of their solicitors who are specialists 
in the area of domestic and international franchising.  However, lawyers often are 
adversarial and can potentially complicate understandings between the franchisor and 
franchisees with legal terminology (Lane and Beamish, 1990).  This suggests that 
there is a need for a franchisor to develop capabilities in contractual modifications and 
negotiation over time. 
The payment of an upfront fee, especially a significant amount, prevents the 
franchisees in acting opportunistically.  However, this study suggests that the upfront 
fee, if not significantly large enough, may not be effective in reducing franchisee 
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opportunism in East Asia.  As previously mentioned, successful franchising in East 
Asia depends on working with a business or conglomerate corporation, rather than an 
individual, which has the financial and administrative resources to develop and 
manage multiple units.  Therefore, the franchisee fee should be significant enough, 
well above A$300,000, to “hurt” the company if it acts opportunistically. 
In East Asia, it is appears that master franchisees may be tempted to hijack the 
brand once they have gained the operational know-how in running the business.  This 
is consistent with a study conducted by Lane and Beamish (1990) on 66 joint ventures 
in Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Caribbean Region.  They found that 
many alliances in these countries collapsed after the simple technology provided by 
the foreign parent had been assimilated by the local partner and no upgrading was 
provided.  The local partner felt that there was no longer a major advantage for the 
foreign partner and consequently would strike out alone.  Therefore, it is important 
that the franchisor continuously provides value to the master franchisees and 
possesses a set of proprietary capabilities so as to avoid being regarded as 
superfluous.  An excellent example is Dome’s proprietary knowledge, experience and 
expertise in product (i.e. coffee roasting and ‘fusion’ cuisine), marketing, operation, 
and retail management that it constantly shares with the master franchisees. 
This study reveals that franchisors should demonstrate a willingness to establish a 
long-term relationship with the partners in East Asia.  This means that the franchisor 
has to spend a considerable amount of time to get to know the franchisees both 
personally and professionally, as evidenced in Dome and the Body Shop cases.  Due 
to cultural differences, the foreign franchisor is not expected to fully understand the 
intricacies of the East Asian culture.  To overcome this difficulty, the franchisor is to 
hire a representative to be based in East Asia who has extensive knowledge of East 
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Asian culture and business practices.  This representative acts as a conduit between 
the franchisor and master franchisees in East Asia. 
The final question examines why some foreign franchisors are more successful in 
East Asia than others.  With respect to this question, the answers of the two previous 
research questions have already provided several valuable lessons.  There are also 
lessons to be learnt in how the franchisor approaches the issue of adaptability to suit 
local market needs, how the franchisor evaluates the risk of entering a foreign market, 
and what marketing approaches to pursue in the respective foreign markets.   
With respect to the issue of adaptability, this study suggests that franchisors practice 
both standardisation and adaptation at the same time.  This is valuable.  From the 
cases studied, a foreign franchisor is required to make adaptations to the business 
format when franchising in East Asia or any international market.  Modifications may 
often be needed not just in the recipes and menu selections, but in the operations as 
well (Sadi, 1994).  However, standardisation is strictly adhered to by successful 
franchisors on branding to ensure that the brand image and value is being perceived 
consistently by its target customers in all markets, as evidenced in Dome, the Body 
Shop and Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf cases.   
An excellent example is Dome’s approach to adaptation in East Asia.  The firm’s 
branding, image, marketing principles and core product (i.e. coffee) are standardised 
across all markets.  However, it allows 30 per cent of the firm’s menu to be modified 
by the master franchisees to suit local tastes.  It is evident from the cases studied that 
the master franchisees in East Asia are often tempted to introduce local fare to satisfy 
its customers.  Therefore, it is important that the franchisors monitor their franchisees 
closely on any new product innovations that might undermine the integrity of the 
concept. 
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Although previous research on international franchising has suggested that it is 
important for a franchisor to possess the capability of evaluating and/or managing 
foreign country’s risk (Miller, 1992; Hacket, 1976), this study did not find strong 
evidence among the cases studied of such ability.  The reason could be attributed to 
the use of unsolicited enquiries to enter overseas markets, which places the onus on 
the potential franchisees to demonstrate that it is relatively risk free to enter the 
chosen foreign marketplace.  Therefore, the reactive internationalisation approach 
undertaken by most franchisors has precluded them from developing strong capability 
in foreign country risk management. 
With regards to marketing approaches, it is evident from the cases studied that 
excellent location and strong market positioning are critical to achieving success in 
foreign markets.  In the case of Dome, the Body Shop and Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf, 
all their stores were located at high traffic, high visible locations in all their markets in 
East Asia.  Therefore, it is critical for a franchisor to work with an overseas partner in 
East Asia who is able to access premium sites, which are precious and prohibitively 
expensive. 
This study has found that strong market positioning is critical in gaining a 
competitive advantage for the franchise operation in the foreign marketplace.  As 
evidenced by the cases studied, Dome, the Body Shop and Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf 
have very clear ideas of what their target markets are.  It appears that these firms are 
pursing niches, which include professionals, teenagers and young working adults (see 
Chapter 3 for a demographic and psychographic description of various key market 
segments in Singapore), which offer high potential for success and profits.   
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8.2 Conclusions 
The key aim of this study was to identify possible critical success factors of 
international franchising in East Asia.  Initially a synthesis of the available literature 
showed that key success factors could be categorised into distance management, 
contract enforcement, cultural adaptability, host country risk management, marketing 
approach and partnership management.  However, it was unclear as to the component 
factors, which could be included within these categories.  This lack of information 
was largely caused by a paucity of research in the area. 
The research in this study enabled a model to be established and the component 
factors within each category to be explored and listed.  They key findings are briefly 
summarised under each main category of the model: 
· Distance Management – Successful franchisors have an effective management 
support system for store openings, close cont rol and monitoring, training (initial 
and continuous), and regular communication to reduce franchisee opportunism 
in East Asia.  This can be best achieved by the provision of local field support. 
· Contract Enforcement – Franchisors work with solicitors who are highly 
experienced and knowledgeable in international franchising law to negotiate 
contractual modifications and contract enforcement.  However, the power of the 
franchisor to negotiate on fees, restrictions and performance depends largely on 
how successful the concept has performed so far in East Asia and the extent of 
the firm’s proprietary capabilities. 
· Cultural Adaptability – Standardisation is strictly enforced by successful 
franchisors on branding across all markets in East Asia.  However, restric ted 
modifications are allowed on products, business format and service delivery to 
reflect cultural differences in East Asia.  Successful franchisors monitor product 
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modifications and innovations by the East Asian franchisees closely to ensure 
that the integrity of the franchise concept is maintained. 
· Host Country Risk Management – Franchisors appear not overly concerned 
about evaluating foreign country policies because of their trust and reliance on 
foreign franchisees’ local knowledge and information.  Simple and 
unsophisticated risk management methods are used by franchisors to manage 
foreign exchange risk. 
· Marketing Approach – Master franchising is the most popular market entry 
mode for foreign franchisors entering East Asia.  Having stores in premium 
locations and strong market positioning are highly essential in competing 
successfully in East Asia.  The master franchisees of successful franchisors are 
found to have the financial capabilities and contacts to access premium retail 
locations in the respective East Asian cities.  Successful franchisors are also 
found to practice niche marketing to target markets such as professionals, 
teenagers and young working adults. 
· Partnership Management – Unsolicited enquiries are preferred by foreign 
franchisors when entering East Asia.  However, as a firm gains international 
experience and resources, it increasingly adopts an aggressive approach to 
recruit potential master franchisees.  The master franchisee characteristics 
closely associated with success in East Asia  are financial strength, 
entrepreneurial and like-mindedness.  Effective management of partners in East 
Asia is only achieved when the franchisor and franchisees commit to a close 
working relationship.  This relationship can be developed rapidly by the hiring 
of an experienced manager who has an intimate knowledge of the East Asian 
culture. 
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8.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
There clearly needs to be more research performed to further investigate and validate 
the categories and factors within the categories for successful international franchising 
in East Asia.  Based on the findings of the cases studied, several directions for future 
research are recommended. 
The conceptual model that has been constructed in this research can be further 
developed and used in three ways.  Firstly, further inductive studies, involving various 
franchisors competing in a specific industry (e.g. bookstores, fast- food restaurants, 
personal service, etc.) or country (e.g. China, Singapore or the Philippines) can be 
carried out to check on the scope of the categories and factors.  Such an exercise 
would add to the robustness and validity of the models (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Secondly, the model can also be used to make meaningful comparisons of case 
study analysis of franchisors of different origins in a specific geographical region (e.g. 
North Asia, East Asia or Southeast Asia) or country (Japan, Indonesia or Malaysia).  
Such comprehensive studies would provide valuable insights into the different 
competitive strategies employed or competitive advantages enjoyed by different 
franchisors (say between a Singaporean and an Australian franchisor). 
Thirdly, the model serves a useful platform for hypothesis testing using quantitative 
techniques to validate the correlation between the categories and factors.  Following 
this, multivariate data analysis can be used to determine if there exists any 
relationship between these factors and firm’s performance.  This would allow 
researchers to draw more general conclusions.  The possible hypotheses for this 
quantitative study could include: 
H1: There are statistically significant differences in the critical success factors 
of international franchising between small and large firms. 
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H2:  Franchisors who possess strong capability in distance management will 
result in achieving high performance in international franchising. 
 
H3: Franchisors who possess a strong capability in contract enforcement will 
result in achieving high performance in international franchising. 
 
H4:  Franchisors who possess a strong capability in cultural adaptability will 
result in achieving high performance in international franchising. 
 
H5: Franchisors who possess a strong capability in host country risk 
management will result in achieving high performance in international 
franchising. 
H6:  Franchisors who possess a strong capability in marketing approach will 
result in achieving high performance in international franchising. 
 
H7: Franchisors who posses a strong capability in partnership management will 
result in achieving high performance in international franchising 
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10 APPENDIX A: GUIDELINE FOR INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
§ Background information and company history 
1. When, how and why did the business begin?  
2. Who are the owners involved in the business?  
3. How did you begin franchising domestically? 
4. When did you first go overseas? When did you expand into Asia? 
5. Why and how did you go into Asia? 
6. Why did you select the particular market entry mode to enter Asia? 
7. Which country did you first enter and why? 
8. Which Asian markets are you operating now? 
9. Have you used the same market entry mode for all the Asian markets?  Why? 
 
§ Distance Management 
10. How do you control and monitor your franchisees’ performance? 
11. What difficulties have you faced in managing your franchisees in Asia? 
12. What support do you provide your franchisees in Asia?  
13. How often do you communicate with your franchisees in Asia? 
14. What sort of information do you communicate with your franchisees? 
 
§ Contract Enforcement 
15. Who are involved from both sides during the negotiations? 
16. What were the major issues considered during the negotiations of the franchise 
agreement? 
17. How different is the international franchise agreement compared to the 
domestic one? 
18. Did you face any difficulties in negotiating with the Asian partners? 
19. How much are the franchise fees, royalties and levies? 
20. Have you experienced any difficulties in enforcing the contract with the Asian 
partners? 
21. Have you experienced any difficulties in the protection of the company’s 
intellectual property in Asia? 
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§ Cultural Adaptability 
22. Do you practice adaptation in Asia?  Why and what are they? 
23. How do you know how much to adapt in Asia? 
24. How do you know if the adaptation will work? 
25. What resources do you have in managing adaptation and innovation? 
26. Are there any other cultural issues that would require adaptation of the 
business? 
 
§ Host Country Risk Management 
27. Did you evaluate foreign government policies before you entered the market? 
Why or why not? 
28. What were the foreign government policies you evaluated? 
29. What resources do you have in evaluating foreign government policies? 
30. How do you manage foreign exchange risk? 
31. Are there any other issues in managing the risk of entering overseas market? 
 
 
